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MOTIVATIONAL MESSAGES: DIRECT CONTACT AND TURNOUT
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Directed by: Professor Jerome Mileur
The following project attempts to connect one type of campaigning, direct contact, to
voter turnout. Direct contact is defined as any type of campaign communication that is
directed from the campaign at an individual voter. Most direct contacts are either
telephone calls or direct mail pieces. The working assumption is that campaign activities
matter in determining voter turnout apart from the demographic, political, and
psychological characteristics of individual voters. Four congressional districts, two from
1994 and two from 1996, are chosen for analysis. Data is collected on the direct contact
efforts of the eight campaigns taking place within the four congressional districts. The
direct contact information is then coded onto voter files containing the actual turnout
information, age, and party registration of each voter. Using logistic regression, the
effects of direct contact are analyzed while controlling for past voter history, age, and
party affiliation.
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CHAPTER 1
WHY STUDY VOTER CONTACT?
Why should we care about political campaigns'^ Clearly, people do. American
elections are frequent, expensive, noisy, and controversial. Various actors with different
roles spend the better part of their adult lives studying elections, participating in
campaigns, or commenting on the electoral process. Most books on campaigns and
elections will begin with a sentence or two on the importance of elections to
Democracy. The following example is typical:
Elections are important because they allow us freedom to actively
participate m selecting our leaders. They are the core of democracy.
Nowhere in the world are more people more freely engaged in active,
responsible participation in the choice of leadership than in the United
States.
. . .[T]he political election campaign is an essential element of a
democratic system.'
Most Americans will agree with the assertions above. Indeed, they are so
commonplace as to be uninteresting. Still, there is some ambiguity in the third sentence
'Nowhere in the world are more people more freely engaged in active, responsible
participation in the choice of leadership than in the United States". The authors cannot
mean voter turnout which is lower in the United States than in most other industrial
democracies. If not voters, then the authors must be referring to the large number of
citizens involved in the electoral process itself ranging from donors to candidates. This
presents a picture of a relatively large number of involved citizens and a mass of
comparatively indifferent voters.
‘ Trent. Judith and Robert V. Friedenberg. Political ('ampaign Coiiiinunicaiion (New York,
Praeger, 2nd Ed 1990) Page 3.
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The following study addresses the question of campaign effects on participation
by looking at the one campaign effort most closely related to voter turnout, direct
campaign contacts, and measuring that activity's effects on the probability of voter
turnout. Direct contact is any campaign effort aimed at individual voters for a specific
purpose. This definition differentiates direct contact campaigning from the electronic
media in that TV and Radio, even when targeted, cannot be aimed at a specific voter but
only masses of people, a preponderance ofwhom may show the desired demographic
characteristics. Although the advent of cable and satellite television has greatly
increased the range of targeting available to candidates using the airwaves, electronic
media is still only aimed at groups, not individuals. The source of voter names for a
direct contact effort is an enhanced file of registered voters. The delivery system used
is usually direct mail, phone calls, or door-to-door contact. As a method for reaching
specific voters with a targeted message, direct voter contact is only one of many
campaign techniques designed to influence voter perceptions and turnout through the
provision of campaign controlled information. Thus, direct contact is best viewed as a
specific type of campaign communication. Until quite recently academic research has
ignored campaign effects and focused research energy on demographic, social,
psychological and institutional voting determinants. These studies produced powerful
paradigms for the analysis of voter turnout and participation. However, to change the
question which introduced this chapter from, "Why care about political campaigns'^" to
the more specific "Why care about the effects of direct contact on voter turnout?"
requires the addition of campaign actions to the voter turnout model. This addition, and
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the implications it entails, is of great interest to reformers, scholars, and practitioners
alike.
Campaign reformers pursue the dual goal of making the system more fair and
more participatory. "Fairness” is generally defined in terms of money and message
content while "participation" is defined in terms of voter turnout. The usually unstated
model is that the money goes into a set of messages and practices which are unsavory
enough to depress voter turnout. An analysis of campaign efforts to increase turnout
may require a shift in the reformist model by showing that in some circumstances the
spending of campaign money may increase political participation. Likewise, it may
point out that it is not so much the amount of money being spent by campaigns as it is
the allocation among competing campaign technologies which deserve the analysis and
attention of those involved in implementing and reforming electoral policy.
Researchers will be interested in the effects of direct contact on voter turnout for
many of the same reasons as reformers but for a few reasons of their own as well. Most
research on voter turnout - and it is one of the most consistent bodies of research
produced by the social sciences — is derived from panel studies and surveys. When they
focus on campaigns they tend to concentrate on Television. Direct contact allows the
study of the actual voter record, avoids many of the pitfalls of survey research, and
makes available millions of potential cases for comparison and isolation. As an activity,
direct contact makes use of county voter files. It is always possible to acquire those
files and enhance them with campaign contact material to ascertain a direct connection,
or as direct as one might get in this type of research, between a campaign stimulus and a
voting act.
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Most candidates and consultants assume that direct contact affects turnout but
would welcome confirmation, ponder denial, and make use of any suggestions that add
the heft of data to their intuitions. No one wants to spend money on ineffective
campaign techniques. The question of the effects of direct contact on voter turnout is
no less than the attempt to link campaign stimulus to the positive policy outcome of
increased turnout
American campaigns have always made use of direct voter contact. In the
introduction to his study on electoral culture in the northeast Michael McGerr gives the
following description of a rally and GET-OUT-THE-VOTE (GOTV) effort during the
1876 presidential campaign.
Early one evening in October 1876 groups of young men wearing
military-style caps and capes and carrying kerosene torches in the shape of
rifles gathered in the sixth ward of the city ofNew Haven, Connecticut.
The men were members of the “York Escort”, the “Shelton Escort,” the
Bradley Guard,” and the “H.G. Lewis Guard,” marching companies
formed for the presidential campaign that year and named in honor of four
of the city’s leading Democrats. ... By seven o’clock, the companies had
formed into line and lit their torches. On orders from the commanding
officers, the men set off, a brass band at their head, through the darkening
streets of the city. Returning to the sixth ward at eight o’clock, the
companies found three or four thousand people filling the street around a
temporary platform at a main intersection in a working-class neighborhood.
Gas lights and Chinese lanterns brilliantly illuminated the surrounding
buildings. As the companies marched and counter-marched, the band
played and fireworks lit the sky. ^
Rallies, marches, and the accompanying door-to-door canvassing illustrated the
intense partisanship and public nature of political activity. The political goal was to
excite partisans through both public display and individual contact. Partisan excitement
and individual attention were the primary tools available to political elites to increase
^ McGerr, Michael. The Decline ofPopular Politics: The American North 1865-1928. (New
York, Oxford University Press. 1986) pp. 3-4
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turnout. Republican campaign schools claim Lincoln once said "First we need to find
our voters, then we need to talk to them, then we need to visit them all on election day
to make sure they turn out to vote". Whether Lincoln said anything like this is less
important than the Republican's desire to claim him for their direct contact efforts.
Direct voter contact, either as mail or GOTV, is eveoovhere. Even Hunter Thompson,
running a Freak Party campaign for Mayor in Aspen Colorado, attributed the closeness
of his strange campaign to their GOTV script "Get off your ass, you bastard! We need
you. Get out and vote!”^
Differing in degree but not necessarily in kind from the Freak Power effort was
Congressman Steney Hoyer’s 1992 reelection effort. Maryland’s 5th Congressional
District covers three rural counties in Southern Maryland as well as large parts of
suburban Prince George’s and Anne Arundel Counties. Its suburban-rural divisions are
reflected in a break between the more conservative rural voters and the liberal
democratic voters centered around College Park, home of the University of Maryland,
and reinforced by the largest concentration of federal workers in any US congressional
district. Perceived divisions within the district have always kept it on the swing seat list
of the national committees but in reality the Democrats are strong here. Generally, this
district produces a Republican challenger strong enough to raise money and attract
attention but not strong enough to beat Congressman Hoyer. Congressman Hoyer had
originally earned his job by winning a tough Democratic primary in 1981. but
redistricting in 1990 made the district more conservative and he began to face a
succession of tough Republican challengers. In 1992 he defeated Lawrence Hogan, Jr.
Thompson, Hunter S. “Freak Power in the Rockies” reprinted in The Great Shark Hunt,
(Ballantine Books, New York. 1979) Page 157
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53% to 44%. Hogan was thought by experts to be one of the toughest challengers ,n
the nation that year,"^
Hoyer's professional campaign team was headed by a general consultant from
New Mexico named Chris Brown. Among his many duties Brown devised a voter
identification and GOTV program for the 5th Congressional District. In a series of
meetings with campaign staff and other professionals Brown laid out his plan.
Approximately 50,000 people were targeted based on their party, voter history, and
demographic characteristics. The goal was to identify as many favorable and undecided
voters in swing precincts as possible. Issue questions were also developed. Issue
responses were cross tabulated against the names of undecided voters. These voters
then received personalized mailings.
Brown designed the target universe, calling scripts, and follow-up mail. The
calling was done by an Oregon firm named Telemark. Voter names and numbers came
from an electronic file compiled from original county tapes. Voter Contact Services
(VCS), a firm with offices in in Hawaii, California, and Massachusetts, had a Honolulu
employee order the Maryland tapes. The tapes were shipped to California and
processed by computer technicians in both Santa Clara and Honolulu. The processing
included appending phone numbers, gender codes and ethnic identification. Although
the technical work was handled on the West Coast, political issues such as targeting
and script development were handled by the New Mexico consultant and a VCS
employee in Massachusetts. By the time the computer file was ready it contained
280,000 registered voters and included voter history going back to the 1988 primary
District description and history taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifnsa. The Almanac of
American Politics: 1994 (New York. Macmillan publishing, National Journal Books. 1995) 583-585.
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and general elections as well as birth date, registration date, gender, party affiliation,
precinct, jurisdictional information, phone number and ethnicity.
VCS created the target universe file of 50,000 voters and mailed it to Telemark
where employees using predictive dialing equipment made the calls in three days.
Predictive dialing technology allows phone numbers to be loaded into a central
computer and continuously dialed with each answer directed to an employee at an open
computer terminal. Disconnected numbers are eliminated from the file while answering
machines and busy signals are placed at the end of the queue for future calling. Such
technology greatly increases the number of calls a single employee can make per hour
and allows greater supervisory control over the now more efficient workers. When the
calling was completed the results were sent to VCS and added back to the Hoyer voter
file. Counts for each response were generated so the print shops would know how
many of each issue piece to print. Mailing tapes and labels were generated within 24
hours and sent to various mail shops around the country. A few days before the election
lists of favorable voters were sent back to Telemark for GOTV calling. The Maryland
race involved consultants and personnel in seven states across five time zones. The
Hoyer campaign spent $1,584,271 in 1992 while challenger Hogan spent $265,065. In
1 994 the Hoyer campaign repeated, on a smaller scale, the voter contact program
described above. The 1992 data were moved forward and matched to a new voter file
so the process might be repeated more efficiently in the 1994 and 1996 elections.
Mid- 19th century rallies. Freak Power tickets, and modern congressional races
all rely on reaching voters with a specific message. The technology varies but the
underlying desire is the same: to move selected voters to the polling place. Still,
7
despite commonality of purpose, it would be a mistake to ignore the technological
distinctions between a local motivational rally, organized along strict party lines by
volunteers, and a phone bank organized and managed by paid professionals. The
professionalization and complexity of modern campaigns represent qualitative changes
in electoral techniques.
Campaign research has taken as its starting point the decline of political parties
and the rise of the candidate centered campaign. Some studies, using measures of
"consultant team presence and quality" suggest the mere presence of consultants
increases a candidates final vote share. ^ Certainly politicians think so. Consultant
hillings in congressional campaigns jumped more than $60 million between 1990 and
1992 — an increase of 32%. ®
If a contrast between the New Haven rally and the Hoyer race illustrates the
move from a party-centered effort to a consultant managed campaign system it also
illustrates that the electorate has become less predictable. In New Haven, partisans
were to be motivated. In Maryland, they needed to be identified first. Modern
campaigns take place in an era where there is no faithful to be taken for granted.
We have moved from locally based party organizations, designed to gain and
hold the mechanism of government and organized along stable electoral cleavages, to a
professional political elite, nationally dispersed, still intent on winning public office but
not so much to take over the mechanisms of government, as to earn money in a newly
^ Guerrieri, Mark. "Can a Dream Team make a Difference?" Unpublished paper delivered at
Northeast Political Science Conference, November 10-12, 1996 Providence RI.
® Morris, Dwight and Muriel Gamache. Handbook on Campaign Spending: 1992. (Congressional
Quarterly Press, Washington DC 1994.)
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minted profession - a profession, like others, heavily dependent on the expertise
inherent in the use of new technology.^
What impact do current technologies have on voter turnout^ For consultants
and candidates the success or failure of communication techniques is either victory or, at
the very least, a showing that exceeds expectations. For our political culture at large
the evaluation of any given campaign technique is more complex. Certainly voter
participation and turnout is an important measure of systemic success, and it is here that
the current electoral structure is often viewed as a failure. Low voter turnout is often
seen as a function of bad candidates and empty, negative campaigns. The argument
claims that such electioneering creates a jaded public more likely to stay home than go
to the polls. Voter turnout in 1876, the year of the rally described by McGerr, was
78%. Voter turnout in 1 992, the year of the Hoyer race was 56%.
Direct voter contact is the campaign technology most closely associated with
turnout. Unlike electronic media, direct voter contact, or much of it, is used to
encourage specific individuals to vote. Despite the effort and money spent by
campaigns to move voters to the polls, the academic literature on voter turnout had,
until quite recently, focused almost exclusively on social and psychological explanations
for the voter decision. While this research has greatly increased knowledge of voting
behavior and turnout a number of paradoxes have emerged. Why, for example, has
voter turnout decreased while one of the main determinants of voter turnout, level of
See Larr>’ Sabato. The Rise ofPolitical Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections. (New
York: Basic Books 1981) and David Rosenbloom. The Election Men (New York: Quadrangle Books
1973). For a discussion of the changes in campaign tactics from a communications perspective see Daniel
Shea. Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art ofPolitical Campaign Management {Vvc\QgQX
Press, Westport Connecticut. 1996)
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educat,on,
.ncreased dramat.cally. Why has voter turnout decreased despite numerous
simplifications in voter registration‘s**
Although there is now a substantial body of research studies political
mobilization effects, most of that research focuses on the aggregate effects of the
political climate such as the race at the top of the ticket, issues, or the economy. There
is still little research on the mobilization effects of campaign activities themselves. Aside
from journalistic articles linking attack ads to reduced turnout the relationship has been
explored very little. Although research on the effects of negative advertising on
turnout is inconclusive at best, a public that is often sick of the political process tends to
take the relationship as gospel. There is also a voluminous literature built around
models detailing the social, psychological, and institutional factors affecting voter
turnout. These studies, by tar the bulk of the work on voting behavior, leave little
room for campaign effects on voter turnout. It is as if all of the good reasons for
voting, or not voting, are taken and those striving to affect turnout directly are viewed
with some condescension, like drones working on shadows in a cave while true social
effects inexorably push the turnout stone up and down the hill. It is ironic that social
and demographic factors, which are mostly beyond the reach of public policy, has
received so much attention while campaign activities, which are well within the
** For an early discussion of the voting paradox see Richard A. Brody, "The Puzzle of Participation
in America" in the New American Political System. Edited by Anthony King. (Washington D.C.;
American Enterprise Institute 1978). There are also many excellent summaries of the literature on
political participation. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E.
Stokes. The American Voter. (New York: Wiley I960); Raymond Wolfmger and Steven J. Rosenstone.
Who Votes? (New Haven Yale University Press, 1980.); Ruy Teixeira. Why Americans Don’t Vote.
(Westport. Conn. Greenwood Press. 1987)
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framework of public policy, have been slighted. What attention campaign activity and
spending has received has been divorced from their avowed purpose of winning
elections and focused on general assertions of over spending or vote buying. Almost
never is the question asked, is the money providing information to voters'? Does it help
drive voter turnout? Instead, the claim is that "too much" money is spent although the
term "too much" is never established in a comparative sense.
Direct contact eftorts are especially underrepresented in the literature. The most
comprehensive book on political consultants and the electoral process now available is
Larry Sabato s Political Consultants
. Sabato's chapter on direct mail consists of
descriptions of fundraising direct mail, an industry that has little in common with direct
mail done for persuasion or turnout.' There are signs that the gap surrounding
campaign effects is being filled. A recent survey of the political participation field
highlights a growing body of literature on political mobilization. This literature will
be reviewed in more depth later in this paper but a quote from authors John Mark
Hansen and Steven J. Rosenstone will suffice as a summary. These authors argue that
voter turnout can only be partially explained by social and psychological factors and
have made a strong case that political behavior, broadly defined, is influenced by the
conscious activities of political elites.
' Sabato, Lariy. The Rise ofPolitical Consultants.
Lcighley, Jan. Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation.
Political Research Quarterly, Volinnc 48, Number 1, March 1995.
They claim:
The reigning theories of participation in American politics, amazing as itmay seem, do not have much to say about politics. Instead they trace
activism to the characteristics of individual American citizens to their
education, their incomes, and their efficacy. They assume that attitudes
determine behavior. When asked to account for changes in citizen
involvement over the last half century these explanations largely fail. "
The following work examines whether specific efforts by political elites affect
voter turnout. Campaign polling and demographic research is first directed at dividin"
the electorate into likely and unlikely voters
,
and then, categorizing the likely voters
into persuadable and unpersuadable voters. Research strategy, and technology come
together to form ever finer divisions for the delivery of diverse messages in the hopes of
building a winning coalition. The political question becomes less, "How might 1 get my
party behind me? and more, "How might I exploit cleavages in my district?"
Although electronic media can be targeted, it is direct contact, with its specific
message delivery system, which is the modern embodiment of political targeting and, at
the same time, the primary tool of the political elite tor influencing turnout. Does it
succeed‘d If direct contact is found to help increase voter turnout, or alternatively, if we
find that direct contact provides information primarily to those already participating and
ignores the information needs of more alienated voters, then discussions of campaign
finance policy needs to concern itself with elite effects on participation as well as strictly
"money and politics" issues.
" Roscnstonc, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in
America. (New York, Macmillan 199.3) Page 28
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Among the specific questions addressed will be
1) Do direct contacts increase turnout?
2) Who receives direct contacts from campaigns'^
3) If direct contacts do work, how many does it take for an appreciable increase
in voting‘s
4) Again, it direct contacts work, which types work the best‘d
5) Do some types of voters respond better than others to direct contact‘d
All of these questions are quite specific, but they directly address more general
empirical questions. Can political elites consciously affect voter turnout‘s Are some
voter groups excluded from their efforts? Such empirical questions have strong
normative policy implications. My argument can be summarized in the following
points. First, to evaluate voter turnout we must be able to concentrate on efforts within
the sphere of influence of public policy. Second, campaign behavior is susceptible to
such influence. Campaign finance regulations are particularly powerful in forming
incentives for campaign behavior. Finally, if particular campaign behaviors are found to
have an effect on voter turnout such behaviors need to be encouraged, or, at a
minimum, not discouraged, by the campaign regulatory system.
1.1 Data and Methodology
1 use multiple sources of data for the following study. First, data from the 1 994
and 1 996 congressional elections are used to select four districts for study. Second,
interviews with campaign operatives and an examination of campaign finance records
are used to reconstruct the strategic and tactical direct contact choices made in each
campaign. Third, a previously ignored but potentially useful data source, actual county
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voting records, is coded with the campaign contact information. This weds the
campaign information with a file rich in individual level demographic data including age
and past voting history. The result is a data set that combines all of the campaign's
direct contact information with the political information contained on files of registered
voters. Logistic regression equations, incorporating campaign contacts as a variable, as
well as control variables, are run to ascertain the effectiveness of campaign direct
contact efforts in increasing voter turnout.
1.2 Dissertation Plan
In Chapter 2, 1 will review the academic literature on voting behavior. This
examination will concentrate on the development of voter turnout and participation
theory from a field dominated by the standard socioeconomic model to one that has
recently begun to explore the effects of political elites on turnout and participation.
This study will look to expand the literature on mobilization by using individual level
campaign contact data instead of fhe more aggregate measures of political influence
generally used in the mobilization work.
In Chapter 3, 1 will examine the uses to which direct contact is put by various
campaigns. Using information from campaign periodicals, as well as campaign
expenditure data, direct contact will be defined in fine enough detail to allow the
formulation of testable hypotheses. The analysis of direct contact will provide a
framework for the choice of case studies and a method for categorizing and analyzing
direct voter contact.
In Chapter 4, 1 will describe the background, strategy, and direct contact efforts
of the eight campaigns under study. The eight campaigns, representing four races, will
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be taken from both 1994 and 1996. Special attention will be patd to the targeting of
subgroups within the voter population at large. One of the chief differences between the
party centered campaign and the candidate centered campaign is in the degree of
targeting. While turn-of-the-century campaigns might be described as targeted in that
they focused on their own partisans, modern campaigns are heavily targeted enterprises
that design messages for numerous subgroups of voters. Targeting by party is still
important but to win an election, much deeper demographic divisions must be found and
exploited. Each individual contact will be examined and a detailed retrospective direct
contact plan built for each campaign. In chapter 5, 1 will summarize the distribution of
campaign contacts. At issue will be the number, type, and distribution of the various
forms of direct contacts within the four voting populations under study.
In Chapter 6, 1 begin to test the effects of direct contact on voter turnout. The
standard socioeconomic model (SES) conceptualizes voter turnout as a form of
behavior that proceeds from particular social resources and attitudes such as income,
education level, social class, and feelings of political efficacy.’^ This data is often
unavailable to political consultants who instead rely on age and voter history
maintained on county tapes to predict voting behavior. Actual voting records for the
race in question allows for the development of probabilities for voting at various levels
The literature on \ oter turnout is \'oluniinous. For early statements see Sidney Verba and
Norman H. Nie. Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row 1972) and Angus Campbell,
Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. The American Voter. (New York: Wiley Press
I960). For a more recent suiv'ey see Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996 The New American
Voter. (Cambridge, Harvard Press 1996).
Age is sometimes available. Level of education is usually available only at the census level and
therefore describes the propensity of a neighboorhood as defined by the census bureau rather than an
individual characteristic.
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ol iige, pas, v„ling hislory, par(y n.cmhe.sh.p, and comaci mlormalion lly isolat.ng
Ihe ellecls ol lolal direcl conlacis on each vole. I will examine the elVecls ol'diiecl
contact on voter turnout in each of the districts under study.
In chaptei 7, 1 will take the next logical step and examine the ellicacy of
clilVerenl types of vole, coiilaci on lui noiil. The kind ol conipai i.sons that will be made
include those between mail and phone eonlacis, Kepiihllcan and Demoeralie conlacis;
and negalive vs, posilive eonlacis. This chaplei will also examine Ihe ellecls direcl
contact has on diireient voter gioups.
In chapter 8, the conclusion, I will examine the empirical findings in light of
pievious hypotheses and place Ihe findings in a larger campaign context I will also
examine the implications Ihe lindings have for current campaign trends and reform
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CHAPTER 2
TURNOUT: CAMPAIGN EFFECTS OR VOTER CHARACTERISTICS?
There has been little research into the question as to whether campaign activities
do what their practitioners expect them to do. This is not to say that social science is
silent on the turnout and persuasion effects of voter characteristics, electoral systems, or
more overtly political variables such as campaign spending, candidate quality, and the
prevailing political and issue mix, it is only to say that research linking specific campaign
activities to individual level responses have been few. Indeed, the literature on voter
turnout IS one of the richest legacies of the social sciences. The following chapter traces
two strands of research which indirectly illuminate the relationship of voter turnout and
direct contact, research on voting behavior, and research relating to political
campaigns. The literature on voting behavior, while rich in explanatory power, leaves
unanswered a number of questions surrounding voter turnout. The literature on
campaigns, both that which studies political mobilization and that which examines
campaign activities themselves, while addressing some of the paradoxes raised in the
voting behavior literature, still slight the study of actual campaign activities. First, 1
will review the literature on voting behavior and campaigns to examine why there has
been little, if any, study of direct contact and voter turnout. For a world that has
provided such a large literature on voting behavior, there has been little information
produced on the campaign activities most closely associated with voter turnout.
Secondly, I will review studies which have either examined general campaign effects on
voter behavior or have specifically analyzed direct contact. Because there has been
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imle work done in the field of d.rec, eomaet and ,,s effects on voter turnout in the
academic literature I will also review the "how-to" technical literature on all phases of
campaigning. - The dissemination of campaign technique information is entering a
period of remarkable growth. Internationally, US consultants give seminars in both the
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics as well as the
more established western European states. At home, the last ten years have seen the
development of a new type of degree; the Master's in Campaign Management. Both
National Committees, most state parties, private companies, PACs, and other political
organizations, all hold campaign training seminars and produce technical manuals on
everything from candidacy announcements to late November campaign office closings.
Many of the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of direct contact can only now be
derived by a look at current working assumptions in the field of campaign management
2.1 Voting Behavior
Research looking at direct voter contact needs to draw upon different analytical
traditions as well as professional literature on the tactics and strategy of voter contact as
actually practiced by campaigns and consultants. Because of the importance of turnout
as a measure of civic health and the ready availability of survey data, political scientists
have produced an enormous literature on voting behavior and turnout making a voter's
motivation, knowledge, and decision making process one of our most widely studied
political phenomenon. There are at least two main strands of research. The older of the
two strands consists of a studies which assume that attitudes and resources precede
There has probably always been a large store of stock "how-to" literature from campaigns. This
authors first campaign handbook was a 1955 document on GET-OUT-THE-VOTE produced by the
Massachusetts Republican State Committee.
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behavior These studies have identified a number of consistent social, psychological,
and political indicators of voter turnout. Wealthy Americans are more likely to vote
than their poorer counterparts. The elderly vote at higher rates than the young, and the
educated at higher rates than the uneducated. Citizens with a strong sense of political
efficacy participate at higher rates than those with a reduced sense of political
effectiveness. Studies have also found that those wtth strong community links
participate at higher rates than the socially mobile Finally, many studies have argued
persuasively that, m addition to social and psychological predictors of turnout, there are
also institutional constraints on voting. The American system of voter registration, at
least before recent reforms, has been found to depress turnout by as much as 1
3
%""
The early studies on voting behavior often obscured campaign effects.
Eventually, with the advent of more comprehensive data sets, researchers started
looking at candidate effort and campaign effects. The campaign literature itself started
with anecdotal presentations by consultants and journalists and slowly grew to include
detailed study of the impact of campaign spending. That empirical research began with
questions of campaign spending points to the importance of available data.
There are many excellent summaries of the literature on voting behavior. For early statements of
the issue sec Verba. Sidney and Norman H. Nie. Participation in American: Political Democracy and
Social Equality. (New York: Harper and Row. 1972); Berclson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfcld, and
William N. McPhcc. Voting. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1961); Campbell, Miller and Stokes
The American Voter. 1 960. For more recent treatments of the topic sec, William Flanigan and Nancy
Zingalc. Political Behavior ofthe American Electorate, 8th ED (Washington, D.C. Congressional
Quarterly Press 1994); Ruy Teixeira. Why Americans Don't Vote.; Raymond Wolfmger and Steven J.
Roscnstonc. IVho Votes? For a current summaiy' of the literature sec Jan Lcighley "Attitudes,
Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation." Political Research Quarterly,
Volume 48, Number 1, March 199.5.
Powell, Bingham G. "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective in "Controversies in
Voting Behavior, 3rd ED" Ed, Richard Nicmi and Herbert Weisberg (CQ Press, Washington D.C, 1993)
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in
_Ihe New American Voter Warren Miller
of data sources in guiding research by saying of the NES
summarizes the importance
teofar as this book is a reflection of the work of other scholars it is sobecause s,nee I%2 all of the NES data have been in the public domain and
accessible (The utilization of those resources) by others has created a
sub-field of the discipline of political science. Furthermore, it has enriched
the work of colleagues in other disciplines far beyond the limits suggestedby the works cited in the notes
.
Miller's quote illustrates two important points. First, the NES data have provided a
touchstone for an enormous amount of study on the decisions made by voters. Secondly,
the object and perspective of study is at least partially dependent on the data available.
The National Election Survey data is a field of dreams for researchers; collect it and they
will come. What they came in search of was voters. The overriding concern of voting
behavior research is with low turnout in American elections. The US consistently ranks
below all other advanced democracies in voter turnout. Without attempting to summarize
the broad and deep literature on voting behavior it is enough that substantial agreement
exists on certain facts. Participation in American presidential and mid-term elections have
ebbed and flowed since the turn of the century reaching a peak after the civil war,
declining in the 1920s, rising again throughout the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's and finally
beginning the long, current decline after the 1960 election. Naturally, most scholars have
focused almost exclusively on the most recent period of turnout decline. Presidential year
turnout tell 13% between 1960-1988. In 1996, turnout reached an all time low as only
48.6% of the eligible electorate voted— and the 1996 election came after the Motor Voter
Miller and Shanks. The New American Voter. Page 6
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Act. the most comprehensive simphfication in our complex system voter registration since
the elimination of Jim Crow laws.'**
Voting studies take the normative stance that turnout is an important measure of
civic health. They subscribe to Schattschneider’s description of participation and
conflict:
The outcome of every contest is determined by the extent to which the
audience becomes involved in it. That is, the outcome of all conflict is
determined by the scope of the contagion. The number of people involved
m any conflict determines what happens, every change in the number of
participants, every increase or reduction in the number of participants
affects the result. Every change in the scope of conflict has a bias.’®
The scope of our own contests, as measured by voter turnout,is increasingly restrained.
Campaigns and other political variables were ignored in early research designs because the
influence of voter characteristics seemed so overwhelming. In 1984, while writing about
campaigns, Edie Goldenberg and Michael Traugott could say, "A substantial difference
exists between the minimal significance that academic studies have attributed to campaigns
and the influence attributed to them by candidates, political consultants, and members of
the press. Goldenberg and Traugott consider the minimal campaign effects found by so
many early studies an accident of history. The SRC studies for example, took place in an
era when most people had made up their minds at least three months before the election
"Only 8% of those interviewed in 1940 actually switched their votes from one party to the
Rosenstone and Hansen. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. Page 25
Schattsehneider, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realists View ofDemocracy in America
(New York: Holt. Rinehart. Winston I960) pp 2 and 4-5
Goldenberg, Edie and Miehael Traugott. Campaigningfor Congress (CQ Press, Washington DC.
1984) p. 3
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other during the campaign."-' This strong relationship between party and vote choice
may have had more to do with communication than partisanship. A close reading of the
SRC studies showed the potential for campaign and media effects when it noted that
voters exposed to newspapers espousing political views different from their own, were
three times more likely to switch their vote as readers exposed to only like-minded
newspapers.^^ Although there are substantial areas of agreement on predictors of turnout,
the consistency of the findings has made the question of turnout decline more, not less,
difficult to address. Demographic and political change over the last twenty years would
suggest increasing, not decreasing voter participation. In the last thirty years our
population has become wealthier, older, and better educated. Barriers to registration
have slowly been removed. Still, voter turnout has declined.
A second strand of research includes the mobilization effects of a host of
economic and political variables. A recent survey of the field claims that "mobilization
factors simply cannot be ignored", and that research needs to study, "... elite and
informal mobilization activities and how they determine the nature, timing, and
consequences of individual participation" .^'* Although the literature on mobilization, at
first glance, may seem to focus on campaign activities it was actually concerned with
aggregate economic and political conditions.
Goldcnbcrg and Traugolt. Campaigningfor Congress Page 5
Goldcnbcrg and Traugolt. Campaigningfor Congress. Page 7
For the classic discussion of this problem see Brody, Richard A. “The Puzzle of Political
Participation in America.” In Anthony King, cd., The New American Political System. (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 1978) pp. 287-324.
Lcighlcy. "Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation."
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A clue to the voting paradox is be found not in turnout studies but in the
examination of what makes voters pick one candidate over another. Much of the early
research on voting behavior, including studies conducted by the Survey Research Center
(SRC), identified party as the most important factor influencing a voter's choice. Party
stood out even stronger against a background of voter ignorance. Early research also
laid the groundwork for the commonplace that Americans knew little about presidential
candidates and even less about congressional and senatorial candidates.^^ Weak
knowledge of the issues suggested that voters made decisions based on social,
psychological, and political cues. Party has retained its predictive strength even in the
face of the decline of party identification in the electorate. In a new addition of their
classic study, Miller reprises the importance of party "As a long-term stable
predisposition, party identification is not only a point of departure for electoral analysis;
it is the most important of several predisposition's that provide continuity across
electoral epochs.
Once party was enthroned as the variable of choice, subsequent studies slighted
the effects of campaigns on voter choice and electoral success or failure. University of
Michigan studies conducted throughout the sixties showed a slight decline in partisan
identification and an increase in split-ticket voting. Yet, despite an evident decline in
party importance, researchers did not focus on campaign effects, choosing instead to
investigate economic and political variables not subject to campaign activities. The most
important of the variables affecting voter choice was incumbency while partisanship,
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes. The American Voter
Miller and Shanks The New American Voter. Page 1
1
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presidential popularity, economic conditions, political conditions, and the differences
between incumbents and challengers were examined for their effects on turnout. The
data sources for these studies were generally aggregate national data or survey
information. Generally, aggregate studies which link either national economic
conditions or presidential popularity show a stronger effect on turnout than revealed by
individual level panel or survey data. The original focus on incumbency as a voting
cue eventually led researchers to the more specific question of campaign effects on
voter mobilization. There has been a long and still unresolved debate as to whether a
decline m partisan voting portends a weakening of political parties or a change in their
electoral role as voter attention shifts to a cue based on incumbency. There is no
denying that until 1 994 incumbents were remarkably safe. Well over 90% could expect
to be elected in a typical cycle and, at least through the sixties and seventies, they
seemed to get reelected by more votes each election. Incumbency enhances safety
and that safety grows with service. The longer one serves, the safer one becomes.
See Abraniovvitz, Alan 1., and Jeffrey A. Segal. Senate Elections.(Ann Arbor. University' of
Michigan Press. 1992); Alan 1 Abrainowitz. "Elections to the U S. House of Representatives." In Joel H.
Silbey ed.. Encyclopedia of the Aniercian Legi.dative System. (New York: Scribner's. 1994); Barbara
Hinckley and Edward Muir. "Elections to the U.S. Senate." In Joel H. Silbey, Ed. Encyclopedia of the
Amercian Legislative System. (New York: Scribner's. 1994); Gary C Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of
Divided Government:Competiton in U.S. IIou.se Elections, 1946-1988. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
1990); For an excellent summary of both aggregate and individual level responses see Gaw Jacobson.
The Politics of Congre.s.sional Elections, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins 1992).
Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections and the Main.spring.s ofAmerican Politics. (New
York. Norton Press. 1970).
See Fiorina, Morris. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It."
American Politcal Science Review 71 1971. pp 177-181; Mayhew, David. Congre.ss: The Electoral
Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press 1974); Cover, Albert D. "One Good Term Deserv'es
Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." Amercan .Journal ofPolitical
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Explanations for incumbent safety fall into three categories. First, some studies
link the rise in incumbent safety to changes in incumbent resources and behavior.
Redistricting, congressional mail, free travel, case work, local appearances, and
bureaucratic growth have all been cited as internally generated sources of incumbent
strength. An alternative explanation of incumbent success looks at change within the
electorate. This argument claims that voters now use incumbency rather than party as a
prime voter cue Albert Cover suggests that incumbency has gained at the expense of
partisanship because incumbents attract an increasing number of defectors from the
opposition party. In a study supporting Cover's thesis, Warren Kostroski shows that
party has declined as a voting cue in Senate Elections and has been replaced by
incumbency It is still an open question as to whether a big victory margin for an
incumbent is at all related to either future victory margins or even the certainty of
victory itself Winners of safe open seats are often able to keep their seats safe but
winners of marginal open seats are not able to make the seat safer in future elections.
Science 21 1974: 523-542
Alford, John and John Hibbing. "Increased Incumbency Advantage in the House." Journal of
Politics A3 1981. pp 1042-61.
See for example Tufte, Edward. "The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party'
Systems." American Political Science Review 67 1973; pp 540-54; Mayhew. Congress: The Electoral
Connection, and Fiorina. "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The Bureaucracy Did It."
Cover. "One Good Term Deserv'es Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional
Elections.
Kostroski, Warren. "Paiy' and Incumbency in Post War Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and
Models." American Political Science Review (December, 1973): 1213-1234
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At issue in all of this discussion of the relation of incumbency to victory is the logic that
asserts larger victory margins indicate safer seats.
If incumbents are winning by larger margins, but are still not any safer, it
indicates an increased volatility in the electorate or changes introduced from election to
election by the quality of the challenger or incumbent and the type of campaign run by
the participants. Such evidence points to a dynamic within the campaign itself Two
such dynamics include campaign spending and challenger quality. Explanations of
incumbent safety might also focus on an uneven contest between a well known
incumbent and an unknown challenger. Incumbents fare well because they run against
unknown opponents and people vote for names they recognize.^^ Much of the research
studying incumbency in light of challenger qualities emerged from new data generated
from American National Election Survey (ANES). This series of surveys was the first
to include congressional district level questions and a district sample size distribution
suitable for analysis. More than just a change in explanation, these studies change the
analysis from items like incumbency and party, which are not under the direct control of
the campaign, to items like the name recognition of the challenger, which are more
effected by campaign activities. When asked to rate Elouse candidates, most voters
See the original statement of the problem in David Mayhevv "Congressional Elections: The Case
of the Vanishing Marginals." Polity (Spring 1974b): 295-317. For other discussions see John Ferejohn.
"On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections" American Political Science Review March
1977: pp 166-176.
See Gar>' Jacobson. "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections." and A/onev
in Congressional Elections’, Hinckley, Barbara. 1980. "House Re-Elections and Senate Defeats: The Role
of The Challenger". British Journal ofPolitical Science 10 441-460; Mann and Wolfmger. "Who Votes?"
Alan Abramovvitz. "A Comparison of Voting for U S. Senator and Representative in the 1978 Election.
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emphasize personal traits, with incumbents especially eftective at engendering positive
personal evaluations In cases with little or no information, personal evaluations
favor incumbents at the expense of challengers and such personal qualifications
influence voters independent of party and incumbency. This information makes it
plausible that a well financed challenger, by increasing name recognition, can influence
the election apart from the social and political demographics of the electorate. The
quality of challengers then, is a factor in voter choice and the closeness of a given
congressional race. Challenger quality itself has been measured in a variety of ways
including past political experience, the type of otTices held, and money spent and
raised.^**
We have come full circle. Explanations of voter turnout based solely on social,
psychological, and political information are incomplete and do not explain why voter
turnout has declined over the past thirty years. Research on voting choice has also
slighted the role ot campaigns but, in studying the effects of incumbency, it becomes
evident that campaigns do play a role in moving the electorate. Still, when
See Richard Fcnno. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. (Boston: Little, Brown,
1978).
Ragsdale, Lynn. Incumbent Popularity, Challenger Invisibility, and Congressional Voters."
Legislative Studies Quarterly 6: 1 980 201-18
For studies looking at past politieal e.xperience see Alan Abramowitz. "A Comparison of Voting
C.S. Senator and Representative. Jeff Fishel,. Party and Organization: Congressional (Challengers
in American Politics. (New York: McKay 1 973. ); Robert J Huckshorn and Robert C. Spencer. The
Politics ofDefeat. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1971); Jacobson "The Effects of
Campaign Sepnding in Congressional Elections." Mann and Wolfmger. 1980. "Candidates and Parties
in Congressional Elections." For more sophisticated measures of challenger qualip' see Shawn
Rosenberg. Lisa Bohan, Patrick McCafferty, and Kevin Harris.
. "The Image and the Vote: The Effect
of Candidate Persentation on Voter Preference." American Journal ofPolitical Science 30: 1986. pp.
108-27; Robert Biersak, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox.
. "Seeds for Success: Early Money in
Congressional ElecUons." Legislative Studies Quarterly 18 1993: 535-51; Jon R. Bond, Quy' Covington,
Richard Flcisher.
. "Explaining Challenger Qualitv in Congressional Elections." Journal ofPolitics 47
1985:510-29.
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concentrating on the mere status of the competitor or on the aggregate spending
involved, the actual effects of campaigns are only implied.
2.2 Campaign Effects and Elections
Paradoxically, some forms of participation have enjoyed a sharp increase. For
example, Kenneth Goldstein analyzed the growth of grassroots lobbying in the office
of former Senator Hart, of Michigan. Senator Hart received approximately 1795
constituent contacts per month in 1959. By his retirement in 1975 that figure had
grown to 9870. His successor. Senator Carl Levin, received 20,000 letters, 5000
telegrams, 10,000 calls, and 1000 faxes per month in 1992.^^ Americans are also great
givers of political contributions. Frank Sorauf estimates that in 1988 between
13,000,000 and 15,000,000 Americans donated to political campaigns.'^ Kenneth
Goodwin takes note of the increasing participation shown by Americans in many facets
of political life and credits the growth to elite direct marketing.^’ In fact, in many
categories, including political donations, Americans far outstrip their European
counterparts. With fundraising, it is observed that American scholars ask "Who uives
how much and why?" while a European observer might ask "Why give at alH". In all
three of the studies mentioned above; that of Goldstein on lobbying, Goodwin on elite
interest groups, and Sorauf on money, the common element is elite recruitment. Sorauf
Goldstein, Kcnnclh. "Seeding Ihe Grassroots: Mobilization and Contacting Congress." A paper
presented at the Midwest Political Science Assoication meeting, Palmer House, Chicago, April 6-9 1995.
Sorauf, Frank. Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities (New Haven. Yale University
Press 1992) Page 36
Goodwin, Kenneth R. One Billion Dollars ofInfluence: The Direct Marketing of
Politics.(C\vM\v<m\, N.J.,Chatham House 1988) Page 1
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summarizes the attitude by saying, "Although contributors respond to inner motivations
and political convictions, they respond more immediately to a specific stimulus.""' A
political Hind-raiser might summarize this line of thinking by claiming that no one gives
unless asked.
Other studies have looked at the links between campaign action or spending
patterns and the vote. Broadcast advertising, for example, as measured by a proportion
of total expenditures is a positive predictor of the candidate's final vote."' In fact, the
news media, by focusing on campaign ads and the horse race, convert ad messages into
horse race stories and the medium truly becomes the message. "" Older studies on
media effects presented researchers with mixed results, with some claiming the
commercials lead to a more informed electorate and others showing that ads had no
effect on the voter's views of candidate quality. More recent studies, using techniques
derived from cognitive psychology have taken a broader and deeper view of influence
and have argued for a powerful mass media effect."*^
Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities Page 36
Jacobson, Gary. "Strategic Politicians and The Dynamics of U.S. House Elections 1946-1986."
American Political Science RevieM’ 83 1989: 773-93; Goldenbcrg, Edie and Michael Traugott.
Campaigningfor Congress. (Washington. D.C.: CQ Press 1984).
"" West. Darrell. Air IVars (CQ Press, Washington D C 1993.)
For the "Ad-Effects" view see Gina Garramore "Effects of Negative Political Advertising",
Journal ofBroadcasting and Electronic Media 29 1985 as well as West, Air Wars. For an early
statement of the "no effects" view see McClure, Robert and Thomas Patterson. 7he Unseeing Eye (New
York, Putnams, 1976.)
Iyengar, Shanto. Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 1991); Graber, Doris. Mass Media andAmerican Politics. (Washington
D C. CQ Press, 1993) 4th ed.
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Campaign spending bears a complex relation to electoral outcome even after
controlling for party and incumbency. Challenger spending is strongly related to
electoral success whereas incumbent spending had a slightly inverse relationship to the
election result. Jacobson suggests that incumbent spending is largely reactive to
challenger spending as incumbents in trouble spend more money.^**
It is possible that studies showing small campaign effects are compatible with
campaign industry assumptions regarding the power of campaigns. At issue is the term
"small". Even in a world of givens, any effort that might move 2% to 8% of the voters
might easily be enough for victory. This notion of political elites operating within a
realm of givens is captured in a quote from The New American Voter
To qualify as a long-term influence a given characteristic must both be
stable and have a continuing impact on other partisan attitudes or the
vote. In contrast, short-term forces in a given campaign can be based on
either the temporary activation of stable predisposition's or some unique
forces (and therefore transient) aspect of the current campaign. Short-term
forces need not have an impact on other forces that help shape the vote.
Most political professionals, despite some self-serving posturing every four years,
understand that they can only change votes that lie at the margin of a complex series of
givens, including party, incumbency, economics, issues, and other ongoing political
contacts. This same notion, of the campaign as an entity moving in a field of givens, is
Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections.
'*** There is also an argument over whether incumbents raise money because of the e.xistence of a
strong challenger or to prevent the emergence of a strong challenger in the first place. See Janet M.
Box-Steffensmeir, "A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy," American
Journal ofPolitical Science 40 (1996): 352-371 and Jonathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green,
"Preempting quality Challengers in House Elections" ./owma/ ofPolitics 50 (1988): 920-937
Miller and Shanks. The New American Voter, pp. 8-9
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emphasized by Gaiy Jacobson, when he claims, "The electoral impact of even major
national issues depends in good part on how effectively individual candidates exploit
them m local campaigns.” * Jacobson goes on to say, “what matters to campaigns is
not whether a majority of constituents care about issues at any particular time, but
whether an attentive public can be made to care"."' In particular, the question is
whether an attentive public will notice issues and become active, or inactive, based
upon the candidate's issue positions.
Studies that look in detail at the workings of congressional campaigns also
emphasize campaign effects within a realm of political and social givens. Campaigns
take shape in response to political realities. Some studies have examined the
relationship between recognition and evaluation and found that, for incumbents, name
recognition is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of incumbent strength and that
the reputation of the incumbent matters as well.” In the Abramowitz model, voter
evaluation of personal qualities, issue positions, constituent service and a diffuse image
variable combine to form an overall incumbent evaluation leading to voter choice.
Jacobson Gar\'. The Politics ofCongressional Elections. (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) p 7
Jacobson. The Politics ofCongressional Elections p.73
It might be better said that "good" campaigns do. Good campaigns target their resources.
Goldcnberg and Traugott {Campaigningfor Congress, p 47) found that 28% of the campaigns under study
targeted only supporters, 32% independents (swing), and fully 40% said they w'ere targeting all voters
whether for conversion or for GET-OUT-THE-VOTE.
” Goldenberg and Traugott. Campaigningfor Congress. Salmore and Salmore. Candidates,
Parties and Campaigns.
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Certainly the presentation of personal qualities, issue positions, and the "diffuse image
variable are critical parts of any campaign.
Lynn Ragsdale adds the challenger to the model and asks, "how is incumbent
popularity and challenger invisibility related^" Ragsdale not only tries to account for
different evaluations between the challenger and the incumbent, she also looks at the
different effects of media advertising vs. personal campaign contact and finds some
evidence that personal contact campaigning might be more effective.
The most ambitious attempts at measuring campaign effects on voter choice and
turnout has been made by Goldenberg and Traugott. Using a representative sample of
congressional races, they examined the effects of stated campaign strategies and actual
campaign activity on a statistically derived measure of a normal vote. They use data
from campaign manager interviews, the ANES survey, FEC reports, campaign
literature, and media content analysis to develop a model of campaign effect on electoral
success. The model evaluates relative electoral success as a function of relative
candidate recognition and relative candidate evaluation. They suggest that evaluation is
in turn a function of candidate status combined with the quantity and quality of media
coverage. Their research also suggests that elections are affected by the working of
the local press and campaign spending strategies. The authors use a two stage
multivariate test, the first to determine the effect of media on recognition and evaluation
and the second to measure the effect of recognition and evaluation on electoral success.
Abraniowitz, "A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative in 1978
They conclude:
Media content is demonstrably important to electoral outcome
Advantages in the quantity of attention by the news media as well as
endorsements and greater resources to purchase campaign controlled
advertising are of obvious benefit to the favored contestant. Media
coverage directly translates into recognition and evaluation that in turn lead
to favorable margins at the polls.^^
Goldenberg and Traugott see campaigns as more than simply competition
between two candidates. Instead, they take the broader view that campaigns can be part
of an ongoing process undertaken by political professionals with long term career goals.
As such, campaigns are about more than winning and losing. They also are strategic
contests where a large victory margin may discourage future competition or a surprise
showing may improve future electoral prospects. Elections are less discrete events and
more a part of a career process.
Research focusing on voter characteristics has provided a powerful model for
predicting an individual's likelihood of turning out to vote. However, that same
research left unanswered a number of question regarding the variability of turnout from
election to election and the overall decline in voter turnout. Studies which focused on
the effects of campaign variables such as incumbency, campaign finance, and challenger
quality have suggested that campaigns have effects as well. In addition, a third strand of
literature, that focused on the mobilization effects of political situations and actions
returns to the question of whether voters are mobilized to vote because of aggregate
political conditions or because, like the person contributing to a campaign, they have
been asked. These mobilization effects have received increasing attention. Part of the
” Goldenberg and Traugott. Campaigningfor Congress, p 159
Leighley, Jan Attitudes, Opportunities, and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation
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interest in mobilization effects stems from concern that the SES model assumes that
attitudes precede behavior and do not consider whether the activities themselves may
generate future behavior. It ignores the possibility that voting might be more
productively viewed as a habit and policy concerns directed toward the early
development of such habits. Participation enhances numerous political attitudes
including efficacy and sophistication. This is not to suggest that the SES model is not
powerful, it clearly is. It is only to suggest that political variables need to be included in
any model of turnout. The notion of a political variable might be an aggregate national
variable such as the state of the economy or the presence of a presidential election; a
local, or state level variable such as the competitiveness of a race or the strength of the
top of the ticket; or a specific campaign event such as direct voter contact efforts.^*'
Although there is ample work on the aggregate level effects, less attention has been
paid to the role campaign activities themselves have on voter turnout.
The few studies that do focus on the extent of campaign effects show that
campaigns can operate at the margin of political and social givens. While campaign
information is not the sole source of voter evaluation, it is a necessary and important
component. Conventional wisdom supports the notion of marginal effects as well and
suggests that voter mobilization can increase voting rates by a modest 2%-5%; but
” Bennet. Stephen. "Know-Nothings' Revisited: The Meaning of Political Ignorance Today."
Social Science Quarterly 69 1988: 476-490
For a brief summaiy’ of the literature on political variables and voting at the congressional level
and below see Richard G. Nienii and Herbert F. Weisberg. "What Determines Congressional and
State-Level Voting?" In, Controversies in Voting Behavior, 3rd Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press
1993) pp. 207-221
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again, percentages and effects that may seem small in the abstract may make the
difference between victory and defeat on election day.
If there have been few empirical studies on campaigns in general, there have
been even fewer that isolate the effects of different campaign techniques on turnout and
electoral results. What work has been done on individual campaign activities has
concentrated on television. Television is generally considered to be the most important
form of modern campaigning, and certainly dominates presidential and senatorial
politics, but when looking at American politics as a whole, mail usurps TV’s throne.
According to the May 1997 issue of Campaigns and Elections:
Mail emerges as the top expenditure category. Over $3 Billion dollars was
spent by political candidates and committees on direct mail over the last
four years. This covered everything from list rental to database
management, labeling to postage, printing and processing to layout and
design, computerized targeting to creative copywriting
Despite its widespread use there has been very little examination of direct
contact in the literature on campaigns and elections. In 1992, Paul Herrnson found that
campaign techniques had an impact on a House challenger’s vote share, and that
direct mail, in some circumstances, had the greatest impact.^® Aggregate measures of
campaign spending often obscure the distribution of such resources. When campaign
spending is divided into categories that include direct communication with voters,
campaign spending not encompassing direct communication, and non-campaign
Ron Fauchacu.x, Campaigns and Elections Magazine “ Answer d) Direct Mail” May, 1997 p 23
Herrnson. Congressonial Elections.
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spending, it is the money spent on communication which is most closely related to the
final vote,®'
Campaign activity is an important source of turnout variation. Turnout varies
first by interest in the campaign, but secondly by voter recruitment through the party or
the campaign. Of those recruitment mechanisms campaign literature is most effective
among those predisposed to vote already.
“
Bingham Powell puzzles over the political attitudes of most Americans, which
would predict high voter turnout, and the relatively low turnout in US elections vis-a-vis
other countries. He blames low turnout at least partially on institutional restraints;
The present analysis suggests that in comparative perspective, turnout in
the US is advantaged about 5% by political attitudes, but disadvantaged
13% by the party system and institutional factors, and up to 14% by the
registration laws.^^
Powell also includes under his "institutional restraints" the object of study in this
paper: party voter turnout and recruitment efforts. He finds the lack of such programs,
especially among citizens with low levels of education and income, to be one of the
main reasons for turnout variance. Other authors have also concluded that our system
of political mobilization does not do a good job of covering those at the bottom of the
social order.
Ansolabehcre, Stephen, and Alan Gerber. "The Mismeasure of Campaign Spending: Evidence
from the 1990 U.S. House Elections." Journal ofPolitics 56 1994: 1 106-18
Claussen. Aage. "Do Parties Make a Difference?" Journal ofPolitics. V. 48 1986 page 47
Powell, Bingani. "Turnout in Comparative Perspective." 4 wer/coi? Politcal Science Review. V.
80 1986. pp 17-44
Walker, Jack L. Jr. Three Modes of Political Mobilization. Paper presented at American Political
Science Association, 1984 p 33
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John Blydenburg conducted a controlled experiment on door-to-door canvassing
and telephone solicitation at the precinct level For analyttcal purposes. Blydenburg
found ,t convenient to distinguish between two possible types of voting behavior
effects, referred to in his study as preference and turnout effects.
By a preference effect, we shall mean any alteration in the individual's
candidate preference or more precisely, in the conditional probability that ifhe votes, he will vote for a given candidate. By turnout effect, we shall
mean any alteration m the probability that he votes at all for anv
candidate.^^
’
Blydenburg found significant persuasion effects but not turnout effects, the exact
opposite of previous studies. He suggests that this reversal may be because the other
studies were about races heavily covered in the media where people had made up their
minds and additional personal contact simply encouraged turnout.
Another controlled experiment on personal campaigning and the vote was
conducted in Britain by Bochtel and Denver. They explicitly asked the question
underlying this study: "Do election campaigns then merely serve to provide personal
psychic satisfaction or to increase ‘expressive solidarity’ amongst party activists?". The
authors chose two flats in one ward of Dundee, One flat provided a control while the
other flat became the location for the experiment. The experimental flat went through
three campaign phases. First they received a personal canvass. The canvass was
followed by a literature distribution and finally, favorable voters were called, reminded
“ Blydenburg, John "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the effects of Personal Contact
Campaiging. Mid^’est Journal ofPolitical Science. May 1971 365-381 Quote from Gerald H. Kramer,
"An Analysis of the Effecth cness of Certain Precinct Level Campaiging Activities"
Bochtel, John and Warren Denver. "The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local
Government Elections, British Journal ofPolitical Science 2 239-260 1971.
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to vote, and offered a ride to the polls. The authors found that those voters receiving
calls and a canvass were 10% more likely to vote than those living m the control flat.
Boctel and Denver conclude
Scholars concerned with the problem of non voting, for example, have
tended to discuss the phenomenon in terms of social and demographic
variables, offering sociological types of explanation. We would not quarrel
with this, but would suggest that the effectiveness or otherwise of local
party activity is an additional factor which should be considered.
Daniel Katz and Samuel Eldersveld found that strong party leadership at the
precinct level increased a presidential candidate's vote by 5%.'' They also found that
the differences were stronger for the minority party. Their work was supported by
Raymond Wolfmger who stated as early as 1963,
The bald proposition that precinct work can have an impact has been
established. A comparison of the data in this paper with those presented by
Katz and Eldersveld suggests that this impact will vary in inverse ratio to
the salience of the communication to the voters. The present research task
in this area to explore the effectiveness of vigorous party activity in
conditions of varying public knowledge and interest in different types of
elections, with different types of voters.
Gerald Kramer likewise found that personal contact was effective in increasing
turnout but not effective in influencing voter preferences for presidential, congressional.
or local office candidates. Surprisingly, Kramer found repeated contacts to be relatively
ineffective.^®
I
Bochtel and Denver, p 269
I
Katz, Daniel and Samel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate.
Public Opinion Quarterly 25 1961 pp 1-25
1
I
,
Wolfmger, Raymond, "The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting Behavior," Public Opinion
j
Quarterly, Fall 1963. p 398.
Kramer, Gerald H, "The Effects of Precinct Level Canvassing on Voter Behavior", Public
Opinion Quarterly, 34, 1971. pp 560-572
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In a more recent study, Robert Hughes, using voter files for the analysis,
concluded that the phone canvass under study had httle effect on the turnout rate of the
independents targeted by the campaign. Simply getting someone on the telephone
appeared to be positively correlated with turnout. This is not so unusual as it might
sound. The chance of reaching someone on the telephone is closely related to stability.
Variables that predict stability such as age, income and community involvement are also
related to voter turnout.^’ W Adams and DJ Smith came to the same conclusion, that
merely having a phone and answering the canvass call might predict increased turnout.^^
The most recent and most comprehensive explication of mobilization literature,
and one that focuses on campaign effects, is the work of Stephen Rosenstone and Mark
Hansen Taking another look at why voter participation is declining, and why it
fluctuates from campaign to campaign, they suggest that social, demographic, and
attitudinal data can only account for 60% percent of the overall decline in voter turnout,
while fluctuations in elite mobilization efforts account for the rest. This marriage of
social and demographic predisposition's with targeted and purposefijl elite mobilization
efforts helps to explain the decline in participation as parties, PACs, and campaigns
expend increasing energy on governmental lobbying efforts and decreasing efforts on
more traditional voter turnout efforts. Rosenstone and Hansen describe the constellation
Hughes, Robert, "Assessing the Effectiveness of a Phone Bank Voter ID and
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE Program for Unaffiliatcd Voters for the 1988 General Election: An E;vplorator>-
Stiid>’. Voter Contact Journal 1991
.
Adams W and DJ Smith, "Effects of Telephone Canvassing on Turnout and Preference: A
Field Experiment, Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1980 pp 389-395
Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Denweraev in America. Page 25
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of factors affecting the who and when of participation with the phrase "the centrality of
poiittcal elites” which is a very different descr.pt,on of the pohtical process than the
social and psychological determinism of earlier studies.^'*
Direct mobilization by political elites for the purpose of increasing turnout is
declining according to Hansen and Rosenstone. They argue that
-Political economic,
and social changes have dramatically altered the mix of incentives for political
mobilization and ... face to face canvassing in neighborhoods has given way to polls and
focus groups... Grass roots organization has given way to professional staff.”
Changes like these are part and parcel of the move from party to candidate centered
campaigns and much of the new technology is hired by professional lobbying firms,
interest groups, and individual campaigns. Parties, on the other hand, have remained
active m direct contact efforts. Soft money and coordinated campaigns, despite
becoming appellations for scandal, were originally legal avenues for increasing party
Get-Out-The-Vote and volunteer efforts. Although it has been persuasively argued that
parties have declined m importance for candidate recruitment and nomination, local and
state parties are still active in mobilizing the electorate. Party communication efforts
The recent rewrite of the American Voter, called "The New American Voter" looks to formative
generational political experiences as determinants of voter behavior which adds an element of history, and
thus, through the back door, governmental statesmanship and politics, as long term factors effecting
turnout levels.
Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Deinocracv in America pp 233-234
For arguments looking at parties and mobilization see Paul Herrnson. "Do Parties Make a
Difference.'’", Journal of Politics 589-613 v. 48 1986; and James Gibson, Cornelius Cotter, John Bibby
and Robert Huckshorn. "Whither the Local Parties?: A Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Analysis of the
oiVnriy OrgmiznWon", American Journal ofPolitical Science, 29, 1985 pp 139-160. Perhaps
this distinction underlies the change in parties from organizations which control jobs and, as a result, the
career patterns of dependent politicians to organizations which control, develop, and distribute political
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no, only increase the stock of voter inforntation but also act as a direct ntotivator of
turnout.” Although parties may have declined as shapers of policy, they do appear to
be active in voter mobilization.^*
Studies of political organizations outside of the party structure also document
the efficacy of elite mobilization. Goldstein, for example argues that, with all other
factors in his model held constant, elite mobilization increased the probability of
participation in a variety of political programs by 33%.'^^
The literature suggests that voters participate and choose based largely on
social, psychological, and political factors outside of the realm of campaign control. As
campaign finance data made possible a closer analysis of specific campaigns, more
studies began to raise questions about the individual campaign effort within the arena of
social and political givens and, as seen, these studies indicate that campaigns do have an
effect. Still, these studies are limited in using data like campaign spending to stand for
what m reality is more specific campaign actions like the production and presentation of
TV and radio, direct mail, rallies, literature drops, etc. Barbara Hinckley comments
technology. The move from politics to technolog>' can certainly be seen as parellel to the change from
recruitment and nomination to mobilization.
Claussen Aage and Mary Ann Kasofsk>', "Dynamic Modelling of Campaign Effects on Voting
Participation Level". A paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association. Atlanta.
The classic statement on responsible parties is "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System"
produced by the Committee on Political Parties and published in American Political Science Review
September 1950.
Goldstein, Seeding the Grassroots.
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that “(r)esearch designs have not yet linked the campaign stimulus with the voter
response”.
Goldenberg and Traugott summarize the problem:
It has been difficult, however to collect contextual data systematically. It is
one thing for the press to speculate or campaigns to assert that this or that
issue or strategy or contribution made a difference. Maybe they are riaht
and maybe they are wrong it is quite another problem- and a much more
difficult one - to measure campaign emphasis or media coverage or a
pattern of endorsements.
The studies of direct contact covered in this chapter have left a number of
questions unanswered, or have given conflicting answers to the same questions.
Although the studies have consistently found some small effect from contact efforts, be
they for elections or lobbying efforts, there is no agreement as to the strength or scope
of the effect. There is no agreement or analysis on what types of communication are
effective and on what types of voters. No one has studied many contacts are needed
nor has anyone systematically looked at what types of contacts go to different voting
cohorts. Mobilization literature in general has placed campaign activities back into the
forefront of analysis but the accumulation of campaign specific data is difficult.
One reason for the lack of data on these questions is the difficulty of collecting
such detailed information using surveys, the most common method of studying
campaigns. The following study explores campaign effects by studying the direct
contact efforts of four campaigns but instead of using survey information the data set
will be created using files of registered voters as a base and adding campaign contact
Hinckley, Barbara, "Congressional Elections" (Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington,
DC 1981) p 138
Goldenberg and Traugott, Campaigningfor Congress p 4.
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information, gathered from interviews, contact reviews, and campaign finance reporting,
to that base. Voter files allow the detailed tracking of individual voters and an accurate
measurement of their actual participation. The most difficult aspect of studying
campaigns is developing a research design which efficiently links a voter's behavior and
demographic background to campaign contacts. By allowing an exact one-to-one
matching between a voter record and a campaign contact voter files allow the use of the
information already on the file such as age, gender, party, and past voter histoiy. More
importantly, using a voter file allows coding each phone call and mail piece to the
correct voter group and avoids survey and panel methods which rely on the voter's
memory of campaign communications. This in-depth campaign view allows for the
comparison of voter groups within a single campaign between those receiving a
campaign contact and those in similar political and demographic groups who, for a
variety of reasons, did not receive a campaign contact. Using voter files allows the
testing of a number of theories on turnout as well as an opportunity to cover a
campaign’s direct contact effort in great detail.
43
CHAPTER 3
CONTACTING VOTERS
Any nnan who attains a high place among you
. may date h,s
downfall from the moment; for any printed lie that any notorious
villain pens appeals at once to your distrust, and is believed
Charles Dickens, American Notes, 1842
To judge from casual conversation or news coverage Americans have taken
Dickens to heart. Negative campaigning is at the top of many campaign finance reforms
and citizens often deciy the "state of our dirty campaigns". Are campaigns as
negative as we seem to think they are^ What types of campaign communications are
there? The election literature summarized in the previous chapter offers a variety of
perspectives on campaigns. One branch of the literature focuses on voting behavior
with its emphasis on the psychological, social, and demographic characteristics of
voters. A second perspective takes elite action as the unit of analysis and studies
candidate recruitment, media placement, campaign finance, campaign behavior, and
mobilization efforts. Literature on voting behavior, by concentrating on voter
characteristics, often slights the effects of campaigns, while studies looking at the
electoral context often verify that campaigns may be as important as the anecdotal
evidence suggests. Still, campaign studies labor under the difficulty of assembling data
from fleeting enterprises and assigning causal relations to the data that can be salvaged.
This chapter concentrates on the idea of direct contact as currently used by
political professionals. What is direct voter contacf^ Why is it worthy of study? What
campaigns use voter contact and when‘s How are direct contact efforts implemented in
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.he political environment^ The answers to these questions are tnterest.ng in and of
themselves, but they also open up a rich world of data sources - tiles of registered
voters - which can be used to track voter part.cipation at the individual level and
electoral results at the precinct level.
The analysis of direct contact will proceed in five parts. First, there will be an
extended discussion of the activity of direct contact as it is understood and defined by
political professionals This discussion will be used to develop a way of categorizing
direct contact efforts for study and analysis. This extended effort at definition will
comprise the second part of this chapter. Third, using a database of campaign
expenditures, combined with census information, we will take a brief look at who uses
direct contact and under what circumstances such use takes place. The fourth part of
this chapter looks at the construction and content of files of registered voters as used by
campaigns. The final section will pull together the previous four sections in a
discussion of case study selection.
3.1 Direct Contact
As understood by campaign professionals, "direct voter contact" refers to that
portion of the campaign using techniques that reach out to individual voters. It may
seem at first that all campaign activities reach out to individual voters but they do not.
Television and radio are experienced by an individual voter at home, or maybe in the car
on the way to work, but the commercial is targeted at a demographic group, not an
individual. Because it is targeted at a group and then broadcast over the airways it is
certain that people not in the target audience will receive the message. Direct contact is
often contrasted with "broadcasting" and is even sometimes referred to as
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"narrowcasting" by consultants. Direct contact is exactly that. It is the del,very of a
contact directly to an individual, not a group. That individual
,s part of a target group,
but the message goes to particular individuals with specific demographic or political
characteristics. It is the individual nature of the message delivery that is the
distinguishing feature of direct contact and it is from that distinguishing feature that the
distinctive strengths and weaknesses of direct contact flow.
It might also be useful here to revisit the division alluded to in the previous
chapter between efforts designed to persuade voters and efforts made to turnout voters.
This IS the same distinction as the "preference effect" for candidate preference and the
turnout effect" regarding the alteration of the probability that an individual will vote at
all, for any candidate.**^ Although direct contact encompasses both persuasion and
turnout, the two are not only different in practice, they require a different method of
analysis. In the following study the two are analyzed separately because of the different
nature of the dependent variable. In turnout it is only necessary to look at a tape of
voters after the election in question to ascertain participation in the previous election but
the voter's actual candidate choice is not so easily discerned. Most campaign studies
use surveys to measure voter behavior and surveys have a clear advantage in the amount
and flexibility of the data collected, but voter files record actual participation and avoid
the over-reporting of participation by sun^ey respondents.
Turnout and persuasion have even spawned different industries. Persuasion
efforts rely heavily on the mail and are managed by direct mail consultants or the
occasional general consultant. Turnout efforts, also referred to as Get-Out-The-Vote
Blydenburg, "A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effeets of Personal Contact
Campaigning"
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(GOTV), are usually phone or door-to-door efforts. The world of turnout is more
diverse than the persuasion universe as campaign volunteers, party workers,
professional phone banks, and field consultants all perform the necessai, technical tasks.
Turnout efforts tend to include more volunteers than persuasion direct contact but it is
always possible for a campaign to use volunteers for the production and deliver, of mail
just as It IS common tor professional phone centers to make GOTV calls. There are
persuasion telephone calls just as there are mailings designed to effect turnout but the
distinction between the two, both in practice and for purposes of analysis is important
enough for emphasis.
It IS also important to distinguish direct voter contact from fundraising. There
is little, if any, discussion of direct contact efforts in academic literature, and, where
there is, it concentrates on direct mail flmdraising. Direct mail fundraising is a distinct
campaign activity and one that has everything to do with money and very little to do
with the immediate turnout or persuasion of voters. Still, the confusion of direct mail
fundraising and persuasion mail persists even in works as comprehensive and well
respected as Larry Sabato's Political Consultants. Sabato has an entire chapter devoted
to direct mail but only talks about the list segmentation and production involved in
fundraising, not persuasion. The political industry reflects the distinction as firms
specialize in either fundraising or political direct mail, but seldom both.**^ A company
like the San Francisco/D. C. based Campaign Performance Group will do only voter
Of late a few firms ha\ e combined. The fundraising firm Malchow and Associates merged with
the November Group, a persusion mail firm and the ftmdraisihg firm Norman Communication merged
with David Welch and Associates, a Republican persuasion company. In both cases the former firm is
devoted to fundraising and the latter to persuasion direct mail and political communication. They are
treated as very different worlds because they arc.
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persuasion mail while a firm like the Boston based, SCM Associates produces
fundraising mail.
Fundraisers contact those deemed likely to donate money. There is an almost
unspoken assumption that the people receiving tlindraising mail will, at a minimum,
vote for the candidate sending out the mail. Even when prospecting, enormous efforts
are expended to acquire lists of “likely” supporters. In fundraising, the lists are
smaller, the targeting more intense, and the costs per piece greater Persuasion mail is
generally targeted at undecided voters. The message emphasizes issues of import to the
undecided and is designed for immediate, emotional appeal. Persuasion mail uses voter
file targeting to reach larger universes at a lower per piece cost than fundraising mail, ”
All campaign communication involves targeting, message construction, and
message dissemination. A campaign’s polling for example, may suggest that women
aged 45-55 are a swing voting universe. A campaign using television will produce an ad
appealing to the target universe and then purchase commercial time in television slots
which, according to a number of possible measures, attract large numbers of viewers
who are women, aged 45-55.
The direct mail equivalent is the creation of a mail piece with a message and a
design appropriate for the targeted voters. The piece is mailed directly to the target
audience ofwomen making use of a list of registered voters for the selection of the list
and final dissemination. It is in the dissemination phase that direct voter contact differs
most significantly from television and radio. No matter how sophisticated the targeting
when using electronic media, the message will go out to a broad spectrum of voters.
See Sabato, The Rise ofPolitical Consultants.
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Even commercials mn on specialized cable channels, while aimed at particular groups,
still reach voters beyond the target aud.ence. They may reach demographic groups not
m the original target or they may reach voters not in the district. Such broad spectrum
ads must convey its message without offense or inconsistency.
Unlike electronic media, a piece of direct mail goes to an individual household.
If a message is to be directed at women, age 45-55. then the labels produced will only
be for that audience, and barring error, no other Direct mail allows for a finer
segmentation of the audience and a more finely tuned message but lacks the immediate
persuasive impact of television It is also easier to ignore. Television commercials are
hard to escape because they intrude into a passive, quotidian experience. Direct contact
mail requires consumer effort and acquiescence. Mail has to be opened and then read
Phone calls must be answered and then tolerated. Much to my neighbor's dismay, I
keep a trash can next to the mailbox in my front yard for rapid “sorting” and 1
immediately hang up on callers who mispronounce my last name. Such message
handling by consumers is far different from the passive viewing of a television
commercial.
When decreased persuasive power and more uncertain delivery is combined
with the ability to more finely target an audience, a push for more and more dramatic
message presentation is inevitable. The voter must be captured immediately by the
message and the most important information conveyed in the most dramatic fashion.
Furthermore, because the message is not as widely seen as a television ad a campaign
might use a more divisive theme because of reduced public scrutiny.
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Campaign communications are part of an overall electoral system. In this system
voter habits and expectations combine with current media and computer technology to
determine the mix of campaign communication methods and messages. One part of
this system, targeting, has always been a part of political campaigns, but has become
increasingly sophisticated. Targeting programs work to divide the electorate into
coalitions that, m a standard two-party contest, will equal 50% plus one of those voting
on any given election day. It is the heavily targeted nature of modern campaigns which
bridges the gap between the importance attached to campaign technology by
practitioners and the academic focus on social, political, and psychological givens A
practitioner knows that a technique swaying 2% to 4% of the electorate is an invaluable
one but an aggregate study of campaign effects will miss small changes that are
concentrated within specific voter groups.
The importance ot dividing the electorate into micro-groups is one of the
distinguishing features of modern campaigns. It is both a cause and effect of a volatile
electorate, candidate centered campaigns, and a voter base accustomed to sophisticated
communication technology. As noted above, some form of targeting has always been
important. In the early 20th century party organizations targeted their own partisans.
Partisan targeting involved building lists of supporters through the compilation of
preexisting canvass lists or the creation ot new, candidate and campaign specific lists.
Campaigns then moved the identified supporters to the polls with an endlessly full bag
of method including simple door knocking and extending to tavern clearing and the
paying ot "social dregs", as one turn of the century progressive pamphlet described a
New York Democratic GOTV effort.
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Campaign targeting of e.ther individual voters or of specific demographic groups
provides all campaign communications with a Similar framework. Like other forms of
campaign communication direct contact efforts arise from the research phase of a
campaign. Research discovers how specific voters feel about issues and personalities as
well as what messages move specific blocks of voters. Research looks to answer the
question: Vv^hat voters are undecided and how might we sway themV Related questions
include: "What types of messages might move voters'^" and "How should these
messages be presented^" Campaign messages are often organized around a central
theme but increasingly, as the public becomes accustomed to more sophisticated forms
of advertisement, the single strand of a theme might be difficult to pick out from a host
of diverse messages. Regardless of how it is presented, campaign communications
begin with a target group and a message. The content of the campaign message and
the make up of the target group form the strategy of the campaign. Although there are
many other elements that go into a strategy, what is said, how it is said, and to whom it
is said make up the bulk of critical campaign decisions. Targeting and message
development used in campaigns has become so sophisticated that one consultant
reported the use of studies to ascertain the impact of various colors on the voter
perception of direct mail. No good campaign delivers a voter communication without
having first defined a message. The exact content of the message can be as varied as the
number of candidates but it is common to divide such efforts into negative attacks,
positive communications, and issue pieces.**^ There are no generally agreed upon
definitions for these terms and one campaign's positive advertisement is another
See Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress or Shea, D, Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics,
and Art ofPolitical Campaign Management. (Westport CT, Praeger Press, 1996)
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campaign's scurnlous attack. Negative attacks look to shine an unflattering hght on
one's opponent or oflfer an enhghtening compar.son between the two candidates to the
vantage of one s rival. Negative campaigns attack an opponent on the basis of a
personal or professional issue not in synch with the district.
Despite Its reputation, not all negative communication is "dirty". In The Little
Book of Campaign Ftiqiiette, Professor William Mayer of Northeastern University is
quoted as saying
We need to find out about the candidate's strengths, it ,s true, but we also
need to learn about their weaknesses: the abilities and virtues they don't
ave, the mistakes they have made, the problems they haven't dealt with
the issues they would prefer not to talk about, the bad or unrealistic
policies they have proposed.
The opposite of the negative communication is the positive one. Like negative
communications, positive communications have a personal emphasis that is not always
directly related to public policy. A positive image message emphasizes personal
experience, history, and accomplishments.**^ A typical positive piece might be for name
identification and it will invariably describe the candidate in positive, memorable terms,
which will have a strong resonance with the voters m a particular district.
Campaigns also communicate with voters about issues. Issue communications
present a candidate's stand on substantive public policy questions. Negative, positive.
Many consultants make it a point of honor to distinguish between an attack ad and a comparison
piece. They then categorize their work as "comparative".
Herrnson, Campaigningfor Congress
**** Hess, Stephen, The Little Book ofCampaign Etiquette, Brookings Institute Press (Washington
DC 1998) page 5
Herrnson, Campaigning for Congress
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and ,ssue pieces have a great deal of overlap and the conceptual distinction, while
useflil, ought not be carried too far.
.The Little Bonk oframnaivn
following example of an ambiguous ad It is taken from the 1972 Nixon Campaign
uses the
. 1NI2CUI1 uoesn i neiieve we should play games with our national
security.
In thts television advertisement what might be defined as an attack on McGovern is
also a useful summary of his military plans The contrast between McGovern and
Nixon was acute on issues of national defense.®'
The mix of campaign messages is determined by political variables as well as
research and the two most important political variables are the candidate's party and
status. Status implies whether or not a candidate is an incumbent, a challenger, or a
contestant tor an open seat. These two items, party and incumbency, are the most
important strategic dimensions of campaign planning and the two most important voter
information shortcuts.®^ It is reasonable to assume then that the source of a campaign
communication raises interesting questions about that communication's content and
effectiveness. Current assumptions are that candidates focus on their records and that
voters evaluate candidates based on that record. Candidates are more successful if they
emphasize issues which are viewed favorably by voters and for which they have an
90
Hess, The Little Book ofCampaign Etiquette, pp 4-5
91 For the study's working definition of negative, positive, and issue see Appendix 1.
For a suniinarv' on \ oter inforniation sliort cuts see Samuel Popkin, The Reasoning Coten.
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996).
53
es.abl,shed record. - This would ind.cate ,ha, ,„cunrbe„,s. often the only one ,n the
race with a record of any sort, would emphasize their background. Likewise,
candidates may often exaggerate their accomplishments and voters, knowing this, may
discount such claims in the absence of experience or use other voting cues altogether. «
Candidates may also emphasize issues which are already identified with their
party.’' In 1994 the "Contract with America” provided a ready identification for
Republican candidates. Republicans are associated with issues like crime and taxes
while Democrats are often seen as more capable of handling education and social
security. The content and quantity of issues is also affected by the competitiveness of
the race. As the race becomes closer the messages become more negative.”'
Noncompetitive races are characterized by a comparable lack of campaign information ”
Sellers, Patrick, “Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns. American Political
Science Review Vol. 92, No. 1, March 1998..
For a discussion of how candidates and voters act in a principle-agent relationship see John
Ferejohn. Ed. Information ami the Electoral Process in Information and Democratic Processes^ (Urbana
IL, University of Illinois Press, 1994); For voter discounting see Melvin J Hinich and Michael C.
Munger, A Spatial Theory' of Ideology." Journal of Theoretical Politics, Number 4, December 1992. pp4-31; Shanto Iyengar, Nicholas A. Valentino, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Adam F. Simon. "Running as
a Woman: Gender Stcreoty-ping in the Politcal Campaigns." In Women, Media, and Politics, Ed. Pippa
Norris. (New York: O.xford University Press. 1992)
” Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. "Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over
Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns." Public Opinion Quarterly
58(2), 1994. 335-57; John Petroeik, "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case
Study." American Journal ofPolitical Science AO, August, 1996: 825-50
Sec Herrnson, Campaigningfor Congress.
The notion of messages varying by competitiveness can be found in Stergios Skaperdas and
Bernard Grofman, "Modeling Negative Campaigning." American Political Science Review 89 March
1995: 49-61
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Incumbents are more I.kely ,o send positive messages h.ghltghttng their background
while challengers are more likely to attack the incumbent.’*
Thus, diflferences in Republican and Democratic campaigns, along with even
greater distinctions between incumbent and challenger races, make both differences
important to the study of any campaign communication. Does the party or status of
the candidate affect the type or effect of direct contact effort? Does the notion of
incumbent advantage extend to the direct contact arena?
The campaign message, and the source of that message, form part of the
strategic framework for campaign direct contact. In addition to strategic
considerations there are also tactical choices involved in all campaign communication
efforts. Some tactical choices involve allocation among different mediums such as the
choice of doing television or direct contact. Other tactical choices include choosing
between different methods of communication within the same medium. There is little or
no research into the allocation choices among varieties of direct contact. Mail, phone,
and door-to-door efforts are the only methods for delivering a direct contact effort.
Why one is used instead of another often depends on candidate and consultant
preference along with the purpose of the direct contact.
Direct contact has three possible goals. First, it might be used to persuade
voters. Secondly, it might be used to urge voters to the polls. Finally, it is often used to
identify how voters feel about a candidate or an issue. This division, with the addition
of voter identification, reflects the division used by Blydenburg between preference and
Herrnson. Campaigningfor Congress and Sellers, "Strategy and Background in Congressional
Campaigns.”
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turnout effects of direct contact^ « Campaigns target some mix of base voters,
generally defined as voters who are members of the candidate's party, and persuadable
voters.
Campaign strategy is still more an art than a science. Still, research that has
focused on the different choices made by incumbents, challengers, open seat candidates;
Republicans and Democrats; and those in competitive or noncompetitive seats have
suggested that the status of the race dictates the mix of direct contact efforts, The
preceding discussion has divided direct contact into a number of mutually exclusive
categories. These categories, and the question they address, are summarized in table
3,1,
Table 3.1: Categories of Direct Contact
Coding Question
Source Where did the contact come from? Incumbent Challenger Rep. Dem.
Type How was the contact disseminated? Mail Phone Door
Purpose What was the purpose of the contact? Persuasion GOTV
Message What type of message was disseminated? Positive Negative Issue
3.2 Who uses voter contact and why?
The only way to examine the effects of direct contact using the categories
created in section 3, 1 is to examine a race closely, or set of races, and follow the effects
of each individual contact. However, before going into detail about the coding process
it is possible to examine the questions of how much voter contact is used vis a vis other
Blydenburg, “A Controlled Experiment to Measure the Effects of Personal Contact
Campaigning,”
See Goldenbcrg and Traugott. Campaigning for Congress', Herrnson, Congressional Elections;
Shea, Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics, and Art ofPolitical Campaign Management.
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commun,cation techniques; who uses direct contact; and, at least in a preliminai^
manner, why direct contact is used. The answers to such questions will assist in p.cktng
case studies where the entire range of categories can be examined.
Congressional candidates consider television the most important advertising
medium and district population density is the key variable in resource allocation. Urban
candidates tend to rate direct mail and canvass activities more highly than rural
candidates, which may reflect the density and concentration of voters and the high cost
of television in urban areas. Despite the dominance of television, direct contact still
makes up a significant budgetary item
,
In an article written for C_ampaigns and Elections Magazine Katherine Cook, a
direct mail consultant working for Lukens Associates, emphasizes that the strength of
direct mail is its ability to reach individual voters with a specific message.'®^ Targeting
and its associated benefits are at the heart of direct contact’s appeal. In addition to the
finer targeting, consultants also consider the cost of direct mail vs. other forms of
communication. When you think of politics you think of the presidential election or
possibly an exciting congressional or senatorial race. Seldom do city council, county
commissioner, state representative, or state senator contests occur to even the most
politically involved citizen. Even congressional races fall out of the populace's attention
range. Even though television dominates well-known races a recent Campaign and
Elections issue even suggested that direct mail might be the largest recipient of political
See Herrnson. Congressional Elections, pp. 181-199
Cook. Katy, "Mr. Smith Stays in Washington" Campaigns and Elections Magazine, May, 1997
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money in the nation if one takes into account federal, state, county, and local races,'"’
Mail and other d.rect contact efforts are still integral parts of the overall effon but most
resources are focused on television.
Direct contact ,s not as public as television nor is it as easy to track from outside
of the campaign. Television money flows to consultants and TV stations while direct
contact expenditures can be spread out among phone companies, consultants, printers,
mail shops, list vendors, and the post office. One author who has collected some
figures for direct contact is Dwight Morris. Morris and his various partners have
analyzed all of the campaign expenditures for every congressional race from 1990,
1992, and 1994.'“ The Morris data offers a number of advantages. First, it separates
persuasion mail from GOTV efforts. This allows for comparison between the two
conceptually distinct categories. Second, Morris keeps persuasion mail separate from
flindraising expenses. Finally, Morris collects the data for each candidate, not simply
each race, and provides a comparative basis for statements about the expenditures of
Republicans, Democrats, incumbents and challengers '” When the Morris data for one
year, in this case 1994, is combined with census data for median family income.
Faiicheaux. Ron. "Direct Mail" Campaigns and Elections Magazine, May 1997, p 15
The book for 1994 has not been published. However, Morris did provide this author with
relevant 1 994 data by congressional district.
Unfortnately, the data reporting period for the Morris data includes a large amount of
organizational maintenance expenditures leading to an a distinction between incumbents - whose
spending is spread out over two years, and challengers who confine their spending to the election cycle.
For the purposes of this analysis the comparison of direct mail and direct GOTV still remains valid even if
the percentage figures for spending on mail and GOTV may be low for incumbent campaigns.
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percentage rural, percentage over 65, and percentage wuh college degree, a picture
begins to emerge on the use of direct contacts in campaigns.
One diffieulty that Morris faced was with the reporting of expenditures for
GOTV, Campaign finance reports often fad to provide enough detail to allocate
expenditures and in the GOTV category - often using volunteers and in-house lists - i,
IS especially difficult. He eventually placed such expenditures in an "other” category.
In an interview conducted with Morris he said the assumption is that the majority of
money in the “other” category was spent on some type ofGOTV effort.'®^ A fijrther
difficulty in measuring GOTV is that it is the one area where parties and independent
groups, especially labor, spend an enormous amount of time and money. Often, the
campaign will rely solely on the party’s GOTV effort. The Committee on Political
Education (COPE), the political arm of the AFL-CIO, spends a good part of its
political budget on turning out registered union members. On the Republican side both
the NRA and the Christian Coalition often work diligently to turnout members. Smaller
GOTV efforts are run by issue groups, local unions, and professional associations. In
1996, for example, one voter file firm. Voter Contact Services (VCS) worked on
GOTV efforts with the Hawaii Service Employees local, the Sierra Club, People for the
American Way, and the American Medical Association. Because of the data problem
and the amount of resources dedicated to GOTV and other phone efforts by entities
other than the campaign, campaign spending alone probably understates the amount of
money going into turnout efforts. Direct contact expenditures can still be placed in
context even with the limitations of the data. In 1994 campaigns spent a grand total of
The interv iew was conducted by the author in July of 1997 at Morris' Virginia office.
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$302
,
250,996 dollars. Of that, $51
,
728,222 ( 1
7
«/„) was spent on GOTV and
$32
,
326,643 ( 12%) went to direct mail for a combined direct contact percentage of
28%. As might be expected the variation of spending for direct contact was quite
wide. Direct mail saw a range of $573,300 and GOTV of $662
,
700
. The variations are
also reflected in percentage expenditures with the mean percentage spent on direct
contact mail being 12% but the range being from 0 to 97%. The following table
summarizes spending variations for direct mail and GOTV by type of race for 1994
Because the 1 994 Morris data is preliminary it was not coded by type of race. I used
the final general election percentage, and a candidate code supplied by Morris, to create
categories for unopposed campaigns, hot races, and contested races. Unopposed races
were defined as races where only one candidate reported expenditures. A "hot race"
included any campaign where the winner received 60% or less of the final vote. Finally,
a race was considered merely "contested" if two candidates were present but the winner
received 61% or more of the final vote. Because there was no data on the file for open
seat races they are not included in this analysis.
Table 3.2 Direct Contact Expenditures by Type of Race for 1994
Level Total Average Mail Mail Percentage Average GOTV GOTV Per.
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Unopposed $11,975,857.00 $9,595.00 3.00% $27,046.00 14.00%
Hot $74,001,074.00 $65,973.00 12.00% $100,589.00 32.00%
Contested $116,274,065.00 $30,194.00 %2.00% $51,001.00 35.00%
Total $302,250,996.00 $43,862.00 12.00% $70,188.00 33.00%
Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.
60
Hot races in 1994 expended $74,001,074 in total dollars. The average hot race
spent $65,973.00 on mail, or l2«/„ of the average amount spent Hot races also spent
$100,589.00 on GOTV efforts which represented 32% of the money spent in the
average hot race.
The absolute amount of money spent on GOTV activities is higher than that
spent on persuasion direct mail. This may be due to the catch-all nature of the "other
campaign activity” category. Still, even if we can be sure about the absolute numbers
when comparing mail and turnout, it is striking how consistent the percentage spent on
each activity is despite the level of campaigning. It does not appear at first glance that
the competitiveness of the race is one of the variables affecting resource allocation
between turnout and mail.
Table 3.3 summarizes the same expenditure data for 1994 from a party
perspective. How does the party of the candidate affect resource allocation divisions?
3.3 Direct Contact Expenditures by Party of 1994
Party Total Avg. Mail Avg. Mail Per. Avg. GOTV Avg. GOTV per.
Republican $137,616,166.00 $43,064.00 13.00% $69,878.00 35.00%
Democratic $164,634,830.00 $44,689.00 11.00% $70,508.00 31.00%
Total $302,250,996.00 $43,862.00 12.00% $70,188.00 33.00%
Note: Data taken from file provided to author by Dwight Morris.
Allocation between persuasion mail and GOTV is almost equal between the two
parties. Republicans spend 13% on mail and 35% on GOTV in the average race while
Democrats spend 1 1% and 3 1% respectively. If party and competitiveness do not
influence the allocation of direct contact resources what does?‘°’ Candidates in urban
It would be useful to e.xaniine the data by incumbents and challengers but the 1994 Morris
iiifonuatiou docs not allow the distinction to be made. There was a code for "incuinbcnt" but there was no
designation for open scat.
61
areas rank direct contact higher than television relative to their more rural
counterparts In many districts the electronic media markets broadcast to hundreds
of thousands of voters who live outside of the district. Time purchased on Los Angeles
television for example, costs approximately $814.00 per rating point while in the third
congressional district of Ohio a campaign might pay only $75.00 per point. TV is
important for both but affordable for only one. Expensive channels are inefficient as
well. Urban areas like New York City and Los Angeles are perhaps the best example
ofTV inefficiencies but adjoining states fall victim to expensive markets as well. New
Jersey relies almost entirely on New York and Philadelphia television. Whenever a
candidate puts on a television ad in South Jersey, all of Philadelphia sees it. More
people who live outside of the district will get the chance to enjoy the candidate's ad
than will voters within the scope of the campaign's concern. There are parts of
southwestern Connecticut that are wholly within the expensive New York media
market. Direct mail, in this circumstance, is more efficient than electronic media
because the message can be targeted to voters in the correct district without paying to
send the message to voters in other districts. If this hypotheses is true spending on
direct contact should increase be positively related to a measure of TV costs while
controlling for total expenditures. The more expensive the TV, the more likely that
direct contact will be used. This is, in fact, the case. While controlling for total
expenditures the Pearson correlation between television Cost Per Point and direct
contact expenditure is .394 and is significant at the .01 level with an N of 699 races.
Herrnson. Congressional Elections, p 1 99
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Can tins simple bivariate equation be improved by adding any other district
demographic information^ Claussen suggested that direct mail was more effacious
when targeted to highly educated voters. If this is correct it still does not indicate that
campaigns make an effort to target as such but it does present a possible explanation of
a campaign’s strategic choice and it also echoes the distinction we reviewed earlier
between the casual voter and the policy wonk. Many consultants also target higher
income voters. Although this may be a stand in for education level, it is worth
examining in its own light. Finally, the rural/urban breakdown of a district may be
related to resource allocation because Urban areas are traditional bastions ofGOTV
activities. However, including percent urban, education level, and median family
income adds little explanatory value to a simple bivariate model containing only
television cost per point. The degree of urbanization, the education level, and the
median family income are all closely related to the TV cost per point.
Data can not capture the complex mix of campaign decision making. It is, after
all, at the intersection of art and science. How things are done is often pursued in the
best empirical tradition. What things are done is often based on consultant salesmanship
and influence. If the campaign professional or the candidate's staff believes that direct
mail is more effective than television or that the message is more efficiently
communicated by using a variety of channels, each disseminating the same message
through different means, there will be an increase in direct mail. Like most industries
many decisions are based on past results, personal relationships, reputation, and trust.
Still, even with personal relations and past predilections taken into account, it is clear
the television cost provides some empirical basis for resource allocation.
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3.3 Voter Files
Once a campaign decides on a course of direct contact the voter file becomes its
most important technical resource. The voter file also provides a rich, and largely
under used, source of research data. The examination ofrelat.onsh.ps between political
variables such as message, method, source, and purpose requires two comprehensive
data sets, a file of registered voters and a specific accounting of campaign direct
contact efforts. The following section will review the use and construction of voter
files. Voter files offer a number of advantages over survey information as a research
tool. While survey data probes deeper than simple voting records, actual data is more
reliable. Survey estimates based on respondent voting reports of their own behavior
suggest voting turnout rates that range 1 5% to 20% higher than rates derived from
official statistics. In 1988 50. 1% of Americans voted in the presidential election but
64% claimed they participated when asked in a post election surveys. Not only do
voter files give a better picture of actual participation than do surveys they also contain
past voting history which allows a comparison of electoral behavior from year to year.
Finally, voter files contain demographic and political information including party,
gender, ethnicity, age, registration date, precinct, and jurisdictions such as assembly
district, state senate district, and congressional district. It is the presence of this
political and demographic information on computer that allows for the sophisticated
targeting that has become a defining feature of modern, candidate centered campaigns.
Miller and Shanks, The New American Pater, p 16
no
Soraiif, Money in Congressional Elections, p 29
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Because this study ,s based on an analysts of these computerized hsts it is worthwhile to
examine the construction and content of voter files in some detail
How detailed targeting can be is limited by four factors, the imagination of the
consultant, money, actual turnout, and data. My experience has been that the
imagination of the consultant is not much of a limiting factor because their imaginations
run toward the expansive. Money, or lack thereof, limits every aspect of campaigning.
Complex targeting often requires that external files be matched to the voter file and this
IS always an expensive undertaking. The relationship of turnout to targeting ,s more
complex but simply put there is a tradeoflfbetween the total number of actual voters
reached and the percentage of people reached who are actual voters. If a consultant
targets people who have voted in five of the last five elections, the chances are very
good that a person receiving that mailing will vote on election day, but the chances are
also good that a large number of people who go to the polls for the election in question
will not get a piece of mail because it has been so narrowly targeted, William Daly,
president of Voter Contact Services (VCS) and Professor Robert Hughes of the
University of Colorado at Boulder have written a series of articles that cover the
tradeoff between what they call "Hit" or the likelihood that a piece of mail will get to a
voter who will vote and "Cover" or the percentage of people who participate that
receive a piece of mail. Consultants and campaigns always have to keep in mind the
tradeoff between fine targeting and a narrow electoral reach when developing their
direct contact universe.
Finally, targeting is constrained by the amount and type of data available in the
voter file. Data quality, content, and cost varies a good bit from state to state and from
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county county within a state In sonte state, there is a single statewide ntagneitc
tape available. The tncreased reporting and data processing required to comply with
Motor Voter legislation has led to an increase in the numher of statewide files.
However, in many of those states certain counties maintain better data than the state file
contains so the final file is a comhinalion of county purchases and the statewide tape.
Other states maintain voter tiles at the county level. That almost always means
that some of the smaller counties will not have automated tiles available This requires
that a campaign or voter file firm keypunch the data. There are even a few parts of the
country where the tiles are maintained by the town and not the county which produces a
profusion of responsible entities and makes tile building a difficult proposition.
Once collected from the proper authorities the files need to be converted to a
standard format before they can he processed. The special computer program and
procedures needed tor each tape take a programmer a day or two to complete and
might cost as much as $1000 per format. Sometimes it is possible that a number of
counties will come in the same format because a single service center does all of their
processing. With automated counties updating for new registrants, deletions and
changes of address are handled by getting a completely new tape and discarding the old
file. Voter files are usually inexpensive enough to make this more practical than any kind
ot merge-purge system. For those few counties still without electronic data it is
necessary to start the expensive and time consuming keypunch process. Keypunching
costs upwards of $70 per thousand entries. Keypunching also takes time. A company
might finish an entire statewide file in the time it takes to keypunch one medium sized
county.
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The data used by consultants either comes on the voter tile or is added by the
vendor. The data that comes on the original tile, often called the "base" file, is entered
and maintatned by the governmental un.t responsible for the general administration of
elections. The quality and content of voter files vary from state to state and from
county to county within a state. For the purposes of this study, only districts which
contain a minimum amount of demographic information will be used. That minimum
includes age, voter histoiyi. registration date, phone number, gender, ethnicity, and
party affiliation. It may be useftil to look at what each of these variables represents
and how they are collected and maintained.
Many counties collect birthdate at the time of registration. The presence of
birthdate allows candidates to send a specific message to particular age groups. In
what has become a regular dance for example. Democrats send mailings to the elderly
that accuse to Republicans of tiding to gut Social Security, Republicans respond by
either defending their record on Social Security or accusing the Democrats of trying to
frighten older people.
Voter history refers to a voter's actual election participation and is the single
most important targeting variable available on a voter file. Candidates use voter history
targeting to save money by removing non-voters from potential mailings or by
identifying voters who may turn out for only certain types of elections. In a presidential
election year, for example, it is useful to see who voted in 1992 but not 1990 even
though they were eligible to vote in both elections. This group of "presidential surge
voters" may respond to increased GOTV or may be the target of additional campaign
messages. Voter history is so important to direct contact targeting that many
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campaigns go to great lengths to add it to the file by hand if it is not available on the
base file.
Registration Date is often recorded by the county as well as age. If age is not
present, and regtstration date is. ,t can be used as an approximation for the age of the
voter. Like age. voter histo^, and regtstration date, party aff.hation ,s also included on
most voter files and it is available on all of the files used for this study. While the
presence of age. voter history, and registrat.on date varies from place to place, they are
often available, and when not available, universally missed.
In addition to data available from the county files the voter file vendor often
adds information including, but not limited to phone number, gender, and ethnicity.
These items are all appended to the voter using computer matching. Phones are
matched by name and address from a national phone file. Gender and ethnicity are
matched based on proprietary dictionaries developed by consultants, campaigns, and
voter file vendors. For gender, a first name dictionary is used. To code ethnicity,
most voter file vendors have developed large surname coding tables. Both of these
Items have a variety of political uses and are very popular selections although neither is
fool-proof Names like Lee, a veiy common Chinese as well as Caucasian surname
which illustrates the inaccuracies generated by the “melting pot” process in the United
States. There are also non-gender specific first names such as "Terry" or "Pat" as well
as voters who register by initials only. Ethnic dictionaries usually contain names for
Hispanic, Japanese, Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish, Russian, Polish, Greek, Armenian,
American Indian, German, and French surnames. It is important to note that
African-American is not an ethnic group that can be targeted by last name coding. In
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many Southern states race is coded onto the voter file to lulfill the voting right's act
which requires statistical infornta.ion by race on voter registration,
,n other areas,
precinct election returns are used to identify predominately African-American precincts.
Despite the problems involved the accuracy rate of gender dictionaries is over 94% and
that of ethnic dictionaries over 80% in most areas.
Because phoning and GOTV efforts are so important for direct contact voter
file, vendors must append telephone numbers to the base file. Like matching with
ethnic and gender dictionaries, phone matching is an imperfect process. There are
unlisted numbers, disconnects, moved, and failed matches caused by spelling
differences. Ifyou are. for example. “Hannahen” in the phone book and “Hannahan” on
the voter role the match will miss. Still, campaigns can almost always obtain enough
numbers from the file to meet their campaign objectives. There are several companies
that maintain magnetic tapes of phone numbers and they are usually generated from
keypunching phone books or buying tapes directly from the phone companies.
These then are the variables found on or added to voter files. Although the
process is mundane, the results allow the complex targeting to which modern political
campaigns are so addicted. In addition to fueling the machine of targeting, the rich data
available on voter files makes an in-depth study of campaign efforts possible.
3.4 Case Selection
The two data files needed to assess any relationship between direct contact and
turnout, voter files and contact information, are both difficult to collect and manipulate.
The difficulty of acquiring and utilizing campaign information is one reason for the
relative lack of election research. Voter files are enormous data sets. The average
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congressional dis.ric. has about 325.000 voters and each voter record includes name,
address, party, voting histo^i. age. registration date, and a variety of other bits of
information. Manipulating and coding files of this size is difficult and time consuming.
Likewise, collecting campaign direct contact information requires finding people who
years removed from the election and whose memoiy and filing system are faulty.
are
Manning the two files, by coding each individual contact to all of the voters on the file
who received the contact, involves substantial computer resources. Clearly, data
considerations call for case studies. It is be impossible to collect and manipulate the
information for anything approaching all of the congressional races - or even all of the
competitive congressional elections - during any given cycle.
The following study examines four districts, making up eight campaigns, and
their use of voter file information. The four cases were chosen with an eye toward
putting together what Eckstein calls a crucial case study. Crucial cases are those that
might present either the most likely proof of a theory or be a least likely case for
analysis. Four important criteria emerge from the previous discussion which frame the
choice of campaigns which, through comparison and contrast, will offer evidence on the
effects of direct contact and voter turnout.
1 ) Campaigns must reach a threshold of competitiveness but still present a
variety of competitive situations. In other words, the two candidates must
have spent enough money to make the analysis worthwhile but still
represent a range of competitive situations.
2) The campaigns must have generated a variety of direct contact
messages and used a number of mediums for the transmission of those
messages to allow for an analysis of the effects of different types of direct
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contacts on turnout. The caiupatgn must also itave
direct contacts to make study worthwhile.
generated enough
3)
Some of the campaigns must come from a presidential
must come from an otTyear, Tl.is allows for some control
year and some
over this critic al
turnout variable.
4
)
The campaigns must come fron, districts w,th a range of television
costs. Previous analysis indicates that direct contact is a substitute for
television, liy capturing districts with a range ofTV costs it is possible to
inter that voter contact elfects turnout at various levels of television
expense.
5)
1 he campaigns must come from districts where the voter files have all
ot the data needed for analysis. This includes a voter file with age, party,
gender, phone number, ethnicity, and, most importantly, voter history.
There must also be personnel available that remember the race and can
pioduce an account ot the direct contact efTorts backed up with
documentation
6)
Someone must give permission for the campaign to be studied.
Initially, twenty districts from 1 994 and 1 996 were chosen. Ten of the districts
were from 1 994 and ten were from 1 996. The districts were then divided between
competitive and non-competitive races, a distinction based not on a prior evaluation of
the race nor the amount of money spent but on the final outcome. Races where the
difference between the winner and the loser was 1 5% points or less were considered
competitive and laces where the difference tell above 15% were considered
non-competitive.
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Out of the initial twenty races, fourteen were eliminated because of a lack of
some critical voter file data component. Two other districts had one or more campaigns
that either could not or would not participate in the study. Since the permission of both
campaigns was critical, the refusal of one side of the contest rendered the district unfit
for inclusion in the study.
The field was narrowed to Maryland Congressional District 5 and Ohio
Congressional District I, Pennsylvania Congressional District 21, and California
Congressional District I Unfortunately, all of the open seats under consideration failed
to meet either the data requirements of the study or had at least one candidate who
refused to cooperate.
A summaiyi of the important characteristics for these four districts is included in table 3 .4
below.
Table 3.4: Case Study Congressional Races
District Competitive level Year Data? TV Cost Per point Contacts
MD05 Not Competitive 94 Yes Moderate/High Moderate
PA21 Competitive 96 Yes Low Light
OH01 Moderately Competitive 94 Yes Moderate Moderate
CD01 Competitive 96 Yes High Heavy
Maryland 5 and Ohio I are from 1994 while California I and Pennsylvania 21
are from 1 996. All four of the districts have voter files which meet the data
requirement. Ohio has age coding on 60% of its voter file but has 100% coverage for
all of the other variables. The other districts all have 1 00% coverage of voter history,
age, gender, and party. The column "TV Cost Per Point" shows that there is a wide
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range of ,elev,sion costs included in the study w,.h a Ingh ,n the California d, strict and a
low in the Pennsylvania race. The "contact effort", which wtll be summarized ,n g
detail in later chapters, is the combined total of both
district.
reat
campaign's contact efforts within a
The definition of direct contact and in this chapter, and a brief discussion on the
utilization of direct contact, as well as a description of the files used to implement direct
contact plans provided criteria for the choice of cases. Although the base voter files
contain all of the political and demographic information needed for study the direct
contact strategy and campaign effort of each campaign has not be explored,. In the
next chapter I turn toward the reconstruction of eight campaign efforts; one Democratic
and one Republican for each of the four districts.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ARENA OF DIRECT CONTACT
Was t^he phone and the mail usefuE You bet. It wasn't our biggest ticket
rad!!r s" rlem'"”
This chapter will reconstruct the direct contact efforts of the eight campaigns
that took place in the four districts under study. Each reconstruction will have three
components. First, there will be a description of the general campaign situation This
initial description will accompany a discussion of the campaign's direct contact strategy.
Secondly, there will be a detailed description of each campaign's direct contact effort.
Finally, at the end of each description, there will be a table which summarizes the coding
for each individual direct contact undertaken by the campaign. At the end of the
chapter each campaign's strategy will have been examined with an eye toward
determining the distribution of contacts among base and persuadable voters and each
individual direct contact will have been described, categorized and coded onto the base
voter file for analysis.
The campaign world exists in a time frame so compressed as to make "advance
planning" an oxymoron. Campaign organizations reflect time compression by coming
into and passing out of existence in six month intervals. Records from two election
cycles ago are difficult to find and, once found, difficult to interpret. Campaign
staffers have moved and even those remaining have only dim memories of past efforts.
Because of the uncertainty of this kind of information it is imperative to confirm the
Interv iew with Bob Holste, Administrative Assistant and campaign manager to Congressman
Phil English.
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data using multiple sources. Usin
finance reports, and a detailed
reconstruction are good.’’^
g interviews, original vendor invoices, campaign
review of old voter file orders, the chances of a
4.1 Maryland Congressional District Five: 1994
Congressman Steny Hoyer is a powerful nine term Democratic incumbent who
represents Maryland Congressional District 05. The key to understanding Moyer's
campaign strategy over the years lies in the diversity of the district that is represented in
the map on the following page. The map also contains a partisan breakdown by county.
Moyer's district includes more federal employees than any other congressional
district in the country. In addition, nineteen percent (19%) of the voters in the district
are Atrican-American. The neighboring 4th Congressional District has a majority black
population. Added to the federal workers and African-Americans is a substantial
academic community centered around College Park, home of the University of
Matyland. With such a strong core constituency it is no wonder that Moyer said on the
house floor in 1994. “I am a tax, tax, spend, spend Democrat, Let me make that clear,
and let my opponents make of it what they will.”
His opponents have tried to make much of such statements. Because of a strong
suburban Republican section in Anne Arundel county, combined with conservative rural
areas m outlying counties, Hoyer always attracts quality opposition. Like many
congressional districts nationwide, the 5th CD in Maryland, although heavily
A "voter file order" is the document or computer file generated when the campaign or consultant
places an order for labels, lists, or a magnetic media file with the voter file vendor. The advantage of
these documents is that they indicate what was actually produced as opposed to what the candidate
thought (or wished) was produced. Copies of the interview forms and documents arc in Appcndi.x 1
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Democratic, has experienced strains between liberal and consen-ative Democrats,
Mao-land 5 include suburban Anne Arundel county, partially suburban and partially
urban Prince George's County, as well as rural St, Mao's, Charles, and Calvert eounttes.
Although the district registration is heavily Democratic tt is the diversity among the
Democrats that has given Republicans hope over the years. The three rural counties
have traditionally been conservative on many issues even though the increase of long
distance DC commuters has diluted the socially conservative vote. According to the
Almanac of American Politics “Historically, this is a Democratic area but southern
Maoland has been conservative on many issues and voted for George Bush over Bill
Clinton, and many Prince George's and Anne Arundel whites are Republicans as
well,”"’ Hoyer faced well funded opposition in 1992 and 1994, In 1992 his opponent,
Lawrence Hogan, Jr, spent $265,065 while Hoyer raised and spent a remarkable $1,6
Million to keep his seat, Hogan, the son of a former congressman and a local Reagan
campaign chairman as well, won 60%-38% outside of Prince George's county but lost
enough inside Prince George's to be defeated by Hoyer 53% to 44%.
The discontinuities and contradictions of the 5th CD attracted another well placed
challenger in 1994. Political consultant and college professor Donald Devine presented
Hoyer with an experienced opponent with an impressive resume and reasonable fund
raising capacity. Devine had been the director of the Office of Personnel Management
during President Ronald Reagan's first term. After winning a hotly contested Republican
Barone Michael and Grant Ujifusa. The Almanac ofAmerican Politics. (Washington. D.C.
National Journal 1995.) p. 617
A table in Appendix 2 gives the electoral and spending histoiy of the district general elections
from 1992 to 1998.
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pr.mao', Devine waged an aggressive battle against Hoyer. Devine spent $58 1,000 to
Hoyer’s $ I 3 Million This time, Hoyer won both in and outside of Prince George’s
county and was one of the only Democrats in 1994 to increase his winning percentage
over the 1992 cycle. Thus, the 1992 and 1994 cycles saw a powerful Democrat residing
m a district marginal enough on paper to attract well financed challengers. Using the
Morns data collected for the 1994 election we can review the spending distribution of the
two campaigns.
Table 4.1: Distribution of Hoyer and Devine Spending
Campaign Hoyer Devine
1 otal
$1,295,285.00 $346,569.00
otT-OUT-THE-VOTE $93,544.00 $89,857.00
GET-OUT
-THE-VOTE% 7.22% 25.93%
Mail $39,684.00 $58,265.00
Mdll /o 3.06% 16.81%
Total Direct Contact $133,228.00 $148,122.00
ContactVo
Mote: Data tak(>n fmm rumrvainn
10.29% 42.74%
ke ro campaign finance reports and file provided to author by Dwight Morris.
The difterences in amount obscure an even greater difference in approach and
campaign strategy. In the last chapter we discussed campaign strategy in the context of
imperatives and incentives arising from the status of the candidate and the
competitiveness of the race. Devine, engaged in a difficult primary, spent a lot of time
and effort mailing to his Republican base. Mail is especially effective in a primary
because the message can be targeted to people of one's own party. Television ads in a
primary reach thousands of people who cannot participate in the primary at all. In the
case of a Republican primary in Maryland, this translates into sending a television
commercial to 303,444 voters; 1 03,362 of them eligible to vote for you on primary
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elecon day. The campaign strategy of each candidate was dictated by their status as
incumbent or challenger as well as the political and demographic construction of the
district. As a challenger from the minority party in the district Devine needed to put
together a coalition that included a very high percentage of his base, independents, and
conservative Democrats. This led him to a highly targeted strategy designed to
communicate with the most malleable voters in the most efficient manner.
Hoyer followed a classic incumbent strategy that included using television
throughout the district to trumpet his experience and accomplishments. Direct contact
was reserved for very specific voter identification and turnout efforts as well as an
attempt to raid Devine's base Although I will discuss the contacts in more detail later in
the chapter the overall strategic implications of the Hoyer and Devine spending patterns
emerge from their status as an entrenched incumbent and a well financed, but clear
underdog, challenger. Hoyer was working a plan conceived three cycles ago. The
incumbent's campaign centered on communicating with an already identified base and
built on programs begun as far back as 1990. Devine, as the challenger, focused on
reaching out first to Republicans for the primary and then to building a winning
coalitions of voters.
4.1.1 The Hoyer Effort
Corey Alexander, Hoyer's current administrative assistant, was in charge of the
direct contact effort. Alexander served as Hoyer's deputy campaign manager during the
1994 general election and had held that position for seven months preceding the
election. Although John Bohannon was the official campaign manager, Alexander was
in charge ot day to day details, including the direct contact effort. A local campaign
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staffer, Patty Fiorello, handled the Idndraising. Mark Mellman served as the Hoyer
canrpa.gn pollster and Matt McWdliams performed electronic media prodnction and
buying duties. The campaign used Voter Contact Service for voter fde work, although
much of the actual mail was designed in-house, Hoyer led 58% to 42% in the early
summer with favorability figures in the sixties and name identification in the nineties.
These strong numbers reinforced the campaign's inclination to run a positive campaign
based on experience and district service.
The campaign direct contact effort started with utilizing voter identification
records dating back to 1992, Some of this 1992 program was described in detail during
the introduction. Previously identified voters, from the 1990 and 1992 elections, were
computer matched against a current voter file. These records listed a number of
Democrats and independents as being for, against, or undecided in a Hoyer campaign.
The results were stored on a voter file in the VCS office. Just before the 1994 election
season the data collected during the 1 990 and 1 992 cycles was moved forward to the
1994 voter file This process eliminated people who had moved or died since the
previous cycle.
The campaign extended its previously identified universe by calling all of the
Democrats and independents district wide who had not been contacted before. After
this late fall effort was completed, Hoyer sent a mailing to both the favorables and the
undecideds who had been identified through phone banks from 1990, 1992, and 1994.'^^
The campaign also did targeted mailings to increase support in rural Charles and
Calvert counties. In its only effort to reach out beyond its base, the Hoyer campaign
The 1994 effort was a micro-coordinated campaign. Hoyer asked questions about a host of local
candidates as well and shared that information with those closely associated with Hoyer.
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ma,led a piece called "Choice” ,o Republican and Independent wcnen with phones who
had participated in the 1990 and 1992 general elections^ Finally, the Hoyer campaign
sent out a sample ballot to all Democrats and Independents ,n the district In a pattern
whtch will be repeated ,n other races under study the Hoyer contact effort concentrated
on those already hkely to vote Little cantpaign effort went to mobilizing new voters.
The campaign did tew, if any GOTV calls, but the Mainland Democratic
coordinated campaign called Democrats in targeted precincts on behalf of gubernatorial
candidate Parris Glendenning, The party work has also been coded back onto the tile
In a final phoning effort the Hoyer campaign called all of their favorable voters on or
around election day.
Table 4.2 below summarizes the Hoyer direct contact efforts. The first column
IS simply a code that designates that particular contact. Democratic contacts begin with
a "D" and Republican contacts begin with an "R". The second column describes the
contact.
Table 4.2: Summary of Hoyer Direct Contact Effort: 1994
Target Group Description Count
All Dem. Hnsids with a phone not previously contacted (sj875) 48,465
Rl Women w/ phones vtd 90 and 92 General (sj876) 3,249
All Ul Hhsids in Charles County Portion of the District (mh597) 19,510
All Ul Hhsids in Calvert County portion of the District (mhS99) 7,692
All Hoyer Favorables for Mailing (mh668) 27,944
All Hoyer Favorables with a phone for calling (mh669) 20,336
All Hoyer undecided for a mailing (mh664) 27,809
All Dl, sample ballot (mh222) 154,000
Democratic Party Phoning in targeted precincts 17,000
Note. Contact descriptions taken from interview with Corey Alexander; counts derived from invoices, job files, and
analysis of computer coded data.
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The campaign also sent mailings to in-house lists of fire fighters, business
leaders, and environmentalists but these lists have since been lost and cannot be
recorded onto the voter file,
4.1.2 The Devine Effort
George Nesterchuck managed Donald Devine's campaign The campaign did
not use a pollster. They used a staff member, not a consultant, for fundraising. Direct
mail, both fundraising and persuasion, was done by Nesterchuck and Devine with advice
from some of Devine’s consulting friends and colleagues. The party also supplied help.
Finance reports indicate that the campaign used national and state party resources for
TV production, radio production, and voter file development Persuasion mail efforts
made use of a voter tile provided by the Maryland Republican Party, The party had
acquired the file directly from the Secretary of State. Devine's organization did no
phoning or voter identification on its own but relied on the state and national parties to
make calls to Republicans in the district. Although well lunded, this campaign was
clearly run with local resources and talent.
Nesterchuck and Devine believed that to win they needed to add conservative
Democrats, Christian Coalition members, and the National Rifle Association to their
base of Republican voters. They also calculated that they would need approximately
two-thirds of the independent vote in the district. Based on this, and the national
Republican trend of 1994, Nesterchuck gave the Devine campaign an even chance for
victory. First, Devine needed to win a primary and to secure his small, but critical.
Republican base against a well known incumbent. To this end, the campaign sent six
mailings to the district's small Republican population. The rest of the campaign eftbrts
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used an ami-tax message to build a coalition of conservative Democrats and
independents. The campaign dropped a positive newsletter to the northern Prince
George towns of Bowie, Laurel, Beltsville, and College Park. The drop featured
information on Devine s public seiwice and anti-tax message. Although the campaign
did not have polling information on this area their analysis of local races and their
experience in the district led them to believe that these neighborhoods contained
potential swing voters. Next, the campaign targeted Democrats in precincts won by
Ronald Reagan in 1988 and George Bush in 1992.'" Following close on the heel's of
the Democratic mailing Devine's wife sent out a letter to all independents in the district
discussing his commitment to family values. Finally, a popular retired State Senator,
Jack Cade, sent a letter on behalf of Devine to voters in his former Anne Arundel
county district. The Maryland Republican party claims to have made GOTV calls to all
of the district's Republican households.
A drop" is a volunteer effort where campaign workers place a piece of literature at the door of
all voters (or sometimes, on all households) in a given area.
There are two types of direct contact targeting. One type uses demographic measures to contact
individuals. This might include age, gender, or voting histoiy. A second type is geographic. Geographic
targeting is often based on precinct election returns which include how a given precinct voted in a specific
election. The two types of targeting are sometimes used in tandem. Precinct election returns are collected
from individual counties, usually on paper, and keypunched into a spreadsheet for analysis. Demographic
information comes off of the voter file.
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The following table gives a snapshot of the Devine direct contact etfort.
Table 4.3: Summary of the Devine Campaign Conlaet Efforts
Description
Count
Kepuuiicdri Mailings (six times)
103,000
Lit. drop in Bowie, Laurel, Beltsville, Coleqe Park 71,712
Keagan Democrats
124,844
Wife letter on taxes to all independents in district 41,597
Letter from Former Senator Cade to Anne Arundel 45,645
Republican GET-OUT-THE-VOTE effort 63,098
uc:>i.iipiions laKen trorr
and analysis of computer coded data.
The campaign recognized the coalition they needed to build but, for whatever
reason, they concentrated on then Republican base. Some of this concentration was
due to the late September primaiy but the campaign also sent out three mailings to
Republicans after the primary. Nesterchuck admitted this may have been a mistake
Having a clear strategy is not the same thing as implementing it.
4.2 Ohio Congressional District One: 1994
Republican congressman Steve Chabot wrested the right to represent Ohio's first
congressional district when he defeated incumbent David Mann in 1994
. He was one
of many Republicans swept into office behind the Contract for America. It was not
only the Republican sweep that brought Mann down. He had to contend with trouble
within his own party as well. While trying to establish himself as an independent
Democrat and to distance himself from a then unpopular President William Clinton,
Mann cast one too many conservative votes for the activists within his own traditional
constituency. Labor was especially incensed by his vote for NAFTA which was,
ironically, a Pro-Clinton vote. His apostasy earned him a primary challenge from
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Afncan-Amencan State Senator BHl Bowen, Mann's original opponent from his 1992
race. The result was a hard fought primary ending in a 667 vote victory for Mann.
The first congressional district of Ohio is nestled entirely within Hamilton
County, Ohio and includes much of Cincinnati as well as a number of surrounding
suburbs. The rest of Hamilton county is represented in Congress by Republican Robert
Portman. A map and chart on the following page show the district's location and the
partisan composition of each community within the district. Cincinnati is a conservative
city and Republican by urban standards. Its immigrants were primarily German, but
over the years, an African American and Appalachian population has emerged.
Cincinnati may be the only city in the country to prohibit discrimination against people
of Appalachian Origin”. A major Ohio River port and a regional center of commerce,
the city is headquarters for the giant Procter and Gamble, or, as they say in Cincinnati,
Proctor and God. Milacron, a world leader in the production of machine tools, and
Federated Department Stores, Inc., which owns Macy’s also make their headquarters in
Cincinnati and bespeak of the city's diverse economy. Cincinnati is equally diverse
politically. Cincinnati has given the world Marge Schott, Klan rallies, and the
anti-pornography movement. Historically, Cincinnati was an anti-slavery Republican
bastion in an otherwise Copperheaded southern Democratic Ohio but, over time, the
city has developed a unique political culture with a strong third party offering additional
competition to Republicans and Democrats alike. Republicans, Democrats, and
Charterites, as the third party is called, vie for local office while Republicans and
Democrats, both seeking Charter party support, compete in the two congressional races.
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One or both of the local congressional districts has been seriously contested in almost
every election since 1964.
Mann's challenger was former City Council member, and current Hamtiton
County Commisstoner, Steve Chabot, In the general election dance between Mann
and Chabot, Mann would step away from president Clinton while Chabot would
advance the image of the then unpopular President one step closer, Chabot spent
S87I,77I to unseat Mann while Mann spent $1,001,393 trying to keep his office.
Despite Mann's slight spending advantage he lost to Chabot 56% to 44%, The political
history of the district's general elections is contained in Appendix 3.
In a race pitting a well financed incumbent against an experienced challenger
both sides were aware that the election might come down to the effective targeting of
swing voters. The number of swing, also known as "persuadable", voters may be small
but their importance outweighs their number. Both the Chabot and the Mann
campaigns aimed the bulk of their direct contact efforts at small groups of potential
partisans. Cincinnati is in a relatively low cost television market and much of a
campaign resources were accordingly directed to television. Each campaign used
television to paint a favorable picture of their candidate while direct contact was used to
reach specific swing voter in particular precincts judged amenable to persuasion.
Although the author is from the Cincinnati area, and was politically engaged enough to have
worked with then City Councillor Jeriy Springer, much of the description of the cities economic base was
taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa's The Almanac ofAmerican Politics Op. Cit. 1994
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Table 4.4: Dis.ribu.ion of Mann and Chabo. Ca.npaig„ Spending
The competitive nature of the district. Mann's problems with his base, and Chabot's strong-
base of support make this contest more like an open seat race than a challenger/incumbent
contest. Although Mann outspent Chabot the difference is not great and much of it is due
to Mann's expenditures on organizational maintenance before Chabot had filed (see table
4.4 above). Unlike Hoyer, Mann could not run a safe incumbent campaign. Mann was
forced to engage his base from the beginning and compete for persuadable voters with the
well known Chabot. It is not always possible to attribute differences in direct contact
expenditures to neat strategic calculations because consultants and campaigns respond
differently to similar situations, but it is clear that in this circumstance Mann's need to
communicate with his base required that he spend money on direct contact. It is the only
way to reach only African-American voters effectively with a specific message and to
speak to the other Democrats in his base without alienating swing voters. Chabot, on the
other hand, could target his direct contact efforts and spend the bulk of his money in the
relatively inexpensive television market.
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4.2.1 The Chabot Effort
The Chabot campaign was a unique combination of the professional and the
amateur. Many campaigns attempt to do all sorts of technical work themselves, but
most never rise above a level of technical med.ocrity, A campaign bogged down in
xeroxing, disk crashes, and production decisions instead of fundraising and voter
communication has serious problems. Consultants often wort, about candidates who
spend more time on campaign details than on raising money or meeting voters but the
Chabot campaign, while a home grown effort, avoided this problem and was efficiently
and professionally run.
The person who put the campaign together was Shannon Jones, She staned as
campaign manager in Januai^ of 1994 and now works for the congressman as his
administrative assistant. Characteristic of the Chabot organization. Jones, still the key
political decision maker after the candidate himself, lives and works in the district, not in
Washington D.C..
The Chabot staff produced its own media, fundraising, direct mail, and voter file
work, consulting occasionally with the Pennsylvania-based media firm of Brabender Cox
for advice. The firm was characterized in the interview as “helpful, but not that
involved in the race."
Although nominally a Democratic district, Jones pointed out that the turnout in
the more Republican leaning suburbs more than compensated for the registration
disadvantage. Ohio Republicans turn out at higher rates than do Democrats or
independents."^ The turnout disparity suggested a three pronged strategy for Chabot.
There is no party registration in Ohio. Democrats and Republicans are defined by Iheir priinaiy
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Firs,, work ,he strong conservative infrastructure tn Cincinnat, by using internally
generated lists built from sources that might naturally gravttate toward Chabo,
including, but no, limited to. Catholic Churches, Realtors. Christtan groups, and
Pro-Life activists These groups either received a Chabo, mailing reminding them of
affintty for their issues or were contacted by the group organization itself on behalf
of Chabot. These contacts are an important source.
Second, the campaign identified swing precincts by taking the Bush percentage
from 1992 and subtracting the Chabo, percentage for 1992 when Chabo, ran for
Hamilton County Commissioner. They then ranked precincts by that difference and
assumed they housed people who inclined toward well known Republicans, The top
200 precincts were designated as "Chabo, persuasion precincts” and were the focus of
nearly all campaign direct contact efforts. Chabofs targeting program is an interesting
combination of party targeting and candidate targeting. Although he was the challenger
his long record of seiwice had allowed him to build campaign experience and
organization.
Within the targeted Chabot precincts the campaign only targeted households
without a Democrat. The Chabot campaign also targeted Republicans districtwide
with a GOTV program. The GOTV effort consisted of one call on the Friday and
participation. The definitional formula for the 1994 file was "Anyone who ^•oted in the 1994 primary- as
"" Republican. Anyone not voting in the 1994 primal as a Republican, but voting
in the 1992 priinar>' as a Republican is also a Republican". A similar definition codes the Democrats with
the remainder being carried as "independent". VCS has conducted studies in Illinois and Ohio and found
that remarkably low number of people "pick" primaries. In Illinois, out of 6,900,000 voters, 7200 people
voted in different part}' primaries over two election cycles.
The prolife movement as we know it today was founded in Cincinnati.
In voter file language this universe would be “all pure Republican households, all pure
independent households, and all pure Republican and independent households”
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Saturday before the election and a follow-up call on the Monday before the election and
on elect,on day ttself Within these disparate universes, the Chabot campaign ran an
aggressive ground game using as a unifying theme. Another Family for Steve Chahot.
Chabot's persuasion pieces were modeled on standard Republican themes
developed for the 1994 election. His standard brochure emphasized local roots, and
featured a young Chabot with his parents standing in front of their mobile home. Inside,
the brochure detailed Chabofs local-poor-boy-made-good rise to community
prominence. Over the course of the campaign, volunteers dropped this brochure to all
targeted households.
The family emphasis of Chabot’s campaign, typical of Republican efforts in
1994, was coupled with other standard Republican appeals including mailings to the
same target universe on taxes and crime. At the time of the interviews no one
associated with the campaign still had a copy of the crime or taxes mailing but both
were described as positive pieces which listed Chabot's issue positions. Republicans
had not cornered the market on standard mailings, and Chabot had to defend his record
on seniors - a mailing necessitated by the standard Democratic attack on Republican
senior policy. The senior mailing showed candidate Chabot standing with his mother
while promising never to cut Medicare.
In keeping with its amateur ethos the campaign placed a volunteer in charge of
a comprehensive precinct leader program. This volunteer attempted to find one family
in each of the 200 key precincts who would be willing to have their picture taken with
Chabot and printed on a post card. The text on the reverse side of the card was
precinct specific and said something like “We live on Elm Street and we are another
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hamify for Sieve Chahoi. ” The letter was mailed by the
vicinity of the volunteer family. Eighty volunteers
campaign to voters living in the
covering eighty precincts were
eventually recaiited. Through a kind of geographic extension these eighty volunteers
saw their coverage increased to include 120 precincts representing over 30,000 pieces
of mail. These cards were sent to all Republican and Independent voters living within
precincts which had a volunteer family.'^^ The campaign also did, or benefited from,
substantial telephoning. 1 994 was a terrible year for Democrats both nationally and in
Ohio. The Republican ticket, headed by the popular Governor, George Voinovich, put
together a formidable coordinated campaign called Victory 94. It was Victory 94 that
contacted all Republicans with a GOTV call in the Hamilton county area. The
campaign itself augmented the Victory 94 effort by calling 10,000 Republicans in
targeted precincts. Victory 94's script was a simple 5 second talk which urged
Republicans to turn out and support the ticket. The Chabot call was more specific,
urging voters to go to the polls because Chabot was in a close race for congress. The
following table summarizes the Chabot direct contact effort:
Table 4.5: Chabot Contacts during the 1994 Campaign
1 arget Group Description Count
300 Top precincts/Drop on local roots/all Rl households 108,003
Top 300 Precincts/Mailing on Taxes/All Rl households 108,003
Top 300 Precincts/Mailing on Crime/All Rl households 108,003
Top 200 Precincts/Mailing to Seniors/All Rl over 65 11,911
Top 120 Precincts/Postcard from local families 45,572
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE call to all Republican HHsIds with a phone 51,906
GET-OUT-THE-VOTE call to 10,000 Republicans in Top 200 23,300
The volunteer was also an amateur photographer and took all the pictures as well as performing
the reemitment duties.
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4.2.2 The IMaiin Effort
The Mann ca,npaign faced ,wo n,a,or prohlcns; neither ofwhicl, was antenable
to improvement without exacerbating the other. The first was the unpopularity of
President Clinton, summarized by the Chabot slogan; ‘‘A vote for this Mann is another
vote for this man,” While addressing the Clinton problem by casting “independent
democratic" votes, he alienated his labor and African-American voters and drew a
difficult primary which cost money and political capital, leaving him weakened for the
general election.
The situation did not look so bleak for Mann in the summer of 1994, An early
poll showed him ahead of Chabot 48% to 32% Mann also had a fair ,%% to 32%
tavorable/unfavorable ratio. The campaign team charged with reelecting Mann was, like
many of the campaign teams under study, a combination of local activists and national
consultants. In almost every case the campaign manager was a local political operative.
In this case the team was headed by native Ohioan JeffBerding Berding was the
campaign manager for Mann from January 1994 until November of 1995, Berding
helped Mann put together a team which included the New York consulting firm of Penn
and Schoen for polling; Washington D.C, consultant Roy Fletcher for the production
and placement of electronic media; and Cleveland based Burges and Burges as general
and direct mail consultants. The campaign used a local staffer, Andy Goldner, for
in-state fundraising, and a DC based firm, FMG enterprises, for PAC and DC
fundraising. The division of fundraising duties between in-district efforts and
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Washington D C. efforts is ,u,te common and points ou, the nat.ona, and local
character of many congressional efforts. 123
Mann's primary challenger was Afncan-American state senator Bill Bowen, the
candidate Mann had onginally defeated for thejoh Bowen, with the support of the
African-American community and labor, lost to Mann by fewer than 1000 votes in the
divisive May primary. The campaign pursued the triple strategic goal of increasing the
perception of Mann as an independent Democrat, solidifying the Democratic base after
the bruising primai^. and increasing Chabofs negative image through early attack ads.
To accomplish these goals, the campaign ran an aggressive, heavily targeted,
direct contact effort. Like the Chabot campaign, the Mann contact effort focused on a
group of voters living in swing voter precincts. The actual swing vote was identified by
a combination of precinct and demographic targeting. First, precincts were identified as
swing through the application of formulas developed by the National Committee for
an Effective Congress (NCEC), a Washington DC group that performs these analyses
for Democratic candidates all over the countiy. NCEC defined swing precincts as
those voting for then candidate Clinton and Republican Senate candidate Michael
Dewine in 1992 as well as Voinovich and Democratic gubernatorial candidate Gene
Fisher in 1990. The campaign also gave consideration to precincts that gave a plurality
to both presidential candidate George Bush and Senator Howard Metzenbaum in 1988
These combinations allowed the campaign to target areas which lean Republican but
may also vote for a belter known and more popular Democratic alternative on the same
ballot.
See Herrnsoii Congressional Eledions.
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After completing their computations the campaign was left with 100 targeted
precincts, Mann himself, along with volunteers and workers, went door-to-door in the
twenty top persuasion precincts. The volunteers left literature at every door and Mann
talked to voters where possible A mailing called "Independence" was then mailed to all
households within the one hundred top precincts. The mailing was designed to build a
positive picture of Mann by emphasizing his independence from the Democratic party
line. Both the literature drop and the mailing featured the same material. Both were
positive, both contained pictures of Mann in the district, and both highlighted Mann's
voting record where it diverged from Clinton or other key democratic constituencies,
The next mailing, targeted to the same key precincts, compared Mann and Chabot’s
policies, A flattering picture of Mann on one side headed a list of issue positions on
education, race relations, and social security On the opposite side was an unflattering
picture of Chabot which listed his opposition to a number of programs touted by Mann,
These same voters received a tlnal mailing constructed from a collage of newspaper
articles praising Mann and his record.
Because of Mann s tough primary with Bowen, his campaign needed to improve
his image in the African-American community. They sent out two mailings which were
designed both to improve Mann’s image and to increase turnout. Because race is not
a variable on the voter file, the mailings were targeted to selected precincts. The first
As is often the case, no campaign staffer had saved any copy of the Mann mailings. These
descriptions arc taken from an interview with Jeff Bcrding, Mann campaign manager.
People often confuse "race" and "ethnicity". This is not limilcd to the political world but is
endemic to cvciyday conversation as well as within the social sciences. Definitions of the terms arc
controversial. However, in the political world "ethnicity" is a category which can be approximated by
using surnames while race cannot. Approximately 55% of African-American voters code as "Irish" on
ethnic dictionaries. Such targeting require care. There arc two ways to target African-American \ oters.
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African-American mailing was signed by Senator Bowen and endorsed Mann for the
general election. The letter pratsed Mann's efforts on behalf of evil rights legislation.
The letter contained nothing controversial and was designed to let voters know that
Bowen was supporting Mann. The second piece attacked Chabofs record on race
issues. Both pieces went to the same group of 38,567 households.
The campaign made two phonmg efforts Their pollster, Penn and Schoen,
designed a turnout program aimed at the Mann base The Penn and Schoen script was a
straight "David Mann needs your vote. Please turn out on Tuesday.” Your polling
place is (say polling place). Blue Chip Marketing, a Cincinnati-based telemarketing
firm, called selected precincts with a more detailed persuasion message. The phoner
asked to speak with a particular voter, praised Mann's record in congress, and urged the
voter to participate in the election on Tuesday.
First, someone who knows the area will simply list precincts they know to contain a certain percentage of
African-Americans \ otcrs. If such local knowledge isn't available, or not applicable, campaigns will
target any precincts that cast over 75% of their ballots for the Democratic presidential candidate.
Recollections of the Penn and Schoen call came from an inten iew with Jeff Rusnak of Burges
and Burges in July of 1997. The Blue Chip script review came in a phone conversation with Terry Ward,
President of Blue Chip Marketing of Cincinnati, also in July of 1 997.
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The following table provides a quick, visual summary
effort undertaken by the Mann Campaign.
of each individual direct contact
F able 4.6 IMaiui Campaign Direct Contact Snniniary
Target Group Description
Door to Door drop to all hhsids in top 20 swing precincts
Count ^
9 296
Independence mailing to top 100 persuasion precincts
ConiDSriSOn mailinn tn tr*r» IDA ... 1
56,418
^ lu lup Fvu persuasion precincts ^ 56,418
Newspaper Collage to top 100 nersiiT-inn
56,418
Bowen Letter to African-American precincts —38,5b/
Race/issue comparison to Atrican-American precincts 38,567
3«5,^8b
ciivfii lu beieciea larQeted precincts 15,233
4.3 F^ennsylvania Congressional District Twenty-One: 1996
All descriptions or accountings of Erie, Pennsylvania, begin with a sentence like
Erie IS the forgotten city". Third in size behind Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, it often
feels Ignored by the rest of Pennsylvania, falling into the great bulk of the state one
political wag characterized as "Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Mississippi in-between." It
IS even relegated the state's highest congressional district number; 21, as if the district
were an afterthought. The city has the best natural harbor on Lake Erie but few, if
anyone, thinks of Pennsylvania as a Great Lakes state. Northwest Pennsylvania is tied
by water and industry more to Cleveland and Buffalo than to Pittsburgh or Philadelphia.
Of course being "forgotten" is never much of an issue with the actual residents of any
given place because their day-to-day life is real enough to them. Part of that life in Erie
is a highly competitive political environment, reflected in the congressional district that
encompasses Erie and the surrounding counties of Butler, Crawford and Mercer. In
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1996 the district produced one of the closest House races in the nation,
district and a partisan breakdown, by county, is provided on the followin
A map of the
g page.
In 1996 the incumbent congressman for Pennsylvania congressional district 21
was Republican Phil English, He brought to Washington what one book calls a "varied
background" which, in 20.h century American politics, means a varied political career
as a legislative aid, campaign strategist, state committee member, candidate for
treasurer, and local elected official. English is a professional politician but one with a
variety of political experiences. He was originally elected in the Republican landslide of
1 994 at the age of 34, the culmination of a political career that started in his early 20's
Local politics tends to be Democratic and union, with contests taking place
along ethnic lines. Poles and Italians have long competed for local oftice. In the past
decade, some of the Italian community has moved away from their traditional roots in
the Democratic party and toward the Republicans. The Polish community has remained
more tied to Erie proper and is very close to labor. Outside of the city of Erie, in Erie
County, the battles are hard fought Reagan won Erie county in 1980 and 1984 but
Dukakis and Clinton won in 1988 and 1992.’^^
The outlying counties of Crawford, Butler, and Mercer make up 49% of the
district. Crawford and Butler county tend to be Republican but Mercer county, hard hit
by industrial problems, is a Democratic stronghold. Before English won in 1994 the
district was represented by the very popular Tom Ridge, now Governor. Ridge, also a
Republican, helped establish the GOP as a force in local politics.
District descriptions and facts talcen from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa.
.
The Almanac of
American Politics (Congressional Qnaterly Press, Washington DC 1996). pp 1178-1180
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English bea, Eric Leavans in a 1994 race that highlighted class differences,
Leavans contrasted hts background as the local son ofa Polish-American mtll worker
with English's histoo- as a mainline Erie family who had never worked in the private
sector, Enghsh stuck with the winning national formula for Republicans and called for a
middle class tax cut and attacked Leavens by linking the Democrat with President
Clinton, Evidently taxes and current political animosities outweighed perceived class
differences and English won by 4713 votes, 89,439 (49%) to 84,796 (47%), A table
summarizing the general election history of the district from 1990 until 1998 is provided
in Appendix 3.
The 1996 contest was very different, even if the outcome proved the same.
Always considered a classic marginal seat, except when held by Tom Ridge, Enghsh
found himself on top of every target list. As early as April of 1995 he was one of two
Republicans targeted by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC)
in local ads that sought to marry English and Gingrich. The ads had serious effects and
contributed to making the 1996 English/Dinicola race one of the 20 closest House races
m the country. English finally prevailed by fewer than 1000 votes and a percentage
margin of 51% to 49% despite outspending DiNicola $1,262,645 to $478,871.
English's spending advantage obscures the large role played by labor in the
DiNicola campaign and also hides some very diverse spending patterns in each
individual race. The two men faced very different strategic situations. Although
television was king m the 21 st congressional district, markets outside the lower cost
TV areas around Eire and intensive, targeted GOTV efforts by both campaigns led the
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to the use of the 2 1 st CD voter file,
of the two campaigns.
The table below summarizes the spending etTort
Table 4.7: Distribution of English and DiNicola Campaign Spending
Campaign
English
Dinicola
$1,262,645.00 $478,871.00
$118,930.00 $66,100.00
1 -
1
nt-VU 1 c% 9%
13.7%
Mail”/,
$151,287.00 $103,288.00 —
11.9% Ti.5%
1 oiai uirect Contact $270,217.00 $169,388.00
wUllldCl /o 21.4% 35.3%
ource: figures taken from EEC reports^
Much of English’s spending advantage consists of money spent on organizational
maintenance in the months and years leading up to the election. Over 85% of the
GOTV and Mail expenditures for English took place in the eight months preceding the
elections. The spending reflects their strategy. English needed to spend money
defending himself and his image against early attacks by DiNicola and labor. This type
of defense is best conducted on television. On the other hand, DiNicola had to spend a
greater percentage of his money on direct contact because he needed to spend time and
money solidifying his base, a more phone and mail intensive activity. The direct contact
strategies for both campaigns are discussed in more detail below.
4.3.1 The English Effort
Congressman Phil English's campaign was managed by Bob Holste, now
English s Administrative Assistant in Washington, D C. Mr. Holste worked as campaign
manager for Congressman English during the final three weeks of the campaign.
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Public Op,„|„„ strategy ,POS) was the., pollstet Ottosea/Sandets did LAC fundta.s.ng
a.td the campaign did local fundraising mternaliy Steve Meyers of SCM Assoc.ates did
direct mail and voter tile work while Murpy/Pmtak/Gautier provided television
production and buying. Again, the English campaign shows an organizational make-up
similar to fellow incumbents Hoyer and Mann. They all had local campaign managers
but national campaign consultants. They also had fundraisers working in the district and
in Washington, D C.
over
In the early summer a POS poll showed English with a 50%-37% lead
RiNicola and a 47%-29% Eavorable/Unfavorable ratio. This ratio retlects the
percentage of voters who view the candidate favorably and any figure under ,S0% is
considered worrisome fhe below average favorable figure may have retlectcd the early
spring labor attacks on English's record and required that the campaign spend money
early to both defend English and attack DiNicoia, Direct contact was only a small part
of the English effort, and it was concentrated in areas within the expensive and
inefficient Pittsburgh media market This is an excellent example of campaign tactics
based on the cost of felevision. The campaign senf out four mailings and ran an
extensive calling effort.
The first piece of mail was sent to all voters in the district who were 55 or over
and contained a signed letter from the very popular former congressman and current
governor, Tom Ridge.
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In the letter Rrdge defended English's effons on behalf of Social Security^ Ridge
wrote
Phil English realizes that Pennsylvania has the second highest seniorpopulation in America 'When it comes to Medicare and Social SecurityPhil s position IS co-stal clear; You earned it, you deserve it, you wer^promised it, you are counting on it, and he wil make sure you get it.'“
A second mailing went to Senior's throughout the district. This piece was a simple
oversized post card with a picture of a senior citizen and the headline quote "No one has
worked harder for us than Phil English," Butler and Crawford county voters, all ofwhom
are within the Pittsburgh media market received a mailing contrasting English's local roots
with DiNicola, who had resided in California prior to moving back to Erie, In fact, the
"Hollywood" Ron image built by the English campaign lasted until the DiNicola people
countered with their own message ten weeks out from the election. This mailing, with
small local variations, had pictures of English in the district opposite of DiNicola
surrounded by symbols of California like the Hollywood sign, sunglasses, and a road sign
saying California U.S, 66", All of it was meant to express the theme, "English is from
here; DiNicola is from there".
English also made heavy use of advocacy calls because, as Holste put it, “Phones
let your message get in below the radar screen." And phone they did. The Pennsylvania
Republican Party called all of the Republican voters in the district prior to election day
with a GOTV script which read "Tom Ridge and the rest of the Pennsylvania
Republican ticket need your vote, please go to the polls on Tuesday." The campaign
calls focused on Crawford and Butler Counties and used a script which reinforced the
mail. "Phil English is one of us and the Democrats have brought in a candidate from
Steve Meyers, English's direct mail consultant, kindly provided copies of the mailings.
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California'"^^ The n,ail also called DINicola a California Uberal and warned the voters
agatnst his dangerous liberal ideas!" The phone effort undertaken by English
encompassed the whole range of phone goals; persuasion, ID, and GOTV. The
following table provides a visual suntma,^ of the English direct contact efforts.
Table 4.8: English Direct Contact Summary
Target Group Description
Kidge Letter to Senior^
Count ' ^
—
Brochure to Seniors
56,994
56,994
Butler/Mercer county comparison piece
52,091
85,256
130,274
«.>dmpaign oalls to Butler and Crawford
67,943
4.3.2 The DiNicola Effort
It IS often difficult to speak of "the campaign manager", as they tend to come
and go like modern professional sports franchises. Bill Peduto was the campaign
manager of record for Ron DiNicola but he only held that position for the ten weeks
prior to the election. It is a wonder anyone would have wanted the job. The campaign
found Itself twenty-two points down with ten weeks to go. Mr. Peduto's first task was
to focus the campaign. After a series of meetings they decided on three goals:
1 Secure a strong commitment from local labor leaders.
2 Solidify the Democratic base
3 Schedule candidate s time and lundraising efforts.
No copies of the scripts e.xist. This reconstruction was done over tlie phone with Jack Zadow,
president of Grassroots Direct, the phoning company making the calls. The inteiv iew took nlace in
January of 1999.
Labor leaders supported DiNicola. The support described was a local effort to keep national
labor, primarily COPE, from dropping the race from its target group. The task of the campaign was to
convince local and national leaders that they could reverse the downward drop and climb back into the
race against English.
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To acccopHsh these three goals Peduto put together a campaign tean, that
included pollster David Bennett of Bennett. Petts & Associates the fundratsing firm
RMM Consulting; direct ma, I expert Ed Peevy of Dtrec, Response; and televtsion
consultant Michael Donilon of Shrum/Donilon/Devine. Peduto was a local political
operative but the other members of the campaign team were from out-of-state.
All three goals were directed at arresting drift and refocusing effort on a base
which, in and of itself, would be sufficient to win the election. It was a strategy born of
distnct demographics and time constraints. Tactically, the DiNicola campaign needed
to sohdtiy their base through personal contact and then use their abundant ground
resources to turn out their vote. They also needed to respond to the English attacks in
key jurtsdtctions. First, the campaign identified a core group of voters who had not
voted since 1992, These voters, mostly Democratic women in Eire, came to 15,000
households with a phone. Each targeted household received one identification call and
then two turnout calls.
Like the English campaign, the direct mail focused on Butler and Mercer
counties. These counties were home to a number of key swing voters as well as being
inside the more expensive and less efficient Pittsburgh media market. The campaign
sent two mailings into Butler county, both to all Democratic and Independent
households. The first mailing, called "Bricklayer" sought to redefine DiNicola from the
slick Hollywood lawyer portrayed by the English campaign to the ex-marine, local boy
made good, "Tough enough to box in the Marines, smart enough to go to Harvard", and
The campaign manager developed a mail plan calling for four mailings to Butler and Mercer
county. These were considered, at least in part, "swing" areas. They only had the money for two and at
the last minute funding groups in the state switched their money over to different Pennsylvania races.
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born to an immigrant
in Butler and Mercer
bricklayer at that. That the piece was mailed to Democratic voters
counties showed the importance placed on recovering a dwindling
The second mailing discussed senior issues and was sent to all Democratic and
Independent voters who were 65 or over and who lived in Butler county. The
campaign called this the
-Older Voter/FDR- piece and it emphasized DiNicola’s ties
to traditional Democratic issues as well as the threat Republicans presented to the
elderly by contrasting Democratic support for Social Security with "Republican Attacks
on our most important social program".
Because of the large number of labor volunteers and the importance of turning
out the Democratic base, the DiNicola campaign concentrated on phoning and literature
drops, both of which can be performed by volunteers. They did two large literature
drops. The first drop was done in the City of Erie and the Shenango Valley. The
second drop, done by labor union volunteers, was in Western Eire county. Both
drops were designed to improve DiNicola's image with his Democratic base. The
campaign used its volunteers for one final foray on the Sunday before the election The
Christian Coalition prints its political endorsements on that day and puts the resulting
ballot package on the windshields of cars parked at churches. The campaign got an
The definition of senior" is somewhat arbitrarv'. One voter file company insisted on using "55
and over" as its senior definition until the owner of the firm turned 54. The definition was altered to read
"65 and over".
The valley is defined as the towns of Farrell, Sharpsville, Sharon, Hermitage, and Wheatland.
Western Eire county is largely a campaign defined area and encompassed all of Erie City, Albion
Boro, Edinboro, Fairview Boro, Girard Boro, North East Boro, Waterford Boro, Wattsburg Boro,
Wesleyv'ille Boro, Fairview Township, Girard Township, Harborcreek Township, Millcreek Township,
Summit Township, Union Township, and Waterford Township
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advance copy of the piece and prepared a response^ Their volunteers then placed the
response next to the Christian Coalitton piece on each car. This activity took place at all
church lots in Erie. Butler City. Greenville. Sharpsburg, Parrel. Meadvtile. and the
previously defined West County area. The drop in response to the Christian Coalition
featured DiNicola with his family history and linked English to "outside extremists” who
didn't have the districts best interests at heart Unfortunately, no copies of the second
drop are left and none of those interviewed remember much about the piece except that
it was taken up with DiNicola's personal background.
The campaign called all Democrats in the district who had voted in two or more
of the last four general elections. In the city of Eire they called all Democrats. All of
the calling was short, direct, and partisan. The script read, in part, "Please go to the
polls on Tuesday to elect a Democrat to congress and stop the right wing."’^^
Labor also made significant efforts. In addition to calling and turning out their
own union membership organized labor helped the campaign to knock on the doors of
all Democrats who lived in precincts with an National Committee for an Effective
Congress (NCEC) defined Democratic performance of 70% or greater.’^® The door-to-
door effort was aimed at persuading Democrats and encouraging their participation.
Labor volunteers then made a GOTV calls to all Democrats living in the same precincts.
Both the door-to-door effort and the labor calls emphasized that it was a union calling
Provided in an interview with Bill Peduto, campaign manager, in June of 1996.
NCEC provides Democratic campaigns and parties around the country with precinct targeting
information. The organization is based in Washington DC and was very helpful in providing information
for this dissertation.
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and that DiNicola represented the union and working class vote. The following table
summarizes the DiNicola campaign effort.
Table 4.9; DiNicola Campaign Direct Contact Summary
Descriotion
Count
u iinsias in Duller and Mercer (Bricklayer)
56521
Ul Hnsids 65 plus Butler,Mercer (Senior/FDR) —
9996
All Hhslds, brie City, Shenango Valley (Drop 1)
81077
All Hhslds, Western Eire County (Drop 2)
—
115793
All D m E„e Cty; All D phone »,d 2 o, more Gen. In the reel ofii^Tcounty UDonej 42653
All D 70% IviCEC persuasion
22903
All D 70/o NcbC with phone
17070
4.4 California Congressional District One: 1996
The California first congressional aspires to fulfill Walt Whitman's
self-description; it too encompasses multitudes. Stretching from the Sonoma county
wine country to the rough, remote, country along the California-Oregon border, it may
present more contrasts and contradictions than any other congressional district in the
country. Although the most common image that outsiders take with them of the first
are the tall redwoods standing over the cliffs in the northern counties of Del Norte and
Mendocino, it is the more populated and suburban southwestern corner of the district
that provides the votes. In the 1980’s the population of Vacaville and Fairfield grew by
roughly 50% to more than 150,000, About 40% of the district's total vote comes from
Napa and Solano counties. The diverse economy includes agriculture, logging,
ranching, tourism, eco-tourism, and the military. The agricultural output counts
marijuana as a cash crop of note. The district contains Fort Ross, the only place in the
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lower 48 states ortginally settled by Russians, They built the for, in 18,2 and sold it in
1841. Had they waited another eight years they would have found gold and the 49'ers
would have had a distinctly Slavtc flavor. As it ts, the sale will go down as yet another
bad Russian land deal in the new world. The Redwoods live and thrive near then
distant cousin the grape vine. Where twenty years ago there were twenty winenes there
are now over two-hundred. A district map and partisan breakdown by county ,s
provided on the following page.*^^
This unstable amalgamation of economic, botanical and historical diversity has
given rise to a competitive and unstable politics defined less by traditional ethnic or
class cleavages like those that divide the more traditional Pennsylvania 21, and more by
cultural conflict between environmentalists, loggers, developers, and suburbanites.
The large number of working class citizens in the district has tilted it toward the
Democratic party on economic issues, but it has gravitated toward Republican social
Views in response to the influx of counterculture voters along the district's coast.
California congressional district 01 is represented by Congressman Frank Riggs
who took his background in the military and law enforcement and parlayed it into
victory m a tough 1990 election. Two years later Riggs, who helped uncover House
checking account overdrafts, found himself uncovered as well. He drew a tough
opponent in Dan Hamburg, one of People magazine's "50 Most Beautiful People" that
year, a charismatic environmentalist who had graduated from Stanford and founded an
alternative school in the district. Hamburg summarized the differences between Riggs
District description and political history taken from Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa. The
Almanac ofAmerican Politics (Congressional Quaterly Press, Washington DC 1996) pp 95-97
106
and himself by saying "He used to be a narc and 1 favored growing your own".
Hamburg won.
They battled again in 1994 Hamburg drew heavtiy on envtronmental suppon
and the battle turned into one ofjobs vs, conservation, Riggs was quoted as saytng, ‘4
say jobs first and not Earth firs, hke Dan Hamburg and the other environmental
extremtsts do”. Evidently the message worked better in 94 than in 92 and Riggs
regained his seat - the only congressman that year to do so.
Spending followed incumbent lines. Riggs outspent Hamburg in 1992 $716,401
to $647,532. Hamburg won 48% to 45%, The roles were reversed in 1994 and
Hamburg, now the incumbent, outspent Riggs $834,61 1 to $605,185, while losing 53%
to 47%. It IS probably the only district in the country where the loser has outspent the
winner two cycles in a row. A table summarizing the district's electoral history is in
Appendix 3.
In 1996, newcomer Angela Alioto surprised political observers by winning the
Democratic primary and the right to challenge Riggs in the general. Related to the
famous San Francisco politician, Joesph Alioto, and wheelchair bound from a skiing
accident, the telegenic Alioto proved to be a colorful candidate. Her surprising primary
victory made her a target of opportunity for the Democratic party. In addition to
providing the Democratic candidate, San Francisco also supplies the TV coverage. Its
stations dominate the market and make advertising in the 1st CD an inefficient and
expensive proposition.
107
Table 4.10: Dis.ribu.io,. of Riggs and Aliolo Campaign Siinipai ii pending
Campaign
Total
Riggs
Alioto
UET
-OUT-THF-VOTF
$1,390,399.00 $1,228,870.00
CjET-OUT-THF-VOTF®/.
$83,4ji'J.OO $61,443.00
Mail
6% 5%
MdiP/o
$431,023.00 $270,351.00
31% 22%
$514,446.00 $331,794.00
ource; FiPiires takpn frr
37%
P’rr'
^27%
Riggs outspent Aliot (see table 4. 1 0) but not by much. Both campaigns spent much more
money on persuasion efforts than on GOTV and both spent larger percentages of their
budget on mail than did other campaigns included in this study. No doubt the high cost
San Francisco media market constrained both candidates.
4.4.1 The Riggs Effoii
Phillips managed the Riggs campaign team. Phillips was from out-of-state,
unlike the other campaign managers in the case studies, but, like them, he went on the
become Riggs’ Administrative Assistant. In addition to Phillips the Riggs team included
POS tor polling, Steve Powell for media production; National Media for media
buying; and Bay Area consultant Harvey Hukari for the targeting and design of direct
mail, Shellie Garret of Garret Enterprises assisted with the complex precinct targeting
and VCS of California provided the voter file effort.
To pay tor this collection of talent, Riggs, again like the other incumbents
studied, relied on two fundraisers, one in Washington D C. and the other in the district.
The local fundraiser was Pam Simpson, a Riggs staffer. Tom Hammond performed the
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PAC duties in the Distr.ct of Coin,nb, a. In July, an Al.oto poll had Riggs ahead 4 !•/. to
39%, a dose margin for a race with an incumbent but not unusual in the turbulent
Californta firs, congressional d, strict. An early POS poll showed that between 40% and
45% of the dtstricfs voters held a favorable view of Riggs. Over 89% of the voters had
heard of Riggs as compared to near zero for newcomer Alioto.
According to Phillips, the campaign stressed voter turnout of its base areas as
well as targeting swing areas for persuasion efforts. The campaign message compared
the experienced Riggs who, as a congressman, had brought a number of local projects
into the district, and Alioto. the young, inexperienced newcomer. This message was
delivered by a two-pronged direct contact effort with the campaign in charge of small,
local mailings and the consultant team of Hukari and Garret providing the targeting and
design for larger direct mail and phoning efforts. The campaign undertook an extensive
calling and door-to-door effort based on precinct election return targeting. Precincts
targeted included all those meeting the following four criteria:
1 ) Dan Hamburg lost to Don Bosco in the 94 Democratic Primary
2) Angela Alioto lost in the 1996 Democratic primary
3) Frank Riggs beat Dan Hamburg in the 1994 General
4 ) Pete Wilson beat Kathleen Brown in the Gubernatorial
These precincts were the focus of a three part walking program. First, all
voters in the precincts were canvassed with an ID question. Second, the campaign
distributed a piece which touted Riggs' district work. Finally, all of the voters were
given a newsletter and a video that attacked a number of statements Alioto had made
109
dunng the campaign. Later, the campaign called back all of the favorable voters in
these precincts for turnout.
The campaign also did a number of local mailings. Mendocino, Solano, and
Napa county voters all received a mailing touting the work Congressman Riggs had
done in their area. The campaign did no, have any copies of the local mailings left for
the election but Phillips described them as "positive pieces which listed the federal
projects that Frank had either brought into the district or was currently working on.
The Napa mailing was further subdivided into a mailing to American Canyon City and a
mailing to all of Napa outside of American Canyon City. Riggs had worked hard on a
federal grant for American Canyon City. Finally, a local mailing wen, out to targeted
zip codes along the district's Pacific coast which highlighted the positive side of Riggs'
environmental record.
The campaign's internal effort was supplemented by twelve professionally
produced and targeted direct mail pieces and extensive paid phone work. The
campaign defined groups of seniors, persuadable voters, and base voters for targeting.
The actual targeting was very complex but, fortunately, the original production orders
were recovered and used for file coding. Seniors were defined as those over sixty.
These older voters received two mail pieces. The first attacked Alioto for "helping to
raise taxes on Social Security benefits by 59%". After noting that "President Roosevelt
would roll over in his grave" the campaign went on to compose another senior piece,
this one positive, touting Riggs for his leadership on the Medicare Preservation Act.
The persuadable universe was defined using a combination of precinct election return
targeting and political information. First, Democrats living in precincts which had
voted RepubHcan for president in 1994 and on the conservative side of a 1994 ballot
measure were chosen. The campaign referred to thrs target as "Soft D's".« Added to
this were Repubhcan voters who had failed to turnout out in two of the last three
elections. The targeted Republicans were called "Soft R's" These voters received
three attacks on Alioto. all designed to remind the voters that "She can't be bothered to
pay her taxes, vote, or live in the district" The first mailing was called "Her Heart" and
implied that Alioto. a San Francisco native who had moved to the district to run for
office, had left her heart in her native city. The second attack, called 'Little People"
detailed taxes that the wealthy Alioto had failed to pay on time and contrasted that with
a quote of hers saying "People who can afford to pay their taxes should be happy to pay
their taxes.’"” The final attack piece sent to the persuadable universe, entitled
"Bothered" summarized the other attacks with three lines: She can't be bothered to pay
taxes, she can't be bothered to vote, she can't be bothered to live here.'"^”
All of the mail pieces were printed on oversized pieces of glossy paper. They
all had a single fold in the middle and a spare outside cover sporting a head turning lead
like "Taxes are for the Little People The Riggs mail is an excellent example of a
graphic presentation mode which conveys a message to even the most inattentive
reader. It may also signal the passing of the assumption, common among consultants,
that a man attacking a woman in a campaign will come off as too harsh and
No one in the campaign could recall which ballot initiative.
The original quote appeared in the Napa Valley Register, March 16, 1996.
Quotes taken from mail piece provided by consultant Harv'ey Hiikari.
mean-spiritied. The Rigg's campaign not only attacked a woman, but one who
campaigned from a wheelchair.
Riggs targeted independents with three positive pieces. The first, "Clear
Choice" contrasted newspaper endorsements of Riggs to negative press for Alioto. The
second, "Fighting" simply listed the endorsements Riggs had received from local groups
like the United Seniors Association and the National Federation of Small Business. The
final piece mailed to independents highlighted headlines from newspapers endorsing
Riggs. The campaign also mailed a piece on the Riggs environmental record that
targeted Democrats. In all, the eleven Riggs mailings reached over 1 50,000 voters.
To supplement the mail, the campaign paid a telemarketing firm. Direct Contact
America, to conduct an intensive persuasion phoning program. Direct Contact called
the same persuadable universe which had received so much mail from Riggs and
delivered a message about Alioto being new to the district and inexperienced at politics.
All of the Riggs contacts illustrate the strategy of an incumbent with a tough race. He
emphasized his record in mailings to independents and he called his base but, in
addition, because the district was volatile and the race close, he attacked his opponent
by mailing to groups of swing Republicans and Democrats.
Table 4 1 1 ilu,i follows so.omarizes the Kiggs contact cITott Because of the
number of mail pieces an extra column giving the ca.upaign's nante for each piece IS
included.
Table 4. II; The Kiggs Canipaigii Direct Contact Sum,nary
"ri
R2
Her Heart
Little People
Soft R and Soft D
Soft R and Soft D
136,069
136,069R3
R4
Bothered Soft R and Soft D 136,069
R5
Roosevelt Seniors One
97,321
Seniors/Medicare Seniors two
97,321
R7
Clear Choice Independents
78,412
R8
Fighting Independents
78,412
R9
Headliners Independents
78,412
Din
Redwood Empire Dems voted 11/94 84,969
Local Mendocino _
K 1
1
Local Solano
K1Z Local Napa (RIO, 11, 12 = 160,626)
r\io Local Coastal Zip Codes 43,296 -
Phoning All voters with a phone 169,000
Walking One target precincts 68,070
Kib Walking Two target precincts 68,070
K17 Walking Three sg525,target precincts 68,070
4.4.2 The Alioto Effort
Tom Pier managed the Alioto for Congress from its inception in early 1996 until
the final vote was tallied in November. Paul Maslin of Hickman/Maslin and Brown
provided polling and strategic advice. Bill Carrick did both media production and
electronic media advertising placement. The firm of Gaddy/Neuwirth handled both local
and PAC fundraising. Ambrosino and Muir did direct mailing planning and production.
The campaign did no internal phoning but did work closely with the Democratic party
and its field phoning efforts. This campaign team was more local than many examined
in this study, Ambrosino and Muir, Gaddy/Neuwirth, and Bill Carrick were all from
CaLfornia, „ is hard to gather front this fact whether it is part of a larger trend toward
challengers hiring more local talent or whether Calfornia candidates can more easily
draw on the huge base of local consulting firms.
In July, the campaign felt it had an excellent chance to unseat Rtggs, Riggs’ high
name ID was a mixed blessing because his favorable/unfavorable ratio was 38»/„ ,o 37%.
The Ahoto's campaign's strategy aimed to link Riggs and Gingrich in the mind of the
districts many swing voters. Like many challengers she felt that attacks were necessary
to weaken the incumbent’s base. The campaign direct mail plan suggested that
resources be spent on targeted voters with a message that emphasized the Assault
Weapons ban, education funding. Medicare and Social Security. To quote from the
plan:
"He (Riggs) is working closely with Newt Gingrich to slash flinding for
education, Medicare, and Social Security. Frank Riggs is strongly
supported by the NRA and opposes the ban on assault weapons and
requiring waiting periods before being allowed to purchase a gun. He is
also out of touch with the needs of working families by voting against
job-training programs.'"^’
To get this message across the Alioto campaign developed a complex direct mail
target of approximately 90,000 voters. The target group consisted of three sub-groups;
independents. Republican women, and soft Democrats. Repetition of detailed targeting
information is tedious but it is worth quoting the Alioto targets in depth simply for
illustration. Unlike Riggs, they are simple enough to review, but unlike English or
Devine, complex enough to be interesting. The three groups are defined below
This special target group for the medicare mailing is defined as "All Independents over 60 plus
all R women over 60 who voted in 1 1/94 but not 6/94 or 3/96 or registered since 10/5/94 and did not vote
in 3/96
n792 nlnVr' and Greens over 30 who voted1 1/9 plus all independents and greens over 2S who voted in 1 I/Q4 nr
T
registered since 10/05/94.
Group b) Republican women: R
1 1/92 but not 6/94 plus Republican
not 6/94 or 3/96 plus all R women
2/26/96.
women ages 25 to 49 who voted in
women 25 to 49 who voted 1 1/94 but
1 8-49 who have registered since
Group c) Soft Democrats: Democrats over age 25 who voted in 1 1/92
3/o7°'i
'
'T'
democrats who voted 1 1/94 but not 6/94 or
s/qa’
w'’o have registered since 10/5/94 and did not vote4/96 plus democrats who have registered since 2/26/96.
Although the campaign recognized that it needed to attack Riggs it also realized
that It had to increase Alioto’s name identification. Messages coming from a known
source have more impact than those coming from an unknown source.'* The first piece
of mail was a reprint of a primaiy brochure called "An Independent Fighter for Us", and
made the case for Alioto as a strong candidate. Rapidly following the brochure were
five negative attack pieces of varying severity Two of them covered education with
one each on Medicare, Assault Weapons and the Riggs record. Like the Rigg's
mailings, all of the Alioto pieces were large, single fold, graphic pieces with very little
text. The mail was designed to convey a message to even the most cursory of readers.
This style of mail is often called "California Mail" because it is thought to have come to
perfection in the expensive Los Angeles media market.
The first education piece attacked Riggs on his student loan votes. The second
piece featured a picture of Riggs and Gingrich with the headline "Frank Riggs voted for
From the Alioto direct mail plan. Quoted with permission of Paul Ambrosino, principal,
Ambrosino/Muir/Hermann. All direct mail quotes from the Alioto campaign come from samples
provided by Ambrosino and Muir.
See Sellers, Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns.
Newt Gtngnch's plan to cut education by $10 B.liion The Medicare piece claimed
that Riggs voted to cut Medicare by 270 billion dollars, wh.le the assault weapon ban
claimed that Riggs wanted to repeal the ban. This mailing illustrates the compelling and
often aggressive nature of graphic mail. When looking at the front the reader ,s faced
with an assault weapon, held in the sinister looking gloved hands of an otherwise
anonymous crimmai. On the back is Alioto. seated in her wheelchair, holding the same
assault rifle, stating "Unlike Frank Riggs, I don’t think militatr-style assault weapons
should be sold to the public. The final attack piece used cartoons to highlight
inconsistencies in the Riggs voting record. All of these mailings went to the same target
group except for the Medicare piece which went to senior citizens.
The campaign had little or no field effort of its own and relted on the state party
coordinated campaign for phone calls. The State Party ran both volunteer and paid
phoning programs which called all of the Democrats in the district. There was an
additional local Democratic effort which tried to increase the turnout among Green
Party members, selected independents, and Democrats, but the local party organization
would not share its actual target information. Table 4. 1 2 below summarizes the Alioto
direct contact program.
Many papers thought she was implying she had been injured with a weapon. She was actually
hurt in a ski accident.
In keeping with the table convention for Riggs, the campaign names of each direct contact
effort is included.
Table 4.12: Aliolo Campaign Direct Contact Snmmary
Code
D1
Name Target ^
Count
'
D2
Fighter
Education
Target Group
Target Group
96,706
96,706
D3
D4
Truth
Medicare
Target Group
I arget Group Seniors
96,706
9,688
D6
College Target Group 96,706
D7
Gun Bdfi Target Group 96,706
Party Democrats
118,987
4.5 Summary
In this chapter 1 detailed the direct voter contact effort of eight campaigns in
four congressional districts through interviews with consultants, campaign managers,
and candidates, along with an examination of phone scripts, door-to-door scripts, and
mail pieces. Each contact was coded onto the base file and identified by source, type,
purpose, and message. One final result of this effort is a description of seventy-three
(73) separate campaign contacts reaching over 1.2 million voters during the 1994 and
1 996 campaign cycles. After the target universes for each contact had been defined,
each contact was coded to voters on the base voter file. Coding proceeded according to
the categories defined in chapter three. Each contact was assigned to individual voters
within five mutually exclusive categories.
1) Party Source. Did the contact come from a Republican or Democrat?
2) Status Source: Did the contact come from an incumbent or a challenger?
3) Type Was the contact delivered via phone, mail or door to door?
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4) Puipose Was the contact designed for persuasion, voter identification or
5) Message. Was the contact negative, personal, or issue specific’
Table 4.13. Summary of All District Direct Contact Efforts
Rpmihliran
MDOS OH01 PA21 CA01 Total
'
11 7 6 17 41
10 8 7 8 33
10 8 6 17 33
11 7 7 8 “41
15 10 6 ~19
~50
4 4 5 ~3 ~
1 1 2 3
nr\T\i
1 1 2 1 5
5 4 4 3 16
P6rsuasion 15 10 7 21 43
Positive 13 9 8 6 36
Negative 4 4 3 10 21
Issue 4 4 2 9 17
Total
Note: Cells reoresen
21
the niimher nf rnr
15 13 25 74
p t umb o contacts in each cateUy. Source: Interviews and supplemental sources.
It is not surprising to see a slight edge for Republican and incumbent campaigns
over Democratic and challenger efforts (see Table 4, 12). Republicans tend to raise
more money than Democrats and incumbents far outstrip challengers in fundraising.
Mail efforts out number phone and door-to-door efforts by a large margin. Sixty seven
percent of the contacts traveled through the mail as compared to 22% over the phones
and 9% via door-to-door efforts. Because mail is related to persuasion, while calling is
related to GOTV, persuasion is the dominate purpose of the contact programs and
occupied 58% of the total.
Given the media attention to negative campaigning it is a moderate surprise to
see that, overall, positive contacts outnumber negative contacts 43 to 36, Still, we need
.0 look closer at what kinds of contacts serve various purposes. The preponderance of
positive efforts is probably a result of most phone efforts being coded as "positive".
This brief summary is useful for understanding the types of contacts involved in
the sample of cases selected for study but it is the types of voters receiving the contacts
as well as the effect direct contact has on those voters that is of interest. Toward that
end the following chapters bring together the voter file information discussed in chapter
three with the contact information summarized in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RICH GET RICHER: THE UNEVEN
CONTACT
distribution of direct
shock all around when, toward the end of that election day our
Too ofTr^rd
“wards had already cashed morean 300 the 486 new registrations that had just gone into the books
In W "T ''°“8 showed roughly 100
that IoTT '"“'T “P at the polls, and we figured
t Iked likTzs'm A' "tat pointooked ike 25 might make the nut, particularly m a sharply-divided
three-way mayor s race in a town with only 1623 voters
wh5dr"“‘'^t‘'’°'^'’'’°"^'
Butwherei Nobody knew
. , until a girlo d been working on the phone network suddenly came up with a key to
a spacious two-room office in the old Elks Club building.
.. We seized the(office) at once, ignoring the howls and curses of the mob in the Elks bar
where the outgoing mayor’s troops were already gathering to celebrate the
victory of his hand-picked successor.
. By six o’clock we had the new
eadquarters working nicely. The phone calls were extremely brief and
dire: Get off your ass, you bastard! We need you. Get out and vote!'1 145
Who receives political contacts^ First, I detail the frequency of contacts with
voters in the four districts included in the study and then I analyze types of contacts
generated, 1 also examine the types of voters who receive direct contacts from
campaigns. What sorts of voters are likely to receive multiple contacts and, conversely,
what voters receive none'^ It campaigns are an important source of political information
and, if those same campaigns provide some motivation for voters to turnout, then the
distribution of campaign information among blocks of voters raises important normative
questions. Included in this section will be a comparison ofGOTV and persuasion
contact efforts in the context of campaign strategy.
Thompson. Hunter S. “Freak Power in the Rockies'" reprinted in The Great Shark Hunt,
Ballantine Books (New York, I979)p, 157
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In the hnal section. I will focu., on dillerences between pe, suasion and (iOTV
contacts and the etrotts candidates ntake to teach on, to
.ndependents and tnetnhets of
the opposite party, C’antpaigns ate contests w.th two piayets hut how ntany votets
teceive contacts front both. I low ohen do candidates tatget
,ndependents. often
consideted the ntost petsuadablo univetse't I low often do candidates a.tentpt to
contact members of the opposite party?
5.1 Kretiiieiicy
orCaii.paigii CoiKacIs
fhete ate 1 ,36 million tegisteted votets on the font disltict base llles and 05%
of those voters received at least one contact from at least one candidate,'-' Sixty-six
percent of the registered voters turned out. The eight campaigns made 4,838,297 direct
contact attempts to the electorate - an average of 604,787 contacts per campaign, or a
little more than two contacts per campaign per voter
Some ol llic contacts recorded in this study were made by political parlies. In one case, the
contact was made by a labor union. Still, this study did not atlcnipl to capture, and probably could not
have captured, the number of mail pieces or phone calls generated by Independent E.xpcndilure and Issue
Advocacy groups,
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Al r.rs. glance ,1ns ,e|ncsen,s a sign.llcan, dVo„ on hchalf ofca.npaigns lo
connnumcare d,recly will, Ihe elec„,a,e via n.a.l, phone, and dooMo-doo, eiro„s.
(see table 5.
1
)
I able 5.1: Total Niimbci of Voters and Direct ( oiitacts by District
District
Mnr.nnf;
Voters''*' Turnout At Least One Mean # of Contacts
OHCD01
265,192 167,625 (63%) 265,186 (99%) 4.45
PAf!n91 MQQCt
272,186 163,845 (60%) 192,804 (70%) 2.53
302,991 216,674 (71%) 290,281 (96%) 2.64
296,316 204,618 (69%)
“
292,461 (99%) 6.89
Note: Cells represer
1,136,685
t the number of voters
752,762
in 6ach ratpnnrx/ Porf-
1,040,732
represent the percentage of total voters w/ithin a district
In three of the lour districts nearly every voter was contacted by at least one of
the two campaigns. Even in the district with the fewest contacts, Ohio CDOl, 70% of
the voters received at least one direct contact from at least one campaign. There is
more variation in the mean number of contacts received per voter That figure ranges
from a low in Ohio CDOl of 2.53 to an astounding 6.89 average direct contacts per
voter in California CDO I With only four districts in the study it is not possible to
generalize on the reasons lor the variance in the number of contacts per district, but as
discussed in Chapter 3, it appears that even in our small case study group there is, at
least on the surface, a strong relationship between TV costs and direct contact Table
5.2 below compaies the mean number of contacts and the 4th quarter average television
costs per point. Although this study concentrates on the distribution of contacts among
voters and the small district sample size does not allow generalization from the district
The "miinbcr of volers" on ihc voter Hie is nol Ihe same as (he mmiber of voters lhal were
registered on election day. For example, after removing all of those who registered after 1 1/94 in
M.iryland CD 05 there were 265,192 thousand voters Icit on I1lc. However, on election day 1 994 there
may have been more. About 8% ol the voting population moves or dies each year.
1 22
level son. hypotheses do suggest thentselves. The average nutnhet of contacts pet
dtstric, does not seem related to election year or turnout. The low and high turnout
dtstricts are evenly split between Republican and Democratic incumbents as well as
presidential and non-presidential year cycles. Furthermore, comparable amounts of
money were spent ,n each race However. TV costs varied w.dely among districts and
the table below indicates the possibility of a relationship between the two variables.
Table 5.2: Comparison of Contact Mean and Television Cost
District Contact Mean TV Cost
CA 01 6.89 $491.00
MD05 4.45 $371.00
OH 01 2.53 $113.00
PA 21 2.64 $19.00
Note: TV cost is the 4th quarter cost per point of
the media market covering the largest part of the
•'^®dia Strategies Research
1998 Media Planning Guide.
The district with the highest TV cost also had the highest number of per capita
direct contacts (see table 5.2). The two lower cost districts; Ohio 1 and Pennsylvania
21, have correspondingly low numbers of per capita contacts. Maryland 5, with
television not quite as expensive as California but still substantially more than Ohio and
Pennsylvania, ranks second. Clearly, direct contact can be seen as a tactical substitute
for electronic media.
Most consultants agree that a message is registered by a voter only after multiple
receptions. One rule of thumb suggests that a television buy needs a minimum of 300
Gross Rating Points (GRP) before any kind of voter movement is to be expected. Three
hundred GRP s indicate that the commercial is seen by the target audience three times.
Many consultants feel that the "rule of three" applies to messages received through
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d.reo, comae as well All „ni.e aveiage con.ac, Hgures sun,n,a„zed
,n Tahle 5.
1
exceed or hover around the nragic number three The imperative to targe, particular
voters. when continued wtih the need to send voters ntuittple messages, suggests that
the distribution ot campaign contacts will duster among voters. Table 5.2 begins to
address the distribution of contacts among voters by displaying the dispersion of
contacts by frequency at every level of contact.
Fable 5.3: Distribulioii of C^oiitacts by Dislricl
Contacts
Q
CA MD OH PA Total
i
3,tiU6 6 79,382 127,021 95,944
9
15,249 10,922 39,687 74,066 139,924
18,703 44,766 20,791 73,390 315,300
0 10,069 60,314 46,181 63,930 541,482
26,323 40,389 26,412 38,001 524,500
35,546 17,318 21,068 18,177 460,545
29,108 27,233 19,839 15,715 551,370
/ 32,621 33,897 12,427 4,504 584,150
o 26,135 23,732 4,980 2,506 458,824
9 tT4,316 5,656 1,251 0 281,007
10 31,005 738 168 0 310,911
11 16,038 221 0 0 178,849
12 9,715 0 0 0 116,580
13 10,854 0 0 0 51,090
14 3,903 0 0 0 19,680
15 1,312 0 0 0 1,312
16 1,242 0 0 0 1,242
17 319 0 0 0 319
Note: Cells represent the number of voters by district, "total" represents the number receiving a contact when all
four files are combined.
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Table 5.3 contains a h.m of conventional wisdom as the plurality of voters
received between two and four contacts. Sign, f,cant numbers also received less than
two and more than four contacts. There is enormous variation among districts.
California CDOl is a major donor to the total number of contacts contributing all of
those receiving twelve or more contacts and the vast majority of those receiving eight or
more contacts. Some poor soul in California received a total of eighteen contacts In
contrast, a voter in Pennsylvania CD 21 might have received a maximum of stx total
contacts from the two campaigns combined.
Table 5,4 below uses the same information but summarizes it into categories of
low, moderate, and high contact groups. The grouping is suggested by the distribution
of contacts in Table 5,3 and the political goal of sending a minimum of three contacts to
each voter. The low category includes those receiving less than three contacts. The
moderate category includes voters receiving between three and five total contacts while
those in the high contact category received more than five contacts during the course of
the campatgn. The districts are ordered in the table from the highest to the lowest
average contact per voter.
Table 5.4: Percentage Distribution of Contacts by Frequency
state Low Moderate High Total
CA 37,807 (12.7) 71,938 (24.3) 187,571 (62.6) 296,316
MD 55,694 (21) 118,021 (44.5) 91,477 (35) 265,192
OH 139,860 (51.3) 93,661 (34.5) 38,665 (18.6) 272,186
PA 160,157 (53) 120,108 (39) 22,726 (8) 302,991
Total 393,518 (34.6) 403,728 (35.5) 232,698 (20.4) 1,136,685
Cells represent total number of voters within each district with percentages in parentheses.
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In Ohio and Pennsylvania approximately half of the voters received fewer than
the accepted target number of three contacts. In the two higher television cost districts
in Matyland and California majority 80% and 89% of the voters received more than
three contacts respectively.
5.2 Types of Contacts
What types of contacts were generated by the eight campaigns under study^
Who sent them and what types of material were disseminated^
Table 5.5: Percent of Voters Receiving No Contacts by Contact Type and District
Variable/state MD OH PA CA Total
Incumbency
Chdllen^er 10% 57% 37.7% 65% 43.2%
31.9% 57% 32.6% 2% 30%
Party
31.9% 57% 37.7% 65% 48%
Republican 10% 57% 32.6% 2% 25.4%
Type
Door to Door 76% 97% 53% 80% 76%
iviaii 0% 45% 49% 5.1% 25%
Phone 66.6% 65% 31.5% 22% 45%
Message
Issue 30.2% 67.8% 81.2% 15% 48.8%
Negative 17.4% 44.7% 70.3% 19.4% 38.6%
Positive 30% 29.2% 9.8% 12% 19.6%
Purpose
Persuasion 0% 44% 21.2% 1.3% 16.7%
GOTV 66.6% 64% 38.7% 100% 67.7%
Voter ID 79.6% 43% 67.3% 80% 67.4%
Note; Cells represent the percentage of voters not getting any contacts of the type listed
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Because ofthe mass of data available each categoi, is summarized by ihe
percentage of voters who received zero contacts within a particular category. Once
again there is significant variation between districts but also some emerging patterns
(see table 5,5). Only 2% ofthe voters in CAO I tailed to receive a direct contact from
their incumbent but fully 57»/„ of OHOI voters missed out on hearing from their
congressman during the campaign Overall, however, voters were more likely to hear
from their incumbent than from the challenger in the district. Voters were also more
likely to receive some form of direct contact from a Republican than from a Democrat.
Neither of these findings is surprising, even in a small sample like this one. Incumbents
are better funded than challengers and Republicans tend to spend more than their
Democratic counterparts.
Looking at the categories by "TYPE" it is clear that mail is more prominent than
GOTV or door-to-door efforts which might indicate that direct contact, once a medium
for turnout, is now primarily a persuasive medium. Moving on to the category named
MESSAGE" it appears that voters are not being overwhelmed with issue information.
Nearly half ot the voters in these four districts received no issue contact at all. Only
38.6% failed to get a negative piece while only 19.6% received no positive name-ID
contact.
The emphasis on mail, a primarily persuasive medium, is also reflected in the
distribution by purpose. 67% of the voters received no GOTV or ID contact at all from
the campaigns while only 16.7% missed out on a persuasive contact. It is clear that
direct contact, one ot the prime elite voter mobilization tools is, at least in these case
studies, primarily a persuasive and not a turnout mechanism.
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The predominance of incumbents and Republicans as a source of direct contact,
as well as the dominance of persuaston matl is clearly seen by looktng at the mode - a
measure the is very sensitive to strategic considerattons. In Mat^land for example, the
mode is six for persuasion contacts. This captures the challengers decision to mail ntne
letters to all Republicans in the district. However, what is interesting when looking at
the modes is not the four measures which manage to reach two or more but the
overwhelming majority of zero or one which ind,cates that, in any given category, a
plurality of voters received one or fewer of that type of contact. Even in cases where
the mean is above two mode often remains zero or one.
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Presented by Distric"
^
Variable/State MD
Mean
Mode OH
Mean
Mode PA
Mean
Mode CA
Mean
Mode Total
Mean
Mode
nicuniDBncy
Inriimhont
3.14 1.00 1.41 0.00 1.16 0.00 1.70 0.00 1.82 0.00
1.31 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.48 0.00 5.19 5.00 2.32 0.00
narty
1.31 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.16 0.00 1.70 0.00 1.33 0.00
3.14 1.00 1.41 0.00 1.48 0.00 5.19 5.00 2.82 0.00
Type
0.24 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.60 ^0.00 0.41 0.00
3.80 6.00 2.08 0.00 1.05 0.00 5.50 4.00 3.12 0.00
Phone 0.34 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.87 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.62 1.00
Message
Issue 0.94 1.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.00 2.10 1.00 0.95 0.00
Negative 1.68 1.00 0.69 0.00 0.49 0.00 3.28 4.00 1.54 0.00
Positive 1.83 0.00 1.49 0.00 1.78 1.00 1.51 1.00 1.65 1.00
Purpose
Persuasion 3.78 3.00 1.05 0.00 1.51 1.00 6.69 7.00 3.28 2.00
GOTV 0.47 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00
Voter ID 0.20 0.00 1.06 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.44 0.00
If the modes alert us to the plurality of voters getting almost none of each
different type of contact the mean emphasizes those contacts that were concentrated on
groups of targeted voters. Although state variation is again high, the same patterns
emerge as in table 5.5. Incumbents and Republicans put more contacts into the hands of
voters. The most common contact type was persuasion mail with phone, door-to-door,
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positive or negative with issue contacts far behind
^>.3 Who is Contacted?
What vote, a receive mult, pie coutacts and what voters are ignored ' The
literature on voter turnout, as well as our discussion of direct contact targeting,
strategy, and implementation, suggests a number of working hypotheses
The distribution of campaign contacts is the mean number of contacts going to
specific voter groups. This distribution is a function of targeting which in turn depends
on campaign strategy and the availability of data. As discussed in chapter four,
campaigns oi'ten pursue the dual goal of holding onto a base while attracting undecided
voters. Interactions between base and undecided furnishes the material for varied
strategic themes. A campaign may raid its opponent's base or lake a stance that
alienates supporters while adding additional votes elsewhere. While making judgments
about when and how to contact base and undecided voters, targeting displays its
strategic side but there is also a large budgetary element in such decision. While the
strategic element m targeting focuses on getting the right message into the right hands
the budgetary element looks to save scarce resources by directing contacts to likely
voters. Any given contact needs to balance both elements. This suggests the
hypothesis that people with a history ol voting will receive more contacts than those
without such a history. Past voting history on a voter file becomes a substitute for
standard turnout predictors like education, race, and income. Age, another strong
turnout predictor, is available on the voter file, so we would expect campaigns to
contact older voters more frequently than younger ones. A review of the contacts
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—
„, „.i,
I selection vaiiable gioiip illustrates the dual nature of targeting. On the one
age ngu,es ,n,o ,ssue ,„a,„„gs. As a
„u,e,- efeens a.e n,o,e
,n,e,c.s,ecl
Social
.Security and that single prog, an, has pr ovided nnn e than ,ts share of partisan
conlhct over the years. Dentocra.s
.out.nely accuse Kepuhheans of want,,,g to gut
Social Security and Reptdrhcans routinely respond, like |.|nl Grannn, "Ah would nevah
cut iny tnonnna's check.” Older citizens are also more likely to vote so campaigns
target them to make sure then contacts get into the hands of likely voters Thus, age is
I'oth an issue target group and a measure of voting propensity,
I’ohtical party also serves holh a strategic and budgetary purpose, l-arty
members vote at higher rates than do nonparty memhers. In the fotir districts under
study, in the election year tinder study, 67% of the voter universe turned out. fins
translates into a 75% turnout for Republicans; 72% for Democrats and 44% for the
unaffiliated virters. Many people claim to be independent and, when defending that
choice, like to say they "vote the man and not the party" A more accurate expression
for independents might be, "Don't vote for either".
Party also plays a major role m strategic calculations that look to solidify or turn
out a base vote. Even with the assumption that some campaigns will target
independents as easily identifiable swing voters the combination of turnout efforts and
targeting by voter history should put more contacts into people's hands who are
registered with one party or another.
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'< 'S also poss.ble
.hat all of these effects will no. exts. at one ti.ne and. in fact,
may cancel one another out. For exatnple. tf a campaign follows a strategy of
appeahng heavily to its base, as Donald Devtne did ,n Maryland CD05 in 1994
,
then
.here will not be much of a relationship between pas. voting history and age. The
blanket mailings to Republicans will cancel out the age and voter his.0.7 effect.
Strategic choices will influence the concentration of contacts but those strategic choices
still take place in the context of modern campaign targeting. One or more of the
relationships between age. voter history, and patly will hold tnte. In summa^. we can
expect the distribution of voter contacts
.0 take on many guises, but regardless of the
nnx, we might also expect .0 find patterns. Such patterns will include strategies that
tunnel more contacts to older voters; frequent voters, and party members. Which
combination ofgroup factors depends on strategic and tactical campaign decisions.
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bfolt:
«' h, v„,e.. A,e, P.. P...,.,
' represent means based on samples amounting to 5% of each base file.
Table 5.7 shows the iiiean number of contacts by the voter demographic groups
of age, voter history, party, gender and the presence of a telephone. A breakdown by
presidential and off-year election is provided for the file as a whole. Looking first to the
means for the combined file of all eight campaigns some general patterns emerge.
Because the districts were all chosen to represent a mix of strategic situations the fact
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that some general patterns still emerge is interesting. Older
contacts than younger voters. Although the move from
dramatic the difference between the
voters receive more
one age group to another is not
youngest group and the oldest is more than two
full contacts. Less dramatic, hut still noticeable are the differences between party and
voting histooi. With pany. independents are less likely to be contacted than are either
Republicans or Democrats.
The case of voting histoiy is more complex. Looking at all eight campaigns
combined in the "TOTAL" column, people who voted in four elections receive nearly
one more contact, on average, than those voting in no elections However, most of this
change takes place between voters who voted in one election and those voting in two
or more elections. In fact, the mean number of contacts tends to peak with voters who
voted in two elections. This non-linear relationship highlights the tension involved when
targeting using voter history. The tension is caused by attempts to balance the chance
of sending a piece of mail to a voter who will participate with attempts to send a piece
of mail to the universe who will participate in the election ,n question. If for example, if
you sent a newsletter to those who had voted in live of the last five elections that
newsletter would no doubt find its way into the hands of very likely voters. However, it
would not find its way into the hands of the majority of people who will turn out to vote
in that election. The most important tradeoff, when targeting to save money, is
between reaching a voter who is sure to vote and reaching the universe of people who
will vote in the election in question. The tradeoff involved in targeting is examined in a
series of articles written in 1 990 by William Daly, President of Voter Contact Services,
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and Professor Ro.er, Hughes of ,he University of Colorado The study calls the
likelihood of sending a piece of mail to a person who will vote a "hit". It then refers to
.he percentage of people who vote who get a piece of mail the "cover". It is evident
from the studies that there is a distinct tradeoff between hit and cover. In the 1988
Iowa Democratic Prima^ for example, a piece of mail that went to voters who had
participated in the 1984 and
.986 primaries reached voters participating in the 1988
primal^ slightly over 60% of the time. However, that mailing only covered 38% of
those turning out for the 1 988 election. Conversely, a mailing sen. to those who had
voted in the 84 and 86 general elections covered 91% of those turning out to vote in the
1988 primaoi but only 30% of those receiving that particular piece of mail voted. The
more finely tuned the targeting the higher the hi. rate of any mail piece but the lower the
total cover. Consultants are usually aware that targeting by past voter his.oiy is ve^
useful in ensuring that a piece of mail gets into the hands of a likely participant but they
are cautious lest their selections be so complex as to miss large numbers of other
electoral participants. The tension between hit and cover may explain why the effect of
voter history on turnout is not stronger and appears to level off after two elections.
Strategic distinctions also emerge from a review of Table 5
.
1
. In Maryland,
where the Republican campaign chose to work almost exclusively on its base, there is
little, if any, relationship between the number of contacts and age or voter history.
There is, however, a strong relationship between the number of contacts and party. In
Pennsylvania, where labor was targeting a freshman Republican, social security was a
major issue. The result is seen in the targeting priorities. The strongest relationship
William Daly and Robert Hughes. "Hit v. Cover in the 1988 and 1990 Elections". Unpublished
Study. 1992. Quoted with permission of the authors.
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appears to be between age and the number of contacts. In Pennsylvania 2 1 voters over
65 show a mean number of contacts that is four times that of voters under 25,
California, with its highly targeted and
history show an increase m
intense direct mail campaign, both age and voter
means In Ohio 01, with most of the efforts focused on
precincts, there ,s a flatter pattern among all of the variables because all of the different
demographic groups within each precinct received a I, he number of contacts With the
slight exception ofCalifornia, none of the districts shows a difference between the
number of contacts received by a male and the
female.
mean
mean number of contacts received by a
No, surprisingly, one of the strongest relations is that of the presence or absence
of a telephone. There is a tautology involved here GOTV is a phone driven effort so
those without a phone cannot receive GOTV calls. Still, this near tautology does
highlight the distinction between GOTV and persuasion. They have different purposes
and practitioners, I, is to the differences between these two activities to which we now
turn.
5.4 Turnout and Persuasion Differences
We might expect GOTV and persuasion to show different distribution patterns.
GOTV was usually a partisan effort in our case study while persuasion contacts were
often targeted by precinct, age, or voter history.
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J:d b/cOTv"" Co„,ac,s for Vo.er Demographic Groups by Persuasion
As expected the strongest variation occurs between party members and nonparty
members (see table 5,8) Overall, independents received a mean of .01 GOTV
contacts while Republicans received 0.7 and Democrats 0.3 This pattern is repeated in
all of the districts where there were GOTV efforts. What is most surprising about the
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d.str.bu„on ofGOTV contacts is that, even when looking at eight campaigns, all using
different strategies, the overall pattern points strongly to older voters
voters, and party members receiving GOTV contai
rs, more frequent
acts more frequently than younger,
lower turnout, nonparty members. Even efforts designed to encourage turnout gravitate
to those most likely to turnout. Tins pattern is mcely highlighted in an article on
GOTV from Campaigns and Elections magazine.
thalyou da l«se
2)
You need GOTV to make sure favorably inclined voters don't si
vote tor the top of the ticket.
imply
3) You need GOTV if you have significant voter support among peoplewho are part ot neither Democratic nor Republican base constituencies.
4) You need GOTV if your support constituency includes voting groups
that are historically low in turnout.
^ ^
5)
You need GOTV if turnout manipulation is the only way to
election.
win your
Ot these rationales for GOTV only numbers 4 and 5 indicate that efforts may be
targeted to non-voters. Even GOTV efforts appear to be targeted to infrequent voters
rather than non-voters. Non-participants do not even get the benefit of an extra nudge
to the polls.
It turnout shows a strong party prejudice and weaker relationships to age and
voting frequency, persuasion shows an even greater number of possible patterns. The
overall effect, when looking at the eight campaigns together, is still the same. Older
voters get two more persuasion contacts than younger voters. Frequent voters also get
Ron Fauchcux, "Do Yon Need GET-OUT-THE-VOTE" Can,paigns ami Elections Magazine^
Oclober/November 19%. pp 54-55.
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more contacts than do infrequent voters hut w,th the same nonlinear pattern, peaking
around two or three elections. Oddly enough, voters w.th a phone receive nearly two
t.mes as many persuasion contacts than do voters without a phone It could he that the
presence of a phone is another stand m for the stability measures so often associated
with higher voter turnout.
e staik differences in the persuasion patterns between states, Ohio and
Maodand show almost no dift'erence between the number of persuasion contacts
received by older voters while California and Pennsylvania both show strong growth in
the number of contacts as we move up the age groups. This may well be a result of
strategic calculations. Both Maiyland and Ohio were otTyear races while California and
Pennsylvania shared the spotlight with the presidential race. Social Security is the most
likely persuasion piece to be mailed to senior citizens. It is possible that the issue is
more salient in a presidential year, serving as one of the few national issues in the
congressional arsenal. Likewise, neither Maryland or Ohio shows any more persuasion
contacts for frequent than infrequent voters. In tact, they display an odd pattern:
frequent voters are contacted more often, relatively speaking, for GOTV than they are
tor persuasion. California and Pennsylvania both show some indication that frequent
voters receive more contacts than infrequent voters. Again, in a non-presidential year,
the lower voter turnout forces candidates to target more likely voters. It is simply too
hard to get infrequent voters to the polls in off-year elections.
Maryland, while not showing an age or a frequent voting pattern does show a
strong party distribution tor contacts with Republicans receiving 6,5 contacts on
average to 2.3 and 2,5 for Democrats and independents respectively. Ohio is the
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exception ,o the party ™|e. There
,s, however, no pany reg.strat.on in Oh.o The
destination of Repubhcan or Detnocrat
,s ass.gned by prt.a^ patttcpatton. Because of
low pnntary turnouts, independents make up 60% of the Ohio Congressional District 01
electorate. Neither campaign could afford to target all independents so they both relted
on precnct targeting with the result betng a flattening out of other demographtc patterns
m deference to the geographic, as opposed to demographic, nature of the targeting.
5.5 Battle Ground Voters
Although campaigns concentrate on turning out the.r own supporters they also
focus on persuadable voters and. occasionally, members of the opposite party. I, is not
uncommon for both campaigns to target the same "swing" voters, nor is unusual for a
candidate to try to shore up his or her own base in response to raids from the other
campaign. Two campaigns competing for the same voters creates a battle ground for
p suasion and turnout. Republicans received twice as many contacts from their fellow
Republicans and Democrats over three times as many contacts from Democrats as from
Republicans (see table 5.9) This pattern holds tme in all states except California where
the Republican campaign went to great lengths to target swing Democrats. If
information from an opposing source is often a factor in changing a partisan's vote it is
clear that that information needs to come from a source other than campaign direct
contact.
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Table 5.9 Mean
Den.ocn,itic Contacts by Party
Party
D voters
MD R
1.09
MD D
2.04
OH R
0
~OHD
0.87
”~PAR
1.01
PA D
1.8
CA R
5.5
CD D Main R Main D
R voters
1 voters
6.9
1 43
0.15 2.85 0 r2.14 0.49 5.5 0.6
2.2
4.3
1.84
0.36
l.o4 1.29 1.66 0.6 0.6 3.6 2.7 1.77 1.77
Allhough neither party expends much etlbrt in reaching out to members of the
opposite party, both Republicans and Democrats do work at contacting independent
voters. Overall, both Republican and Democrats produced a mean number of 1 .77
contacts to independent voters. Although candidates pay more attention to panisans.
they both pay some attention to independents. Who these independents are is an
important normative question They are less likely to vote than are Republicans or
Democrats and therefore more malleable to elite voter turnout efforts and because
journalist, politicians, and academics all view independents as the most readily
identifiable swing vote.
Forty one percent of the independents on the base tile receive from 0 to 2
contacts (see Table 5. 10) In tact, 45% of the independents on tile received no contact
at all trom any campaign.
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Although in Califonna non-aligned voters were included in the cantpaign, in all
of the other districts under study they were largely tgnored.
Table 5.10: Percent of Contacts by Range for Independents by State
Range MD
0-2 44.6%
3-5 53%
6-8 \2.Z%
Over 8 0
OH
44.2%
14.9%
0.9%
Cells represent percent of independents
PA Main
25% 95.7% 41.3%
19% 3.3% 37.6%
22.9% 1%
”l3.1«/o
33.9%
eceivina a aivpn mi
0 8.1%
calculated using the eniire univers^for each disl" es are
Even though independents are frequently ignored, there ,s some variation
among the districts. In Ohio congressional district Oi for example, 44.2% of the
independent voters received from 3 to 5 contacts while only 3.3% of the Pennsylvania
independents received a like amount. This result is at the intersection of strategic
calculations and registration law. In Ohio, the lack of party registration produces a
partisan list ot Republican and Democrats based on their past primary participation.
These primai7 participants are usually taken, and rightly so, as highly partisan.
Campaigns are forced to concentrate on the unknown group of independents. In
contrast, therer are very few independents in Pennsylvania because state law encourages
registration in on of the parties. As a result, candidates must focus more resources on a
larger group of party registrants whose partisanship is not so tightly defined as in Ohio.
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Table 5.11:
Number of
Mean Number of Cont
Elections Voted
acts Received by liidepende iits by Age and
The results in table 5, 1
1
mirntr the distribution of contacts among all voters only
with even more concentration in the hands oflikely voters. Voters over 65 receive, on
average, three times as many contacts as do voters 25 and under. Likewise, there is a
noticeable jump in the mean number of contacts when comparing those who voted in
two or more elections with those who voted in less than two elections. In fact, the
relationship between age, voter history, and the mean number of contacts is evident in
every district except Pennsylvania where only age appears as a factor in independent
voter contact targeting. Once party is removed as a factor it is clear that campaign
communications reach older, more frequent voters. Even among that group of voters
least likely to vote, independents, campaign communications cluster around those
independents most likely to turn out to vote.
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5.6 Summary
strategy guides d.rect contact, but strategy itself is bounded by budgetary and
tact, cal concerns The antoun, and nt.x of direct contact is d.fferent from district to
district. Still, despite the demographic and strategic differences there is a distinct concen-
n of contacts in the hands of those already most likely to vote. This concentration
might be related to another pattern that emerges from the tables and that is the use of
direct contact as a persuasive medium although even GOTV eflfons are directed toward
likely voters.
The concentration of contacts with likely voters is manifested in the distribution
of contacts among the important swing group of independent voters. An outside
obsenier would expect GOTV eflfons to concentrate on partisans but even persuasion
efforts are most often directed at party members. Republicans and Democrats are
equally likely to contact independent voters and equally unlikely to contact members of
the opposite party. Independents receive less persuasion contacts than do their partisan
counterparts and they receive almost no GOTV efforts. The distribution of contacts
among independents is even more skewed toward older, more frequent voters than it is
among all voters.
When It comes to voter contact the rich do indeed get richer. Those least likely
to vote, young, infrequent voters who are independents are the least likely to receive
campaign information or a nudge to the polls. However, lurking behind this analysis is
the question as to whether direct contact has any effect on turnout at all. If not, then
the distribution pattern is of little concern. If so, then the lack of information directed
toward infrequent voters reinforces a host of other factors reducing turnout.
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CHAPTER 6
turnout and voter contact
voL as
Republican polling firm newsletter
The d,s,ribu,ion of d.rect contacts stud.ed in the prevtous chapter is important
because it is the campaign technology most closely associated with voter turnout and
the concentration of direct contacts among l.kely voters merely reinforces current
turnout patterns. However, there is a second quest,on that needs to be addressed
before the issue becomes clear: Do contacts mfluence turnout. A skewed distribution
of contacts to those already predisposed to vote will make little normative difference if
we find that direct contact has little if any effect on turnout.
Most research paradigms predict that direct campaign communication will
increase voter turnout, A cost/benefit model will assume that direct mail and phone
calls are mechanisms that reduce the information cost to the voter by providing data on
the candidates and the election, if voting choice is a retrospective act ofjudgment, then
direct contact can serve as a reminder of an incumbent record. If we look at the act of
voting as a the end result of complex demographic, psychological, and political
interactions, then direct contact is a nearly exact mirror in its efforts to identify and
contact voters based on the same variables often used in academic analysis. Looking at
voting behavior through one of the academy's many demographic and psychological
lenses the discussion of targeting paints a picture of direct contact which reinforces
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performance with a third. Studies in voting behavior, whether they study turnout or
voter choice; or whether they use rational choice theoi^. cognitive processing,
retrospective voting, or prospective voting models all predict some possibility that a
campaign will successfully impart communications based around already existing
electoral cleavages. In addition to the electoral cleavages, campaigns also know that
voters approach an election with a measurable predisposition to participate. Campaigns
know this and target accordingly. Any effort to ascertain the effects of campaign
contacts on turnout must also take this predisposition into account and control for it
6.1 The Relationship of Direct Contact and Voter Turnout
In Its most simple form the research question is whether turnout increases with
the number of campaign direct contacts. Where Vhdep represents the probability of
turnout for the election in question and must be some number between 0 and I
, The
term "C" in the formula equals the number of contacts received by a given voter or
group. The function (b) represents the amount of change in the probability of voting for
each additional contact. This simple statement might be illustrated by visualizing
turnout as a function of direct contacts or:
Formula 6.1: Relationship Between Contact and Turnout: Vhdep = b(C)
As discussed earlier both the number of contacts a voter receives and a given
voters probability ot turnout are also effected by past voter participation, age, and party
affiliation. Any analysis of the effect of contacts on turnout must include age, voter
history, and party affiliation as control variables.
Formula 6.2: Full Model. Vhdep = b(0)+b(I)(A)+h(2)(PT)+ b(3)(PA)
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Where the relationship includes the intercept b(o) as well as terms for age as
P ted by b(l)(A) and by past turnout as represented by b(2)(PT). The party term
is represented as b(3)(PA)^ Together, these lunct.ons
examine the relationship of turnout and direct
create a model with which to
contact while controlling for age, past
voter turnout and party affiliation. The model will be tested using logistic regression
analysis. (Log,t)..>o Before developing the model, however.
. w,ll look at each of the
control vanables in turn One demograph.c charac.erist.c that is important ,n academic
research as a turnout predictor that also appears on the voter file a, an tndividual level is
age. - Age figures into the targeting scheme both as another turnout predictor and as
an ideal voter block for specific message deliveiy. Nearly every campaign studied sent
at least one mail piece to seniors detailing campaign positions on Medicaid and Social
Security, Likewise, age is a key variable in predicting turnout. Preliminary logit
models run using only age as an independent variable suggest that for every one year
increase in age there is a 3% increase in the probability of voting. Although this figure
will decrease when other control figures are introduced to the model it is consistent
from district to district.
Logit IS one ofa family ofgeneral linear models (GLM's). GLM's include linear regression.
mu tiple linear regression. Probit. and Loglmear modeling. Logit is called for because the dependent
medtmrl'
dichotomous variable the distnbution of errors may not be normal andpredicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities thus ruling out a multiple regression model
‘
m
analysis, requires the assumption of multivariate normality of theindependent variables for the prediction rule to be optimal. Logistic regression analysis requires fewer
assumptions. Because logit is designed for data with a dichotomous dependent variable, which in this case
IS whether they Uirned out to vote or not. it makes good statistical sense. However, a logit coefficient is
the estimated effect ofa unit change in the independent variable on the natural log of the odds ratio and is
difficult to understand in probabilistic terms. 1 will therefore employ a procedure to produce more readilv
understood probabilities. •
See Miller and Shanks. The New American Voter.
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Research on voting behavior generally uses age, education, political efficacy.
mcome, and other psyoholog.cal and demographic factors as independent variables
Unfortunately such information
,s not available at the
.ndividual voter level and few, if
any consultants, rely on census data. Instead they use the past voter history contarned
on the voter file to provide a convenient summary variable for the rnformation used by
scholars in research Voter histoy
,s maintained at the individual level and it is current.
Census data is often old data, or data estimated from old data, and often imperfectly
matched to precinct lines. As one direct mail consultant said, "The best predictor of
future behavior is past behavior" Reliance on past behavior for prediction is general
knowledge in the social sciences as well.
By relying on voter history as a control variable the question becomes not so
much, "Did the contact affect turnout^", as it is, "Did the contact affect turnout given
the voter's current predisposition to vote^" How to include voter history in the model
IS not so straightforward. There are five elections coded onto each base file.
Because the dependent variable represents the 1994 election in Ohio and Mainland and
the 1996 election in California and Pennsylvania the other elections need to be defined
by their distance in time from the actual election year. The following table summarizes
the naming conventions for voter history for each election available on the file.
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Hllilc <1.1: V;iri:i|,to f,„. |,;ieclion lli.sloi-y
There are for,,- pr.ssihic way., „fc„n,h,„,„g
,„e vo,er hi„o,y a, a comrol variable
m the model. Ihrst, all ol'lhe election, may he added to the model individually. Second,
some combination of elections which seem mo.,t explanatoiy may be added to the
ntodel. Third, a smgle snmmaiy variable "Tote”
.summarizing the total number of
election, in which a voter had iH,n,ci,,a,ecl leading up until the general election may be
used. Finally, wders may be coded into three categories,
.such as non-participants,
moderate participants, and high participants. Test models using only voter histoiy
combinations and the depetident variable show that using "Total Elections" as a
iluantitative variable from 0-,*; provides the best explanatoiy power as an independent
variable. Preliminary models run to assess the dilTerenl combinations of voter histoiy
show that, m a bivariate model, the impact of voter history on predicting turnout is veiy
strong. However, age and voter histoiy arc highly correlated .so age is included in the
llnal model. Models will be evaluated in greater depth in later sections but, as an
example of the power id' past voter histoiy as a predictor of turnout, in PA CD2I,
people who had voted in three previous elections were 42% more likely to turnout than
were people who had not previously voted.
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voter contacts were more often directed
In the previous chapter we saw that
bers of the same party. In general, party members received more contacts than
.ndependents. The importance of party as a factor in the distribution of campaign
contacts requires that it be used as a control variable when looking at the effects contact
has on turnout. Party will be entered into the model
category of independent as the base.
as a categorical variable using the
The following tables present the results from Logit models within each d, strict.
The 1994 elections ,n Ohio CD 01 and Ma^land CD 05 are presented first, followed by
the 1 996 elections in California CD 01 and Pennsylvania CD 21
, Finally, we will see
what the implications for our model are for a combined sample of all four districts while
including a dummy variable for presidential election year. The partial effects and the
probabilities for voting at each variable level will be examined as well. After presenting
the models for each district to answer the question, ” Do contacts affect turnout^ ” that
question will be refined by examining the effects of different types of contacts.
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Table 6,5 below summarizes the coefficients, standard errors, and partial effects
of the logit model using total contacts, pas, elect.on histo^. age. and party membership
as predictors of the dependent variable, participat.on in the 1994 general election,'"
Table 6.2t Causes of V.tee Tueuou, by Age, Voter Hlsto.^, Party, and Contacts: OH
N=11333. Percentage of Cases Correctiv Predirtpri ttv rnTc
ignificant to the .05 level. Full model presented in AppInVix 4
® freedom.‘Signi eLte pend^^^^^^
The coefficient represents the amount of change in the log of the odds of the
dependent variable for each one unit increase of the independent variable. This is hard
to understand in probabilistic terms and is converted into a more readily understood
partial effect" in the final column. The coefficients indicate that all of the variables
have a positive relationship to voter turnout. That is, as they increase, so does the
probability of voter participation. The partial effects column for total contacts, total
elections, and age details the change in that probability from one unit to another of the
independent variable. Party is included as a categorical variable and the partial effects
represent the increase in voting probability over the base category of independent. It is
this column, and future derivations of similar numbers, to which we will focus much of
the rest of our analysis. Partial effects represent the difference in the predicted
probability of a person voting in the election in question between two values of an
The full model for Ohio, as well as the other districts, is presented in Appendix 4.
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independent variable with all of the Cher variables ,n the ,nodel held constant, ,n this
case held constant at the empirical mean.
In the table above the 9«/„ partial effect for age represents the difference ,n the
probability of votmg between a 25 year old voter and a 60 year old voter. Thu, wh.le
holdtng the total number of contact, past vot.ng histo^ and pa„y n.embership vanables
at their mean, 60 year olds were 9% more l.kely to turn out than were 25 year olds.
Party membership has a venr strong relationship with the probability of voting.
Democrats are 22% and Republicans 29% more likely to vote than independents. This
strong party effect is an artifact of party registration law in Ohio. There is no party
registration required. On a voter file, voters do not come with a party field defined
For political purpose, those who voted in the Republican primary are coded as
Republican with the same process followed for Democrats. Thus, the mere definition of
party encompasses past primary voter participation. This kind of registration system
makes it more difficult and expensive for candidates to define and target a group of base
or persuadable voters.
For the variable on voter history the measure compares voters who had not
participated with voters who had participated in two previous elections. Those
having voted in two previous elections were 37% more likely to vote than those who
had not voted in any previous election.
Age, party membership, and past election history, as expected, are strongly
related to the probability of voting but what of direct contact'^ In Ohio, receiving three
contacts increases the probability of voting by 2%. Direct contacts, the only variable in
The effect of elections is non-liiic;ir and peaks at two. The increase in the probability of voting
decreases after two elections allhongli each additional election (up to five) represents an increase.
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the model under the control ofthe campaign, does not have as strong an effect as
de.og.ap,„c var,a>„es, „a, i.
. p„„,.a„y
,„,g,„flea„,. A ,wo percent increase
,
-urnout. especially a.nong the right voters, can easily swing a close elect, t,n
Table 6 3 below stnnmarizes the lelevant model mlbrmation for Maryland
Congressional District 05.
Table 6.3: Causes „f Vote.- T„n,„„, by Age, Voter History, Party anti Contacts: IMI)
Variable
Coefficient*
~SE —
Partial Effects**
0.09*
0.01
~e%
0.82*
0.01 39%
0.01*
0.01
-0.3*
0.06 Tt%
-0.34*
0.11
N-17264. Percentage of Cas
-1.54*
es Correctly Predicted - 74"/,
0.09
Once again, past election history has a very strong effect on a person's
probability of voting. Those who had voted in two past elections had a 39% greater
probability of voting in the 1994 election than did those who had voted in no elections
at all prior to the 1994 race. However, there is a striking difference in the importance of
party. In Ohio, party membership indicated an average 28% increase in the
probability of voting while in Maryland party membership indicates a 7% decrease in the
probability of voting. It is possible that in Maryland, independents are more active
electoial participants
- possibly due to the high number of federal employees in the
district. Federal employees have the financial, educational, and psychological
characteristics of high turnout voters but may, as a group, be discouraged from partisan
affiliation. This is highly speculative and more analysis would be needed to develop a
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more definitive answer. Age has the expected impact. Those voters who are sixty
years old show a 7»/„ higher probability of voting than those voters who are 25. The
probability of participation also increases with the number of direct contacts. Voters
receiving three contacts were 6o/. more likely to go to the polls than those receiving no
contacts - an indication that in Mainland, political elites were able to affect turnout
with multiple contacts. Table 6.4 below begins to examine the 1996 election districts.
Starting with Pennsylvania congressional district 21.
Table 6.4: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: PA
Variable Coefficient SE
Partial Effects
1 0131 wOMldol2> 0.03“ 0.02 3%
voier nisiory 0.63‘ 0.02 "31%
Age r o.or 0 ~6%
Democrdtic 0.05“ 0.07 1.1%
0.31* 0.07 5.3%
Coilbldflt
-0.96 0.08
jM- itjf H. reiueniage or cases Correctly Predicted - 73%
** Not Significant. ‘Significant to the .05 level. Full model
. Model Chi Sq 3040.91 with
is presented in Appendix 4
5 degrees of freedom.
Once again, the effect of voter history stands out with a 3 1% difference in the
probability of turnout between voters who went to the polls in two elections and those
who have yet to go to the polls. Age is consistent with the previous models. Older
voters were 6% more likely to participate in the election, in this case, the 1996 general,
than were younger voters. Party membership still has a fluctuating effect and
Pennsylvania falls well between the extremes of Maryland and Ohio with Democrats
showing a small 1.1% increase in voting probability over independents and Republicans
a more robust 5.3% relative increase. Contacts show some effect. There is a 3%
increase in the probability of turnout among voters who had received 3 contacts over
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those who had received 0 contacts. However, even th,s small effect, which ,s no.
insign, f,can, from a poht.cai perspective, is statistically insignificant, „ is worth
remembenng that the Pennsylvan.a race was decided by fewer than 1 100 votes and the
Democrafic candidate had scheduled three contacts to moderate l.kelihood voters - but
ran out of money before the final contact could be made.
The most intense direct contact efforts took place ,n the h,gh TV cost and low
TV coverage efF.ciency distr.ct of California Congress.onal district 01
. Table 6.8 below
shows the coefficients, standard error, and partial effects for the California district
Table 6.5; Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party and Contacts: CA
Variable Coefficient
~SE
Partial Effects
0.15* 0.0065 9.7%
0.7* 0.0174 34%
Age 0.003**
0.0034 2.5%
Democratic
-. 1010*** 0.0589 '
-1.4%
'
Republican 0.411* 0.0631 6.5%
Coiibtdnt
N=14848. Percentage of Ca
-1.27
ses Correctly PrpHirtoH 700/
Again, past voter history shows a strong effect on the probability of voting. Age
and Democratic are not statistically significant. Being Republican increases the
probability of voting 6.5% over the base category of independent registration. The
change from 0 to 3 direct contacts increases the probability of voting by nearly 10%.
Before comparing the district results and examining the effects of specific types
of contacts on voter groups it might be useful to examine the coefficients produced
when a sample is pulled using all four districts. This combines the various strategic
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approaches and allows for the inclusion of a variable designating presidential or
non-presidential election.
Table 6.6: Causes of Voter Tin-
Combined file
noiit by Age, Voter History, Party amt Contacts:
Variable
Coefficient* SE
Hartial Effects
0.065*
0.006
"
4%
Age
0.74*
0.015 35%
0.007*
0.001
~5%
Repuhliran
0.182*
0.049
”
3 .6%
0.384*
0.037 7.3%
0.483*
0.037
“
9%
lM-22830. Percentage of Ca
-1.599*
ses Correctly Predicted - 74 3
~b.063
7% MnHol r'hi c....
.54 with six degrees of
The combined tile follows the general trend of the districts All of the variables
included in the model are significant and all are related to increased turnout. Voter
history still has a strong infiuence as does the newly added variable for presidential year.
With all other things held constant, voters in the two elections held during a presidential
year were 9% more likely to turnout than those voting during the two non-presidential
election years.
Before comparing the districts and discussing their differences it might be useful
to pull together the partial effects from each table before embarking on a more detailed
discussion.
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Table 6.7; Comparison of Partial Effects Among Districts
Variable
1 otal CoDlacts
OH MD
~PA~
Main
I\Jo
~6% “ 3% Tt% ~4%
Age
O//0 39% "31%
"34% 35%
11% 7% 6% ~3% ~
""5.5%
26%
-.7%
~NS
-1.4% 3.6%
30.8%
'~NS ri.3% 6.5% 7.3%
NS=Not £
INJA
iignificant NA=Nc
NA
>t Applicable. Parti
~NA
3l effertc rf^nroeAni
“na
^
~9%
voting in 2 elections; A,; = ^tlTt?
Republican = the change in probability compared to an inritno h ^ old voter; Democrat and
Ptobaottitv tot tnose voting fn a ptesioUXIn'oST^TeSrr;,,~''S rntp^O 4
There is a striking difference between the consistency of age and voter history as
compared to the inconsistency of party and total contacts. Despite the variety of
campaign situations represented these two independent variables show a steady and,
in the case of past voter history, dramatic influence on the probability of turnout Age
IS also consistent across all four districts although it is a little higher in Ohio than the
other three districts. This difference may not be due to any unique political or social
factors but because of the structure of the data. Age is not available on many of the
Ohio records and the missing data is skewed toward older voters.
The contrast between age and voter history on the one hand and total contacts
and party on the other is not as mysterious as it looks. The effects of age or past
participation might be seen as consistent across the country. A sixty year old in
California has similar life experience to a voter in Pennsylvania. Likewise, a voter who
has gone to the poll twice before will be more likely to vote than a non-voter no matter
where they live. The effect of direct contact, however, is a part of a larger question
regarding the campaign as a whole. If we assume that campaigns effect turnout, then it
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is the can,pa.gn as a whole which might capture that effect. Thus, the effect of direct
contact on turnout will increase with the overall percentage of campaign resources
directed toward contact and. for the most part, that ,s the case. The most intensive
direct contact effort, that taking place in California congressional district 01, is much
greater than that of the smallest contact effort, the one carried out by David Mann and
Steve Chabot in Ohio congressional district 01
, To the extent that the effect of direct
contact on turnout measures the campaign effect on turnout it reflects strategic and
tactical choices. The greater the allocation to direct contact, the greater the effect that
particular campaign activity has on turnout. It is difficult to gauge from the data the
total campaign effect on voter turnout but it does appear that the greater the allocation
to one particular aspect of campaigning, in this case direct contact, the higher the
turnout which, at a minimum, suggests that campaign efforts themselves can motivate
the electorate.
Party might be thought of as more comparable but, at least with voter file
definitions of party, the term "Republican" and "Democrat" might mean very different
things. In Ohio for example, the party designation is based on primary participation. In
Maryland, it is simply a question of voter registration. In one, party is defined by voting
in elections where turnout is already low while in the other it is a matter of personal
choice -- unrelated to the act of voting.
Although in every district contacts raised the probability of turnout the strength
of the effect varied from 2% in Ohio to 10% in California. Maryland and Pennsylvania
fall in the middle of the spectrum. The change from zero to three contacts raised the
probability of a Keystone Stater by 3% but increased the likelihood of a Marylander
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V0
.,„g by a more substantial 6%, Why the difference. The data does not allow for any
contprehensive testing of hypotheses regard,ng the d.fference anrong d.striots but a looh
at the probability ofvot.ng at each level of the independent variable may reveal some
patterns^ Table 6,8 summarizes the probability of an individual voter participating ,n
the election ,n question for each level of the quantitative independent variables voter
histow. age, and total contacts while holding all of the other variables at their mean.
Table 6.8: Pfobability of Voting by Total Contacts, Voter History and Age
thfinriPnpnHpn'i'*^'"
'"epresent a probability of voting in the election in question for each level ofe inde endent variable. Models are presented in Appendix 4
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Table 6,8 is similar ,o ,he partial etfecs
.able 6,7 bu. provides more informa,
.on
on ,he effec, of
.ncremental increases. The firs, th.ng ,o note is the different starting
points of the 1994 elect.on and the 1996 elect.on. This d.fference is illustrated in the
voting histoo. rows. In Maryland and Ohio, both 1994 races, a person who had not
voted ,n a past elect.on had a 30% probab.lity of showing up for the 1994 general.
However, in 1996. for the California and Pennsylvan.a races, non-voters show a 41%
and 47% probabil.ty respec.vely of showing up at the polls. These results are
consistent with the known turnout differentials between presidential and
non-presidemiai years. Despite the different starting points the effects of pas, voting
were consistent across districts. Participating in even one previous election raised the
likelihood of voting by between 1 7% and 20%, By the time a voter had participated in
four previous elections his or her participation in ftiture elections had become
certainty.
a near
Keeping the presidential and off-year difference in mind let us consider age and
total contacts. Age is presented in ten year increments. The probability of voting
increases between 1% and 3% for each decade. The low is in California where a
voter's probability of turnout only increases by 1% per decade and the high is in Ohio
where each decade sees an increase of nearly 3% per decade in the probability of
turnout. Although the numbers look small from a decade to decade movement they
are quite significant when comparing older and younger voters. Even in California,
where the age effect is the weakest the probability of a 65 year old participating is 4.5%
higher than the probability of a 25 year old voting. In Ohio the difference is nearly 12%.
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Direct contact also affects turnout In Oh.o and Pennsylvania each addit.onal
contact added about one percentage point to the probability of voting. In Ohio even
-hat small effect flattened out after three contacts. Tins indicates that n.ultiple contacts
may increase turnout but also points to a saturat.on level after which each addit.onal
contact adds l.ttle to the probability of voter turnout. In Maryland and California the
effects of direct contact are more noticeable. In Maryland each contact raised the
probability of voting by about 2% while in California the effect was nearly 4% for the
first few contacts leveling off to 2% as the voter reached the four or five contact level.
Evidently, direct contacts are also subject to a law of diminishing returns.
Direct contact increases the probability of turnout less than demographic factors
such as age, party affiliation, and past voter histo.7 . In general, a voter who receives
three contacts is from 3% to 10% more likely to turnout than a voter who receives no
contacts from either campaign. This district variation indicates that complex local
factors also influence the turnout effectiveness of direct contact. Although the sample
size of districts is too small to test any hypotheses some factors suggest themselves for
future research. One possible factor is the cost of television. The two districts with the
strongest contact effects California and Maryland, also have the highest TV cost per
point. California, where contact effects are even stronger than in Maryland, also has
much higher television costs. Likewise, the two districts with the least expensive TV
costs, Ohio CDOl and Pennsylvania CD21 show the least direct contact effect on
turnout. This relationship between TV cost and direct contact effect suggests the
presence ot an overall campaign effect on voter turnout while controlling for other
variables. That effect might be spread out among all campaign activities including direct
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contact, television, radio, and free media
devoted to direct contact, the higher the
The higher the percent of campaign activities
marginal effect of voter direct contact on
turnout.
With a small relationship established between direct contact and voter turnout
the next group of questions center on the importance of different types of direct
contacts on different types of voters At the beginning of the data collection phase
direct contact was divided into four mutually exclusive categories: First, contacts were
divided by source. There were two definitions of "source". Contacts were divided
between Republican and Democratic as well as between incumbents and challengers.
Secondly, contacts were divided by their method of delivery. There were three delivery
methods; phone, mail, and door-to-door. The vast majority of contacts were delivered
by either mail or phone Third, contacts were divided by purpose. Again, there were
three purpose categories; voter identification, GOTV, and persuasion. Finally, contacts
were divided by their message type. Message could be positive, negative, or substantive
issue contacts. In the following chapter we will examine the effects of these different
types of contacts on different groups of voters.
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CHAPTER 7
WHO DO WE ENCOURAGE TO VOTE?
Electoral politics has always been about divtsion. The rallies described in the
introduction were all about reminding the faithtul that they were different - they were
Republicans or Democrats - and that, unless vigilant, the enemy would take control of
government. Modern politics is very much the art of dividing the electorate ,n ever finer
ways. Deciming partisanship in the electorate and the concomitant rise of candidate
based organizations combined with computer and communication technology to create a
system which melded necessity and capacity. While much of this division is aimed at
persuading groups of voters deemed malleable, some of it is aimed at increasing turnout
among specific voter groups. Choices regarding how to address base and swing voters
provide the framework for direct contact strategy. The tactical implementation of
direct contact strategies takes on a number of characteristics which have been captured
by dividing up the contacts by their source, purpose, method, and message. This
chapter examines each categoiyi to see if one type of contact influences turnout more
than another. It addresses such questions as whether incumbent contacts increase the
probability of turnout more than challenger contacts. Which is more effective in
increasing turnout: phones or mail? Do negative messages depress turnout or increase
it“^ Finally, the chapter also looks at the effects of contacts on different types of voters.
All other things being equal do non-voters get more motivation from direct contacts
than frequent voters'^ Do younger voters respond to direct contact differently than
older voters?
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7.1 The Goals and Methods of Direct Contact
Conceptually and professionally direct contact rests on a disttnction between
persuasion and turnout. This divtsion is less perfectly mirrored in the two primary
methods of delivery, that of phone and mail. Generally, persuasion contacts travel vta
the post office whtle GOTV efforts move over the phone or on foot. Both persuasion
and GOTV can also be carried out using a door-to-door effort. Still, a "less perfectly"
is called for ,n the prevtous dtstinction because there are such things as persuasion
phone calls and GOTV mail Because the two dtchotomies are closely related tt will be
all the more interesting to revtew their effects on turnout side by side. After all, GOTV
ts destgned to tncrease turnout while persuasion is used to influence a person's candidate
choice and the method of contact would seem secondary.'*"
Table 7.1 Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with
Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for GOTV/Persuasion/ID and Mail/Phone/Door toDoor Contacts
GOTV PERS Voter ID Mail Phone Door
OH01 13.1%*
-15%* 15%* NS 12%* NS
MD05 NS 6%* 16%* 13%*
-6%* NS
PA21
-11%* NS 27%* NS 13%*
-10.1*
CA01
Note: Cells renrt
NA
>S(>nt tho norr'onl
13%* NS 11%* 6%* NS
• ^
' ' ^ M, MIC \jixjuaui\ny ui voimq Tor voiers receivrna 0 contacts anri vntprc
NS=ToI'lignmca^^^
significant at the .001 levl NA=Not Applicable
The coefficients used to produce the probabilities in table 7. 1 are derived from
models similar to those used in Chapter six with one exception. Total contact is
removed from the model and various mutually exclusive groups, which add up to the
number of total contacts, are added in its stead. Table 7. 1 contains two such divisions.
All of the models used to create the partial effects tables in this chapter arc presented in
Appendix 5.
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First, total contacts are divided into GOTV, persuasion, and voter identification
contacts. Secondly, total contacts are divided into mail, phone, and door to door
efiforts. Changes in the probability of voting occurring when each type of contact is
increased from 0 to 3 is presented For each change, the model controlled for age.
voter history, and party affiliation. Again, like the base model explained in chapter six,
age and voter history were included in the model as quantitative variables. Party was
included using an empirical mean for Republican and Democrat. Two facts stand out
from the data in table 7. 1 First, the effects on turnout are more consistent when
looking at the method of contact rather than the avowed purpose of the contact. What
this says is that phone calls are more effective at increasing turnout than are other
methods of voter contact. Although the data does not provide any clues as to why this
might be. two things come to mind. First, phoning is often done on or near election day
and may well serve as a reminder to that percentage of the voting population for whom
such reminders are useful Secondly, the mere presence of a phone in the house - and
the fact that someone in the house was home to answer it, is. in and of itself, a measure
of social stability.
Taking PA21 as an example, mail does not reach a statistically significant level
but three phone contacts increase the probability of turnout by 13%. This contrasts
with the comparison between GOTV and persuasion in the same district where the
GOTV effort was associated with an 1 1% decrease in the probability of turnout while
persuasion was not significant. The same pattern in repeated in every district as the
method of direct contact tells us more about the effects on turnout than does the
contact’s purpose. This emphasizes an important tactical point. It may well be that the
165
avowed purpose of the contact is less important than
least when it comes to voter turnout. The telephone
the method of communicating
— at
appears to have a strong impact on
voting in three of the four districts. Phoning has a much greater effect than mail or
door to door m Ohio and Pennsylvania and slightly less of an effect than mail in
California. Even the seeming anomaly of Maryland may be due to the structure of the
data. Unlike other districts there were no blanket GOTV efforts undertaken by the
campaigns. Instead, the Hoyer race identified favorable voters via the phone and then
mailed to them to encourage turnout. However, the voter identification contacts, all
done by mail, had a very strong affect. In fact, the change in probability of voting when
moving from 0 identification contacts to three is 16%. The low overall phone effect in
Maryland but the strong effect of voter identification efforts is due to the large number
of bad and disconnected telephones in the Prince George’s county portion of Mainland
CD 05. A telephone number might be disconnected or incorrect for a number of
reasons but almost all of them are related to notions of stability. The longer a person
resides m one place and does not unlist or change his number, he will tend to match
with a good phone. The more often a person moves, has her phone disconnected,
changes numbers or unlists numbers the greater the chance for a mistaken, or
disconnected number. Stability is highly related to turnout so places with a mobile
population tend also to have low turnout and a high number of bad telephones.
Because the areas with bad telephones overlap with low turnout areas, the positive
effect of phoning is masked and actually shows up as a drag on turnout. However, as
the revised Maryland figures indicate, in a specific case where the phones are known to
The worst places for tclcplioncs tend to be urban college areas such as Cambridge MA and
Bcrkely CA because they combine highly mobile student populations with pockets or urban poverty.
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be good there is a strong pos.tive effect on voter turnout. Thus, phoning appears to
have a strong effect on voter turnout but. unfortunately, this mechanis.n nray be least
effective ,n poo, highly ntobile areas most ,n need of turnout effbr, The nnpact of
voter
.den, if,cation on turnout in the other distncts reinforces the notion that identify,ng
voters early on in an effort to ascertain their vote preference is associated with a higher
voter turnout. More expensive and more intensive than simple GOTV call, voter
identification efforts generally represent multiple, coordinated contacts.
Also evident from table 7. 1 is the lack of any positive effects on turnout from
door-to-door efforts. This is certainly contrary to expectations. Most experts would
consider a personal appearance a, the voter's door to be the most powerful form of
campaign contact; although, it must be said, all campaign workers have met candidates
who might no, benefit from personally appearing at someone's door. Candidates are
urged to walk door-to-door whenever time, fundraising, and district demographics
allow but, according to the figures in table 7. 1 these efforts can even reduce the
probability of turnout. The effects of door-to-door efforts were not significant in
Ohio, Maryland, or California, In Pennsylvania walking efforts were related to a 10%
decrease in turnout. Why does door-to-door, presumably among the most effective
campaign tactics available, appear to decrease turnout in Pennsylvania‘S
The answer may well be in the coding of the data, A look back to the contact
efforts in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Ohio shows that most of them were in the nature
of literature drops, not direct visits with tamilies. With mail and phone efforts it is
relatively easy to ascertain the exact targeting of the call or mail effort, but it is next to
impossible to do so with a non-targeted literature drop. In Pennsylvania for example.
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.wo of ,he "dooMo-door" efforts were blanket drops in the lower middle class Eire City
and the Shenango Valley. To code th,s on the file, all voters Hv.ng ,n those areas were
Itsted as having received the contact. In the Shenango valley drop campatgn literature
was placed under the windsh.eld wipers of cars parked ,n church lots on Sunday. The
drop was in response to a s.m.lar effon by the Christian Coalition. In a case like th,s. no
good way exists for determining who really received the literature let alone who may
have read it. Such blanket drops in low turnout areas may well account for the negative
relationship between so called "door to door" eflforts and turnout.
There are variations as well as similarities. In Ohio CDOl, GOTV efforts had a
strong effect on turnout, while in Pennsylvania CD05 the same type of effort had little
or no measurable impact. Mail had increased turnout in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
California but not m Ohio. It is difficult, when looking at contacts at this level of detail,
to determine why one type has an effect in one area but not in another. All of the
myriad strategic and tactical choices come into play. Given how different every race is
demographically and politically it may be remarkable that we can find any consistencies
at all such as the generally positive effect direct contact has on turnout; the power of
phoning, the efficacy of ID efforts and the seeming futility of door-to-door drops.
7.2 Negative and Positive Contacts
Few issues surrounding the conduct of campaigns attract as much attention as
negative advertising. Observers journalistic, academic, and elected decry their increase,
their content, and their effect on voter turnout. Negative advertising is seen as both the
cause and result of the coarsening of our national dialogue The effect of negative
advertising on turnout is also a hotly debated empirical controversy. Ansolabehere and
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Iyengar argue ,ha, negative advert.sing lowers turnout. Other scholars, such as Darrly
West, argue that mistrust of government is much more strongly associated with lower
turnout than negative advenising and that, in fact, negative advertising has no
significant effect on turnout a, all - Because the contacts recorded for th,s study were
divided into negative, positive, and issue contacts we can examine some of the
relationships between negative direct contacts and voter turnout. Table 7 2 below
summarizes the partial effects involved in the types of campaign direct contacts
Table 7.2: Partial Effects of Change From 0
Issue Contacts
to 3 Contacts for Positive, Negative, and
District
OH01
MDOS
PA21
CA01
Positive
7%
NS
-8%
Negative
NS
2%
14%
15%
Issue
NS
6.3%
-11%
8%
negative, and issue contacts. ‘Significant to the .05 level. NS=NoI signiS
The partial effects presented in table 7.2 are not good news for advocates of the
classical model of democracy. Under such a model, one might hold, with Aldous
Huxley, that "The survival of democracy depends on the ability of large numbers of
people to make realistic choices in the light of adequate information."'” It appears as if
the issue information, which, presumably, is all that Huxley would find adequate, has
much less of an effect on turnout than do the negative attacks sent out by the candidates
See Steven Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative (New York, Free Press, 1995) and
Darryl West, Air Wars: Television Adverstising in Election Campaigns 1952-1996 2nd Ed (Washington,
DC, CQ Press 1997); Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Dirty Politics: Perception, Distraction and Democracy
(New York, Oxford UniversiW Press, 1992)
Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World Revisited. (1st Ed. New York, Harper and Brothers) p 58
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or the posi,.ve pieces ,ou.,„g candidate background. In ntos, cases, issue ads had less
issue ads had a negative effect on voter turnout. Only ,n Ma^land d,d tssue contacts
come close to their positive or negative counterparts.
Some of the largest effects are reserved for negative contacts In Pennsylvania
and California turnout increased 14% and 15% respectively with the addition of three
negative contacts to the voter's stock of campaign information. They also had a
positive effect on turnout in Maryland albeit a slight one. In Ohio, again giving us at
least one exception to the possible development of a generalization, negative contacts
were not statistically signiticam. There is little room to believe that issue contacts have
a strong impact on turnout while either positive or negative direct contacts, especially
negative contacts, do appear to increase the probability of a voter participating in a
given election. Why do contacts based on personal qualities seem to motivate voters
more than issue pieces'^ The presentation of human characteristics lends itself to more
humorous and dramatic presentation styles. What is at work here is the ability to draw
the voter into thinking about the campaign in the face of a remarkable marketing
cacophony. The level of non-election noise is substantial. Electoral messages have to
compete for mental attention against much better funded and more frequently presented
private advertisements. To draw peoples attention to their candidate they need to
present memorable material quickly. People to remember personal information more
readily than issue data. Also, information that is presented as a narrative is easier to
recall than textual or pedantic material. Finally, insofar as campaigns are about the
reinforcement of already held beliefs and opinions, it is the personal narrative, or the
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personal attack, which is fitted to link pnvately held behefs with the differences
presented by two candidates.
7.3 Republicans, Democrats, Challengers, and Incumbents
Although the Republican campaigns studied made more individual contacts than
the Democrat one.s. perhaps refiect.ng their more robust fitnd.ng, there is httle a prior,
reason to believe that Republican contacts will have more of a cumulative effect than
Democratic contacts. There is, however, some reason to believe that incumbent
contacts will have more impact than challenger contacts. Incumbents are known entities
and research suggests that communications are more believable when the source of the
information is familiar. It is also possible that communication will benefit challengers
proportionally more than incumbents because they enter races as blank slates. In other
words, a communication about a challenger increases the stock of voter information
whereas a communication from an incumbent may simply reinforce previously held
beliefs.
Table 7.3: Change in Voting Probability for Voters Receiving 0 Contacts with
Voters Receiving 3 Contacts for Republicans/Democrats and Incumbent/Challenger
Rep Dem Inc Chall
OH01 NS NS NS NS
MD05 8% 3% 3% 8%
PA21 7% NS 7% NS
CA01 11% 7% 11% 7%
• I zj v/i vviimy lui vuierb receiving u coniacts and voters
receiving 3 contacts all other things being equal. Control variables include age, total elections, party, the number
democrats, incumbents and challengers. All variables included are significant to the
.001 level. NS=Not Significant
The Republican/Democratic dichotomy is the mirror of the
Incumbent/Challenger dichotomy in table 7.3, but looking at them side by side highlights
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the differences. In the three districts where
model, Republican contacts had
party reached statistical significance in the
greater effect on turnout than did Democratic
contacts. This sontewhat unexpected result could arise tbr,n the d.fferent coalit.ons
needed for a Repubhcan, as opposed to a Democrat,
c. victo^. Republicans need to
large, suburban voters wh.le De,nocrats often need to increase turnout a,no„g poor and
working class voters. For example. DiNicola focused attention on infrequent voters
while English focused on the outlying suburbs.
A less clear pattern emerges with respect to incumbent and challenger contacts.
In two of the three districts where candidate status reached the level of statistical
significance incumbent contacts had more influence than challenger contacts ,n the
other. In Pennsylvania, challenger contacts were not statistically significant. In fact,
the coefficient was negative. This may be due to the number of blanket literature drops
performed by DiNicola's challenger campaign. In California the difference is also quite
high. Receiving three incumbent contacts increased the probability of turnout by more
than 12% while the challengers contacts only increased the likelihood of turnout by
5.3%. In Maryland, the challenger contacts were associated with a higher probability
of turnout and may simply reflect the Republican/Democrat dichotomy, Hoyer, the
Democrat and incumbent, targeted lower probability voters than did Devine, a
challenger and Republican.
The preceding examination of the turnout effects of different types of direct
contacts still leaves open their effect on different voter groups. It is one thing to note
that different types of contacts have comparatively stronger or weaker effects but quite
another to note whether such effects are strongest among likely or unlikely voters. How
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do direc, contacts affect d.ffetent voter groups. This broad question
,s
.ntportant to
researchers looking at the dyna.n.cs of turnout as well as refornters searching for an
elect,on system that w,ll re,na,n
.nclusive wlnle becoming less dependent on pnvate
interests for fund.ng^ An examination of voter file orders over the pas, four years a,
VCS. as well as a quick glance at the targeting undertaken by these eight campaigns,
overwhelmingly consist of age, gender, party, and voter histoty selections. Do such
common political practices have an effect on the distribution of turnout in elections?
The following section evaluates the effects of direct contact on each of these commonly
targeted political groups by selecting each subgroup independently and testing the effect
of direct contact on each group. The same model used earlier reappears in each section
with one difference, the variable chosen as a subgroup drops out of the model, while the
other variables remain as controls. An examination of the contact effect on turnout by
party will seme as an illustration. First, only those voters within the party in question
are chosen. Then, the model is run controlling for total elections, age, and total
contacts. Party drops out of the model One possibility is that independents, because
they are generally less likely to participate than party members, will benefit more from
direct contacts than will Republicans or Democrats. Alternatively, Republicans and
Democrats, by merit of their previous decision to register with a party, may be easier for
a campaign to move to the polls with an extra effort or two. The second possibility is
supported by the data. In Pennsylvania, California, and Maryland direct contact
increases the probability of turnout equally for both Republicans and Democrats.
Independents do not seem to respond as well. In all three states, the relationship is
either not statistically significant or substantially smaller in magnitude than for either of
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the part,es^ ,n Ohio, none of ,he relations,,,ps are s.gn.ficant independents are both
harder to move to the polls and less likely to be
them.
recipients of candidate efforts to move
Candidates also frequently target by gender. Sonte ,ssues are deemed
.nore
relevant to men or to women Anti-gun control mail for example. ,s often dtreced to
men wh„e pro-cho,ce and educat.on maihngs are often sent to men. Research indicates
that men and women turn out at similar rates. This has not always been the case. In
1952
.
79»/„ of the men and 69
. 3% of the women self-reported voting in the most recent
election, in 1984
,
73
. 6% of men and women reported voting ,n the most recent
election.- Roughly the same results are found in the four district samples present m
the study, in each district, the turnout percentage for men and women was within 2%
points, in Ohio and Pennsylvania the turnout was identical for both groups, in
Mao-land, men turned out at a slightly higher rate than did women, in California, the
only district with a female candidate, the female turnout was 2% above the male rate.'®
Nor did contacts have a diiTerential effect on men and women, in every district
studied, the effect of direct contact on turnout for each gender showed the same
direction and strength.
158
^ ^ ^
^ P‘^rties generally doUU V calls to their own members, ignoring independents. Models run which included ID GOTV and
ersuasion as variaWes in place of Total Contacts lent some support to this idea. The coefficients weremuch stronger for ID and GOTV for independents but seldom reached statistical significance.
^ Conway, Margaret. Political Participation in the United States. (CQ Press Washington DC
1985) p 27
’
However, the equivalence in turnout percentages masks a shift of electoral power to women. In
each of the districts under study women comprised anv^vhere from 6% to 9% more of the total turnout on
election day.
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7.4 Older and Younger Voters
ge is ,he demographic measure most commonly assoc, a,ed with voter turnout.
Within hmits, the older the voter, the higher the turnout. There are a variety of
competing theories on why this might be so but the theories fall into two different
categories. Generat.onal theories speculate that the current group ofolder voters went
Ihrough events of pol.tical and historical socialization whtch tended to tncrease their
drive to participate in electoral politics. Other theories speculate that simply growing
older, by increasing stability and community connection, increases turnout. In one
group of theories the historical period of political socialization is key, in the other it is
the process of movement through demographic stages. In the four districts in question
voters over 55 turned out at rates 35% higher than voters 25 and under. Because of
the higher probability of turnout for older voters direct contacts should have less of an
effect on them than on younger voters. Turnout becomes a near certainty as voters age
and there seems to be little room for increasing turnout.
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Table 7,4 below summarizes the results of two models. Each model was butl, using a
subset ot the samples for each district. The first subset
The second subset contained all voters 30 and under.
consisted of all voters 55 and over.
state Mean No Contacts Three Contacts
3S . B Vo NS
~NS
^
78% 76.3% 79.3%
47%
~NS NS
87% NS NS
44% 40.4% 47.5%
86.9% 81% r 87%
50.4% 28.4% 38.9%
Note: Cells represe
90.5%
nt the probabilitv of votino at
73.7% 81.5%
H.vzuauimy oi lumoui wniie ho ding all variables at their mMn 7 . 'CHiebenis me
statistically significant at the .001 level All moll^^^
Significant. All other probabilities
Party included in the model as a categorical variable usino lnHet.^*^H*
age, voter history, and party.
Democrat and Republican.
''^'•^ , g I dependent as a base, and reporting categories for
1 able 7.4 above presents three probabilities for each age cohort. To take Ohio
as an example, with all variables held at their mean, the probability of turnout with all
variables held at the mean for those 55 and over and under is 76.3% while it is 39.8%
tor voters 30 and over. This difference is repeated in every district.
Because of the higher turnout for the older cohort we might assume it is more
difficult for contacts to increase their probability of turnout. The data does provide
some support for this thesis. Neither Maryland nor Ohio produced statistically
significant results in both age categories. In the two races which took place during a
presidential year, direct contact does have a statistically significant effect on the
probability of turnout for both cohorts.
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In Pennsylva„,a,
,he change from 0 ,o 3 contacts produced s.m.lar results. For
the older group, the change in the nutnber of contacts increased the probabihty of voting
by 6o/„ whtle the younger group saw the shghtly larger, but not trrelevant, increase of
7%, This effect was intensified in California, Three contacts increases the turnout of
older voters by 7,8% but tncreases turnout among younger voters by more 10,5%, It
posstble that direct contact has a disproportionately greater effect on younger voters.
There are a number of possible reasons for th.s impact. First, older voters are already
so likely to vote that any additional campaign information has little or no effect. This is
another way of saying that older voters are already integrated into the electoral process.
They know when elections are approaching, they understand how to participate; and
they have had years of placing disparate bits of information into a political context.
Younger voters are correspondingly less socialized into the electoral process. Anxiety
about how and where to vote, combined with a lack of informational contexts makes
campaign direct contacts more useful sources of informafion and, consequently,
increases their utility as turnout motivators. The notion of socialization takes on even
more normative importance when we recall that older voters are much more likely to
receive direct contacts from candidates. Younger voters may need them more to
increase turnout but campaigns, for a variety of reasons, are encouraged by our current
system, to direct contacts to the older voters who least need a prod to the polls.
7.5 Frequent and Infrequent Voters
Age may be the most common variable used in academic studies on turnout but
it is not the best measure of voter participation available to consultants. To predict
turnout, they turn to past voter history. Past voter history captures the effects of age as
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t.«». I. id..»IVi„g V«.„ who h.„
proof that such a habit exists. Therefore, we should
differences in the effects of direct
but voter history is
expect to see even stronger
contact on frequent and infrequent voters than with
younger and older voters.
There are many possible ways of looking at "frequent” and "mfrequent" voters.
For simphctty I have opted to consider all non-voters and all voters who have
participated in only one election to be infrequent voters. Any voter who has
participated in two or more elections is coded as a frequent voter, The files for each
district were divided along these lines and models were run across each of the
subgroups. Table 7.5, like table 7.4, summarizes the effects of the model by presenting
the probabilities of voting at that level in the model where each variable is held at the
mean.
I first ran each model using a subgroup defined by the number of elections voted. Models were
rim on subsets of voters who voted in 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 elections. It was clear from looking at the
changes m the model as they moved from one subset to another that the real difference was between those
who had voted in 2 or more elections vs. those who had \ otcd in 1 or fewer elections.
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The next ,wo columns presen, the probahih.ies of voting for each subgroup a, ,he
infrequent voter" and "frequent voter" level.
probability of turn-out* wNirho^lding al^v 7hfmod
represents the
party, and total contacts. Constants are incliiripri in oarh m
controls for age, voter history,
significant at the .05 level
" significant. All other cells are
Direct contacts have a stronger effect among non-voters than among voters
with, once again, the exception of Ohio, where the effects of contacts were neither
significant nor appreciable. It is difficult to tell from the information why contacts had
little impact in Ohio, Both campaigns targeted frequent voters more than infrequent
ones and both campaigns spent most of their time and effort on persuasion and not
GOTV, In fact, when the above models are run in Ohio by substituting the number of
persuasion, GOTV, and Voter Identification contacts, the GOTV contacts are
significant tor both frequent and infrequent voters. The coefficients for both groups are
nearly identical. Evidently the mix of contact efforts and other campaign information
did not move infrequent voters to the polls any more than their more frequently
participating fellow citizens.
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‘lislricls Ilie coiiliicis li,ul no slalisi,
llie probabiliiy ol'tuinoui n
itislically significant cITect on
(Vaiucn, voles Among
,nnc.,uem voles, however
'here ,s a rhslmc, elVee, ,n Maryland, Ihree eonlaels n,creased an ndrermen, vrders
clKince onurnou, hy nearly 7% In Lennsylvania, Ihe „rol.alnl„y ol Unnou, among
."'Veriuen, volers increased Iry 5.6% will, Ihe add,Mon ol Unee conlaCs, Cal.lo.ma
•shows II,e g,ea.e,s, d, lie, cnee w„h ihe ,ece„„ ol ilnee coniacis
,„c,eas,ng il,e
.nohalnlny
orinmonl hy nearly 12% aniong
,nlVer|„enl voles,
7.6 ( oiicliisioii
All coniacis aie „ol ceiled equal r-iven w,ll, dishrcl dilleences in Ihe ,e,sulls
emerging Iron, each model enough genealizalions emegc lo skelcl, an onilme ol lhe
relalionsinp helween dneci conlaci and vole, ,n„,o„l The sinpiise ,s no, lhal Ihe
di.sl,res .show vanalion ,„ each mdividnal model h„i lhal disliicis as dilleenl as Ihe ones
under study show any pallein at all
nearly, lelephone elToils woik heller al inceasing Inirionl lhan does mail In
l'ailiie,ss lo mail, il is designed lo pei.snade vole, nol lo Inn, Ihem onl In Ihis lighi,
phones aie only doing Ihe, joh I lowevci, one mighi Ihink lhal Ihe inciease in polilical
inlonnalion alone would inciea.se Innionl. Il does nol appear lo do ,so. I'hone calls
woik heller al increasing liirnonl no mailer wlial Ihe purpose ol'lhe conlaci, Door-lo
-dooi ellorl.s, which niighi he expecled lo he poweifnl liirnonl lools, do nol have a
positive atTecI at all
( ontaels are also more potent al increasing liirnoiil to the extent which they
oiler the chance for more dramatic presentation Positive character pieces and negative
rillacks aie slionger engines ol liiiiioiil lhan issue communications Likewise, Ihe
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communication has more ofan effect on tuinoui when it comes from the incumbent.
Voters prefer the devil they know on election day and they ntr.t
the familiar devil's communications as well.
must be more motivated by
All voters are not created equal For younger voters and mlVequent voters the
receipt of campaign contacts has a discernible mob.lization etfect. Older voters, and
those with a history, of past election participation, have already so developed the habit
of voting that candidate communication has little if any impact on their probability of
turnout.
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CHAPTER 8
CAMPAIGNS AND THE HABIT OF VOTING
television, that 3 8 years ago helped construct the myth of another
add'd'-Tte'^etr "f F ^enn dy ' He
:r»rrrr .... r..u.., ...
From Slate Magazine International News Summary 9/22/98
Research over the past forty years has provided a wealth of information on voter
turnout but veot little about what political elites themselves can do to influence that
turnout. Certainly journalists and campaign workers believe that political campaigns
directly affect voter participation I am writing this one day before the 1 998 election
and one consistent stream of commentai^ claims the election hinges on the turnout rates
of Democratic and Republican partisans. But even this line of commentaiy slights the
direct efforts of campaigns. Often, the participation discussion focuses on the effects of
national political stories on people's predisposition to vote. Typically, the analysts will
debate whether the Clinton scandal will increase the turnout of Christian conseiwatives
or loyal Democrats. An alternative scenario has voters on both sides staying home
because they are sick both of scandal and "negative campaigning" in general. Taken to
Its logical extreme this line of thought directly links campaigns to depressed turnout and
implies that if politicians ceased campaigning, turnout would increase. There is a
notion contained within such beliefs that lend power to this chapter’s opening quote.
Modern democracy has become more and more a matter of viewership and not
participation.
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My goal in this project has been to examine the effect of one aspect of
campaigning, direct contact, on voter turnout, and has been
campaigns can make a conscious difference in electoral
participation. In this final chapter I summarize
how they fit into the broader literature on campaigns and voter turnout, I also examine
the project's findings in light of the larger questions posed by the decline
turnout and current trends in campaign finance reform.
motivated by the belief that
outcomes, including
my project's main findings and discuss
of voter
8.1 The Incentive Sirncture of Direct Contact
In chapter three I noted what has come to be called the paradox of voter
participation. Simply put, even though most of the measures associated with turnout are
moving in a direction which would predict an increase in voting, we have actually seen a
decrease in voter turnout. The 1998 elections had the lowest turnout on record.
Running parallel to this is what I call the paradox of voter contact. The evidence
suggests that voter contact increases turnout, especially among low turnout voters.
However, political campaign imperatives provide incentives for campaigns to
concentrate direct contacts on voters already likely to vote. This is the direct contact
version of the rich getting richer.
The logic of campaign targeting arises from a desire to get the right message to
the right people and to do so at the least cost. Both desires lead campaigns to
concentrate their contacts m the hands of likely voters. First, some target groups who
are more likely to vote, like seniors, are also the target of issue specific direct contacts.
Secondly, campaigns try to save money by sending their message to those who have
participated m some combination of past campaigns. Finally, most GOTV efforts are
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outside of the GOTV
directed at partisans, leaving most independents
four dtstncts undet study at least one, and often ntote than one, ofthese target,ng
patterns were present. Seniors, treguen, voters, and party
.nentfters received
direct contacts from campaigns than did
universe. In the
more
younger, mtrequent voting, and independent
voters.
The distribution of contacts would not be an ,ssue if there was l.ttle ground to
believe that contacts were irrelevant to turnout, but that ,s not the case. Direct voter
contact does increase the probability of turnout. The change ,n probabihty for each
single contact is small, ranging from 1%
one contact and the cumulative effect of
to 4% but most campaigns send out more than
a change from zero to three contacts increases
the probability of turnout anywhere front 2% to 7%, Although these numbers ntay seem
small, the vast majority of congressional turnover takes place in elections decided by
similar margins.
Some contacts work better than others at increasing turnout Phones are much
more etfective than are mail or door-to-door etforts and multiple calls more effective
than single calls. Voters appear to respond to prodding. Personal messages, however
delivered, are more ntotivational than are issue pieces. In a number of the districts,
negative mail or phone etforts were particularly effective in increasing turnout The
ttirnout effect of direct contact is about the same for Republicans and Democrats but a
decided edge goes to incumbents over challengers.
All voters do not respond the same way to direct contact. The probability of
turnout tor voters thirty and under increases by an average of 6% for every three
contacts received but, for voters 55 and over, that same number of contacts only
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increases the probability of turnout by an average of 2,5%.
when looking at frequent and infrequent voters. Infrequent
A similar pattern is found
voters, defined as those
probabtlity of voting for every three contacts recetved Frequent voters show r
average increase of 1%. Campaigns can tncrease turnout and they can most
,
turnout among those least likely to vote.
an
increase
8.2 Implications for Research
Research on voting behavior has concentrated on voter resources and
characteristics. The act of voting is seen as a function of a voter's wealth or age or
informatton resources or sense of political efficacy. However, such explanations do
little to explain why. when most measures associated with higher turnout have
increased, voter turnout has decreased; or why. despite the relative consistency of such
factors from cycle to cycle, turnout varies. This study provides some grounds for
arguing that the actions of political elites need to be included in any model seeking to
explain the fluctuations, be they temporal or spatial, of voter turnout. The use of voter
files for this type of research is invaluable. Researchers looking to isolate and test the
efficacy of campaign activities should contact campaigns ahead of time and secure their
agreement to participate in the study. Early vendor interviews, especially with the
telemarketing companies, will insure that data will be saved. Campaign cooperation
will allow the researcher to collect contextual information like TV, Radio, and direct
contact expenditures. Telemarketing cooperation will allow the researcher to measure
the actual contact record tor each individual voter and measure that contact record
against voter turnout. Most telemarketing companies maintain each response next to
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the voter record including records for bad number, disconnects, and retlised. If
precinct voting returns a link could also be
combined with survey information and
explored between candtda.e choice and cantpatgn acivities^ Not only would ,nore
research involving the use of voter files establish links between cantpaign act.vities and
turnout, it would also provide more
.nformat.on about which voters are left out of the
information delivery process.
Researchers should add direct contact informat,on to historical models of voter
turnout. Research ,n.o past elect,ons cycles might show that direct contact expenditure
IS related to voter turnout fluctuations. It is at least suggest,ve that turnout decline
parttally overlaps the rise of the candidate-centered media campaign and the dechne of
the party-voter-mobihzation parad,gm. Voter files represent an especially rich and
diverse data set for the tracking of direct campaign effects and allow for the one to one
linking of campaign action to voting behavior.
Finally, any detailed study of actual campaign activity exposes the paucity of
spending data. It is common for researchers to plead for "more and better" data while
obhv,ous to the costs of data collection at the source. As one who has filled out far too
many FEC forms I could not, in good conscience, call for much added complexity. Still,
it is surprising that more scholars have not waded into the expenditure jungle.
Currently, only the Morris data presents a detailed picture of campaign expenditure
based on FEC data. Such research might be greatly facilitated by simply adding a
category code next to each expenditure entry. Additionally, the FEC might attempt to
computerize expenditure data. This is no doubt a massive task but certainly smaller in
scale than the entry of all donors. There are a lot more donors than vendors. Perhaps
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one explanation for reform's focus on fundraising is the ready data a
campaign donations. Better expenditure data will flesh
vailable on
campaigns by detailing outflow as well as inflow.
ouf the issues surrounding
8.3 Implications for Reform
In 1980 there were 204 firms openly devoted to makutg ntoney in some part of
the political campaign process. The 1 996 Carol Hess political resource dtrectoo- names
3500. The growth of campaign professionahsm and the professional marketing of
candidates is not a new development so much as a rapidly accelerating one. As early as
1937 John Dewey was worried about issues being determined by ” habit, party funds,
the skill of managers of the machine, the portrait of a candidate with his firm jaw, his
lovely wife and children, and a multitude of other irrelevancies, determine the issues."
Distaste tor organized, electoral politics is a part of a deep and longstanding distrust of
politicians in general. One hundred years before Dewey's comment, a folk song, later
adapted by Aaron Copeland as a t|uintessential American statement, presents a musically
cynical chant to campaign and candidate trustworthiness:
Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes a well known dodger.
Yes the candidate's a dodger,
Yes and I'm a dodger too.
He'll meet you and treat you
And ask you for your vote.
But look out boys.
He's a-dodgin for a note.'®^
Today, the timeless concern over the power and morality of politicians, melds
with concern over the state of campaign politics, its techniques, and the consultants who
Intciricw with Cnrol Hess; Mnrch 3, 1996
Dewey, John. The Puhtic audits Prohleins. (Alliens, OH Swallow Press, 1927) p 122
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bring expertise ,o bear on ,he process. The ent.re polihcal process is viewed with
d.s,as,e by a majority of Americans, Critiques of campaigning concentrate on the evils
and influence of money and wha, are often seen to be vacuous campaign messages.
Many campaign reformers would have the electorate believe that politicians are
bought and sold and that improvement requires some combination of less money and
more governmental regulation. There is no doubt the many campaigns are unsavo^.
Nor IS there any doubt that any system of campaign financing will lead to abuse. What
IS missing in many reform arguments is any appreciation of the utilitarian side of
campaigns in a democratic system. The absence of a notion of the campaign's role in
democracy is analogous to the absence of empirical research into campaigns. The
rallying cry of "get money out of politics" ignores the very function of money within
politics.
This research suggests that at least one function of money, as funneled through
campaigns, is to increase voter turnout, a goal shared by reformers as well as defenders
of the status quo. Clearly, elite mobilization efforts account for at least some of the
variation m turnout from district to district or election cycle to election cycle. Although
It may sound trite, campaigns are, at least partially, about communication. The logic
of the argument is simple. Elections are arenas in which candidates, working within
given limits, try to communicate their beliefs and capacities to voters. The exact effects
of communication, and how they work, are debatable, but, at least in this paper, some
forms of those communications, in some circumstances, increase voter turnout.
Communication costs money. To call all of the households within a
Massachusetts state representative district one time would cost $20,000. To send all
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eholds 111 that same distiicl a letter would cost approximately $ 1 7,000. A recently
approved Massachusetts initiative imposes a spending cap on Representative districts of
$30,000 ($ 1 8,000 for the prima^, where there are almost no races, and $ 1 2,000 for the
general) Even if a campaign put all $30,000 into direct contact, assuming a campaign
could be run without a paid manager, lawyer, or accountant, that campaign could not
even send two pieces of mail or make two phone calls to district voters. This is
especially devastating in light of the data in this study suggesting that only multiple
campaign contacts increase turnout
The argument that campaigns are forms of communication, and that
communication costs money, seems unexceptionable, but is in fact, heretical. It seems
to lead to the conclusion that money is good and the more money the better.
Alternatively, it focuses attention not so much on the sheer amount of money, so much
as the need for some minimum amount of funding which will allow challengers and
incumbents alike to communicate their issues, and display their character, to voters. It
proceeds from the assumption that campaigns have a valuable role in educating and
turning out voters. The question that arises from the argument is not how to get money
out of politics so much as to how money can best be regulated to produce electorally
desirable results.
The notion of "electorally desirable results" is not one that gets a lot of detailed
attention in campaign reform discussions. Although this is not the place to develop a
theory of electoral democracy 1 would suggest that the notion of "clean and fair"
This is assiiniing paid plioncs and dircci mail Presumably, vohmlccrs could make literature
drops and provide phoners for calling. This reliance on volunteers merely reinforces the already
overwhelming strenght of incumbeuts who can cultivate a core group of volunteers year round through
constituent work.
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elections is but one critenon. Others, which are equally i.uporta„t, include a process
which facihtates turnout and electoral change. From th,s perspective the linritat.on of
campaign money - and, in a related manner, the fonneling of campaign money to purely
persuasive mediums instead of more turnout specific method, may serve to decrease
turnout. Secondly, the restriction of campaign money also violates the notion that
elections need to facilitate electoral change. In a world of incumbent advantage, and
this study extends that advantage to the efficacy of incumbent communications, suggests
that real challengers need to outspend incumbents just to stay even,'« Any reform
which limits spending benefits incumbents. In a world of zero spending, the better
known candidate with a constituent service based organization will win.
This study suggests that restricting campaign spending may harm campaign
efforts to turn out voters. If increased turnout is the goal, then policies that encourage
campaign spending on direct contact efforts are warranted. This notion of encouraging
the right kind of campaign spending is captured in a New York Times article on soft
money. Congressman Albert Winn of Maryland, is quoted as saying. "Soft money has
helped drive my voter programs. If we didn't have that money I'm sure the turnout in
my district would go down,'"* Winn's district is largely African-American and has
proven in the past to be a low turnout area. The picture of soft money doing what it
was originally designed to do, increase turnout through voter programs and build local
party strength, is quite diflerent from the prevailing view where soft money has become
shorthand for political corruption, Frank Sorauf rightly calls soft money "a term of epic
There are numerous studies which show the enormous fundraising advantages of incumbents.
See Paul Herrnson, Congressional Elections,', or Sorauf, Money in Congressional Elections.
New York Times, June 8, 1998. National Edition Page A 12.
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imprecision" but in one of its incarnations it was intended to facilitate party GOTV
efforts. Current reform discussions should focus less on eliminating soft money and
more on redirecting it back to its original intent.
If, even for a moment, one can accept the assumption that certain kinds of
campaign spending are beneficial to democracy, then systemic reforms will aim to make
the beneficial activities cheaper relative to the alternatives. However, in almost no
discussion of campaign reform is direct contact discussed. In fact, many proposals, by
limiting spending, making ftindraising more difficult, and providing access to free TV
time will actually decrease the incentives to engage in direct contact at all.
In addition to the two general proposals suggested above, encouraging more
campaign spending and redirecting soft money back to its original purpose, 1 propose
the following specific topics for discussion in light of this study's findings.
I) Reduce postage costs. The largest single cost of any direct mailing is often
postage. Campaign reformers often suggest that privately owned radio and television
stations provide free air time. Why not the federal government’’ Reduced postage
would decrease the cost of direct contact vis a vis television and radio and reduce the
pressure to target mailings to smaller groups. It would broaden the use of direct
contact while, at the same time, broaden direct contact targeting. Reduced cost postage
will also give challengers the same benefit as incumbents who make good political use
of franked mail. Franked mail is restricted to non-political uses but incumbents often
target franked mail just like voter mail and use gender, age, and even voter history to
make sure the right message gets into the right hands.
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2) Increase
.he number of election day phone calls. In ,h,s study phoning
proved the most effective direct contact turnout medium yet 67% of the voters in the
study received no GOTV contact at a„. How m.gh, the campaign system he statctured
to make more phone calls to voters before or on election day7 There are a number of
possibilities, ofvaiying political plausibility, ranging from reducing the cost of phoning
through selective tax reduction, subsidy, and legislative fiat to providing parties and
organizations with fiinds for GOTV, Some organizations, like Project Vote, already
make non-partisan GOTV calls to increase turnout Surely this kind of activity would
benefit from government subsidy. As the internet slowly becomes a viable political tool
and e-mail takes its place as a voter contact method, will it to favor those already likely
to vote or can incentives be constructed to insure a more widespread message delivery?
Finally, why not have a governmental system in place which makes election day calls
reminding people of their duty to vote^ This type of program, while technically simple
and cheap, is political dynamite Still, the notion ofgovernment using effective
techniques to increase turnout is worth debate and again, the increasing reach of e-mail
provides another cheap and simple method of governmental communication. There is no
suggestion that government sponsored TV ads do anything to increase voter turnout.
3) Make sure the data is readily available to all candidates Voter files are
at the intersection where the information requirements of democracy meet privacy
concerns. Before every election 1 get a few phone calls from people who have traced a
campaign phone call back to my firm's voter list. We try to remove the person's name
from our file. Still, this begs the question as to whether, in a democracy, people have
the same right to avoid a political communication as they do a marketing initiative. This
192
is siso reUued lo the nolio,, ol' unlisted phone nun,bets. In sotne pa„s of, he eounbs,
25% of nil nun,he, s n, e units,ed - Tins witiKh nwnI n„o the p. ivate , eal,„, while
understandable, removes huge parts of the populaee fron, a type of pohtieal
eonununicat.on proven elfeCve n, me, easing voter turnout fins prtvaey issue is also
played out over access to vote, lile. So.ne states resbret the access to the tile or linn,
the data available. Any additional costs Iron, ,'estricted access are inevitably passed on
to campaigns and reduced party and campaign GOTV eirorts.
I he modern campaign takes place in a deafening arena. My son's third word
(whether the first was mama cm dada is a matter of dispute) was french f,-y. I low many
McDonald's commercials did he see before the age of twc)-^ 1 low do eampaigns, with
their comparatively minor resources, expended in a compressed time frame, get heard
above the dm? What is it they can do to help further at least one goal common to any
democratic electoral system, that of widening participation'^ This study suggests that
by calling and mailing voters, especially those who need to begin to develop the habit of
voting, they can widen participation. Unfortunately, the current logic of our electoral
system leads candidates away from broad based direct contact elTorts and toward either
the electronic media or highly targeted direct contact etTorts. The money that does go
to diiect contact is olten spent on persuasion mail I’hose resources that do go to
GOTV aie not always directed at those voters who need the biggest nudge to the polls.
Finally, the current political atmosphere is one where it is more likely that the amount of
A rcporl by Siincy Sampling orCoimccticul, (('lioosing between Directory Listed and t^andoin
Digit Sampling in Light of New Demographic Findings, May 19, I9K9, conference report) comparing
listed and unlisted number households shows that unlisted numbers cluster among high and low incomes.
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campaign spending will be restricted with a concomitant decrease in the ability of
political elites to do what little they can to increase voter turnout.
This study indicates that campaign communication increases turnout. Of special
note is the util.ty of phone calls at tncreasing turnout among younger, tnfrequent voters
- and some evidence the multiple calls are more effective than a single call. This type
of campaign communication may well be the most effective tool politicians have at their
disposal to spread the habit of voting throughout the electorate. It may well be that the
critics are right and that the content of campaign communication is often empty and
misleading, but it is information none the less, Isaiah Berlin once said that there was
no guarantee that, once found, truth would be interesting. The same is true of campaign
communication. The desire for democracy is nearly universal but no one said that,
once realized, it would be intellectually edifying. Our politicians do have tools at their
disposal which can widen citizen participation. We should spend less time on taking
those tools out of the hands of political elites and more time structuring a system that
encourages their correct use.
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appendix a
DEFINITION OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND ISSUE CONTACTS
Differentiating positive, negative, and issue contacts was a two steDDroce^s Fire, „ .
script or mailing was examined for issue content. If a specific issue, or group of issues’the primary topic of discussion, the contact was defined was as an issue contact.
’
If the prmary topic of discussion was the background, history, or experience of one of theWO can idates, the piece was not considered an issue contact. If the communicationfocused on the opponents background, history or experience, or if the communication wascomparison between personal characteristics to the advantage of the campaignproducing the communication, it was defined as “negative."
If tlie primary topic of discussion was the background, history, or experience of the
candidate issuing the communication, it was considered "positive". GOTV calls which did
not criticize the opponent, or raise an issue question were considered positive as ^11
Most of the mailings, phone calls, and door-to-door scripts fell clearly into one of the
above categories. Some of the contacts mentioned both a candidate's accomplishments
and an opponents opposition to those accomplishments. Such pieces often called
"comparative" are a gray area. For purposes of this study, if the primary graphic or the
weight of the text, emphasized issues, it was coded as an issue piece. If the primary
graphic or the weight of the text emphasized candidate characteristics, it was coded as
positive or negative.
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW DOCUMENTS
Document 1: Before interviewing anyone associated with the
each candidate sign the letter listed below.
campaign 1 requested that
Mike Hannahan
P.O. Box 43
Amherst, MA 01004-0043
Dear Mr. Hannahan;
This letter gives your permission to study
election cycle.
my campaign that took place during the 1
9
IS my understanding that you are researching the campaigns voter contact efforts and
will focus your research on direct mail, voter id, and GOTV. I also understand that I willbe allowed to review the written material before it is submitted for publication and request
any changes that may affect future campaigns.
Sincerely,
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.. i.».i.., i. “rrL‘,£w"" " -
Thursday, November 05, 1998
<Contact:26>
<Company:25>
<Address 1:27>
<Address 2:28>
<Address 3:29>
<City;30>, <State;31> <Zip:32>
<Country:33>
Dear <Salutation:40>;
Thank you for agreeing to speak with me about your campaign. I wanted to write and
sZmhir mo'-e
The purpose ofmy research is to examine the effects of direct voter contact. I def.ne
irect voter contact as any non-fundraising contact to an individual voter for the purposes
of persuasion or GOTV. Direct voter contact includes door to door efforts, mail aTd
p one calls. For a variety of reasons 1 am concentrating on efforts that took place from
July 1 until the election.
I intend to collect information on each individual contact. After collecting the information
Will code the data back onto a current voter file and examine the effects direct contact
had on turnout and persuasion.
To accomplish this I need to discuss each individual piece of mail or GOTV call. I
understand that detailed information is hard to recall after a few years but anything that
can be provided will be helpful. I will be reviewing campaign expenditure forms from the
FEC because the line item details of such reports may often be helpful in filling in
specifics.
The questions will cover the following general areas;
-What was your role in the campaign?
-Who were the other key campaign players?
-What were some key campaign target groups?
-How did you feel about the race at the beginning?
-Did any other groups do direct contact on your behalf?
-Did you do any door to door efforts?
-Did you make any Voter ID, Persuasion, or GOTV phone calls?
-Did you make use of persuasion mail?
197
dtStnt/e;;;?^ ‘° ‘'"“ "'^ types of i„fon™tio„ abou, each
foy;:cirs:eirdi:rs^^^^^^^ , *.„ p™he
group, or other targeting variables.
registration date, gender, ethnic
-How many pieces did this group receive^
Tn k' ^ or phone calH"When did the contact occur?
It might help if you had around your office any of the following information
-Direct mail plans
—GOTV plans
-Sample mail pieces, phone scripts, or Door to Door scripts
-Polling information
"Names of people responsible for the work
-Names of people involved with the party or independent expenditure groups
Overall, I think the Initial interview will take about one hour. After that Ito complete the project with follow-up phone calls.
hope to be able
I look forward to speaking with you. Thank you again for your time and cooperation.
Sincerely,
Mike Hannahan, Vice President, Voter Contact Services
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List of Interview Subjects:
Maryland Congressional District 05:
George Nesterchuck, Campaign Manager, Devine for CongressDr. Donald Devine, Candidate ^
Corey Alexander, Campaign Manager, Hoyer for CongressDon Powe.l, Operations Director, Telemark Inc. (Hoyer Phones
Ohio Congressional District 01:
Shannon Jones, Campaign Manager, Chabot for Congress
Jeff Herding, Campaign Manager, Mann for Congress
Jeff Rusnak, Vice President. Burges and Burges (Mann Mail)
Brewster Rhoads, Political Consultant (Mann Targeting)
Pennsylvania Congressional District 21:
Bob Holste, Campaign Manager, English for Congress
Bill Peduto, Campaign Manager, DiNicola for Congress
Steve Meyers, SCM Associates (English Mail)
Jack Zadow, Grassroots Direct (English Phones)
Jim Thompson, Political Director, COPE
California Congressional District 01:
Beau Phillips, Campaign Manager, Riggs for Congress
Paul Maslin, Hickman, Maslin, Maulin (Alioto Pollster)
Harvey Hukari, Hukari Associates (Riggs Mail)
Donna Patterson, Patterson and Associates (get new name)
Shellie Garrett, Garret and Associates (Riggs Targeting)
Paul Ambrosino, Ambrosino and Muire (Alioto Mail)
Tom Pier, Campaign Manager, Alioto for Congress
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Section 1. Involvement;
Name:
Date of interview:
What was your role in the campaign?
How long did you have that role?
Who was your pollster?
Who was your fundraising consultant?
Who was your direct mail consultant?
Did any one else work as a consultant on the campaign? Who? What was their role
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Section 2: The campaign overall.
In July, what was your horserace figure?
What was your favorability?
Your Opponents?
What was your name id?
Your Opponents?
Can you summarize m a few words what you needed to do to win?
What groups did you target for persuasion?
What groups did you target for turnout?
Why did you target particular groups for persuasion?
Why did you target particular groups for turnout?
If you can remember, what did you think your chances of winning were in July?
1. Poor
2. Fair
3. Good
4. Excellent
5. No answer
Section 3: Direct Mail Section:
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What Did you use any direct mail in the campaign?
Lets talk about the direct mail part of your campaign?
How many pieces did you send?
To how many different target audiences?
What were those target audiences?
How many pieces did each audience get?
What did you feel about the role of direct mail in your campaign?
What percentage of your budget was spent on direct mail?
What did you feel about the role of GOTV in your campaign?
What percentage of your budget do you think was spent on GOTV?
How many different pieces did you send out?
Now lets talk about each individual contact
RACE:
Contact Information Form:
Date of recording:
Recorded by:
Contact name or description:
Approximate date contact was made:
Contact purpose: Persuasion Id GOTV Other
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Specifically, what did you hope this contact would accomplish?
Contact type: Mail Phone Door to Door Other
Target of contact: (describe in detail and PROBE for)
PROBE for:
Party
Age
Voter History
Geography (precinct, town, county, other)
Precinct targeting analysis (persuadables, turnout etc)
Registration date
Gender
Ethnic Group
Group membership
Who designed the piece of mail (or script, or door-to-door program)
PROBE for:
Direct Mail consultant
Phone Bank Firm (or volunteers)
Direct mail house:
Voter file vendor:
Do you have a sample of the mailing (script for the phone call or door to door)
Was the same piece sent to the same universe again? Yes No
If so, how often?
Would you describe the contact as a Name ID Issue Negative
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Other
Did the eontact win any awards? Yes No
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appendix c
ELECTORAL AND SPENDING EIISTORY
Table A.l: Ohio CD 01: 1994
Year Rep.
1990
Candidate
1992
1^. UldCKWt^il
S. Grote*
1994 S. Chabot
Grote
$278,294
Table A.2: Maryland CD 05: 1994
Table A.3: Pennsylvania CD 21: 1996
Year
1996
Rep.
Candidate
1990
1992
Tom Ridge
1994
Tom Ridge
Phil English
Phil English
Dem
Candidate
None
John Harkin
Bill Leavens
Ron DiNicola
Rep Percent
68%
49%
51%
Dem Percent
32%
47%
49%
Rep Spending
$361,712
$705,861
$450,795
$1,262,645
Dem
Spending
$15,800
$465,190
$478,871
Table A.4: California CD 01: 1996
Year
1990
Rep.
Candidate
F Riggs (1)
Dem Candidate
D Bosco
Rep Percent
43%
Dem Percent
42%
Rep Spending
$251,662
Dem
Spending
‘R.in 9
1
1992
1994
F. Riggs (1)
F. Riggs
D Hamburg
D. Hamburg (1)
45%
53%
48%
47%
$716,401
$605 185
$647,532
1996 F Riggs (iO M. Alioto 50% 43% $1,390,399 $1,228,870
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BASE MODEES
Ta^ble A.5: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter Histo^, Party, and Contacts:
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
N 11333. PercentaQe of Cases Correctiv Predirterl 77®/ —
00, ,e«l,
-s«„„ica„, a, 05 ,e.e, Beginning Log Likelihood
Table A.6: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter Histoiy, Party, and Contacts:
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient*
0.09*
0.82*
0 . 01 *
-0.3*
-0.34*
-1.54*
SE
.Exp (B)
0.01 1.09
0.01 2.27
0.01 1.01
0,06 0.74
0.11 0.71
-srg'nton,
13470.
^'gniricant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model
Table A.7: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts: PA
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
0.03*
0.63*
0 . 01 *
0.05*
0.31-
-0.96
SE
0.02
0.02
0.07
0.07
0.08
Exp (B)
1.02
1.87
1.01
1.05
1.36
N=14974. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
-73%. Model Chi Sq 3040.91 with 5 degrees of freedom.'** Not
Significant. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14269.
Table A.8: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:CA
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts 0.15* 0.0065 1 16Voter History 0.7* 0,0174 2Age 0.003** 0.0034 1Democratic -.1010***
0.0589 0 9Republican 0.411* 0.0631 1 5Constant
-1.27
*Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 Level
Likelihood with model 16318.
*Not Significant. Beginning Log Likelihood 14848. -2 Log
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Table A.9: Causes of Voter Turnout
Combined file
by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contaacts:
N=22830
^
n/uuwimoaeQ
ign,ficanl to the 001 level Beginning Log Likelihood 23266, -2 Log Likelihood with model 18560
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models by contact type and voter subgroup
Tables for GOTV/Persuasion/Idcntification (Table 7.1)
Table A.IO: Causes of Voter Turnout with TOTV/p •OH ^OTV/PersuasionA^oter Identification:
RTJnn I ‘Significant to the .001 levelg mg og Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11246.
Exp (B)
0.054
1 17
0.044
1 23
0.041
n fi4
0.028
2 17~
0.001
n ri7R
1.01
0.089
2.9
4 06
0.07
‘Significant to the .01 level
Table All: Causes
MD
of Voter Turnout with GOTV/PersuasionWoter Identification:
N~1 31 70. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74%.
17264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 13438.
Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood
Table A.12: Causes of Voter Turnout with GOTV/Persuasion/Voter Identification:
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)TypeGOTV *-0 181 0.037 0Type ID *0.472
0.061
1 6Type Pers 0.038 0.022 1 0'^Voter History *0.612
0.016 1 fi4Age *0.013
0.001 1 01Democratic
-0.125 0.08 0 882Republican *0.538 0.083 1 71Constant *-1.03
0.081
N=14280. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%. ‘Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood
17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14196.
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Table A.13:
CA
Causes „f v„(er Turnout with (;OTV/l>ersuasion/Votcr Identification:
N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
- 79%Log Likelihood with model 12577
Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 16318.
Tables for Mail/Phone/Door-To-Door (Table 7.1)
Table A.14 Causes of Voter Turnout
Total Contacts: OH
with Mail/Phone/Door to Door Included for
leJ Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 76.74%. . ‘Significant to the .001 level,eginning og Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11268. ‘Significant to the .001
•» »"o^ included for
Variable
Mail
Phone
Door to Door
Voter History
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
‘0.189
‘0.825
‘0.011
‘0.333
*-0.661
‘-1.73
-0.096
0.004
SE
0.029
0.052
0.05
0.019
0.001
0.064
0.129
0.105
Exp (B)
1.2
0.908
1
2.28
1.01
0.716
0.516
,.^'“^;centage of Cases Correctl, Predicted - 74%.
-Sigrtificant to the .001 level Beginning Log Likelihood 1 7264
-2 Log Likelihood with model 13443.
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'Significant to the .05 level.
N=14280. Percentage o, Cases Correct,, Predicted - 74 ,4%.
-Slgnlticant to the 00, level
Beginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14191.
to Door Included for
N=13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted
-790/0.
‘Significant to the 001 levelBeginning Log Likelihood 16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12577.
'Significant to the .05 level
Tables for Positive/Negative/Issue (Table 7.2)
Table A.I8: Causes of Voter Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts:
Variable
Voter History
Positive
Negative
Issue
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
*0.782
*0.197
**-0.18
**-0.134
*0.012
*1.05
*1.34
*-2.07
SE
0.027
0.037
0.067
0.056
0.001
0.074
0.078
0.071
Exp (B)
N 11333. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 76.14%. ‘Significant to the .001 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 15540. -2 Log Likelihood with model 11247.
2.18
1.21
0.829
0.874
1.01
2.86
3.84
‘Significant to the .01 level
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Table A 19: Causes of
MD voter turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contacts:
N-13170. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted 74 ido/ ,
-Significan,
,.e 05 ,e.e, Beginning Log LiLe.ihood
.g
Table A.20: Causes of Vo.er Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contaets:
N 14280 Percentage Of Cases Correctly Predicted - 75%. ‘Significant to the 001 levelBeginning Log Likelihood 17310. -2 Log Likelihood with model 14070.
‘Significant to the .05 level
Table A 21; Causes of Voter Turnout with Positive, Negative, and Issue Contaets;
Variable
Voter History
Positive
Negative
Issue
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
-0.161
‘0.247
‘0.168
‘0
‘0.332
-1.06
0.688
-0.086
SE
N-1 3999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%.
16318. -2 Log Likelihood with model 12546.
0.017
0.028
0.011
0 015
0.001
0.06
0.065
0.079
-Exp (B)
1.99
0.85
1.28
1.18
1
0.917
1.39
‘Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood
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Tables for Republican and Democrat/Incumbent/Challenger
(Table 7.3)
fable A.23: Causes of Voter Turnout Party ami Status of Candidate: Ml)
N=13131. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74 15%. ‘Significant to the 001 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 1 7264. -2 Log Likelihood with model 1 3468.
‘Significant to the .01 level
Table A.24: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: PA
N=14280 Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73,24%
-51901110301 to tire .001 leyel "Sigoilioaol to 10. 01 le,el
Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 17310, -2 Log Likelihood with model 14228.
Table A.25: Causes of Voter Turnout Party and Status of Candidate: CA
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Republican Candidate ‘0.167
0.01
-
1 18Democrat Candidate ‘0.137
0.01 1 14Voter History ‘0.685 0.018 1 98Age “‘0.002
0.001
'IDemocratic
-0.109 0.059 0 896Republican ‘0.372 0.066 1 45Constant ‘-1.33 0.075
N-13999. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. ‘Significant to the .001 level, “‘Significant to the 05 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 16318 -2 Log Likelihood with model 12672.
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Tables for Age Cohorts (Table 7.4)
Table A.26: Causes of Voter Turnout bv Aee
55 Plus OH ^ K ’ Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Variable Coefficient
Total Contacts 0.058“
Voter History 0.86‘
Age
-0.013‘
Democratic 1.03‘
Republican 1.7‘
Constant
-0.673‘
N 2649. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 82%. ‘Significant to the
Beginning Log Likelihood 3162. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2219.
-Exp (B)
0.023
0.056
0.005
0.164
0.189
0.397
1.06
2.36
0.987
2.82
5.47
.001 level. “Significant to the .01 level
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
-0.013
0.656
0.005
1.1
1.33
-1.81
N-2705. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 73%,
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2930.
SE
0.022
0.054
0.014
0.158
0.128
0.342
Exp (B)
0.986
1.92
3.01
3.78
‘Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3454.
Table A.28: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts*
55 Plus MD
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts “0.11 0.046 1 11
Voter History ‘0.841 0.037 2 31Age ‘-0.037 0.005 0 96
Democratic “-0.59 0.18 0 55
Republican ‘-0.64 0.265 0 52
Constant ‘1.68 0.405
^3247 Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 80%. ‘Significant to the .001 level. ‘‘Significant to the 01 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 3470. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2713.
Table A.29: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
30 and Under MD
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts 0.022 0.05 1.02
Voter History ‘0.694 0.05 2
Age “‘0,03 0.013 1.03
Democratic 0.047 0.134 1.04
Republican 0.236 0.26 1.26
Constant ‘-2. 31 0.36
N=2530. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 72%. ‘Significant to the .001 level. “‘Significant to the .05 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 3276. -2 Log Likelihood with model 2945.
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Table A.30:
55 Plus PA
Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
SignSioanttotte 001 te,e7
-2 Log Likelihood with model 3251. Beginning Log Likelihood 4125.
Table A.31: Causes of Voter Turnout
30 and Under PA
by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
N 2807. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74.14%.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 3739
Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3861
« and Contacts:55 Plus CA
Variable Coefficient SE ExD fB1Total Contacts ‘0.15
0.015 1 16Voter History ‘0.783
0.032 9 1ftAge ‘-0.027
0.004 0 97Democratic 0.228 0.153 1 25Republican ‘0.78 0.354 2 18Constant 0.287 0.353
N=4566. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 87%. ‘Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3980
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2970.
Table A.33: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
30 and Under CA
Variable Coefficient SE sQXLU
Total Contacts ‘0.158 0.014 1.17
Voter History ‘0.402 0.048 1.49
Age ‘-0.05 0.013 0.95
Democratic ‘-0.46 0.119 0.63
Republican 0.1 0.117 1.11
Constant 0.15 0.336
N-21 95. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 63%. ‘Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 3042.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 2803.
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Tables for Frequent and Infrequent voting subgroups
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
*0.64
-0.01
*0.008
1.35
1.76
-1.87
N 5245. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 74%.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 5773.
SE
0.017
0.07
0.002
0.11
0.1
0.1
Exp (B)
0.985
1.89
3.85
5.83
Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6360.
Table A.35: Causes of Voter Turnout by
Infrequent Voters OH
Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Variable Coefficient SE Exd (B1
Total Contacts
-0.013 0.017 0 986Voter History 0.74 0.05 2 09Age 0.01 0.002
1 01Democratic 0.64 0.1 1 9Republican 1.1 0.09 3 01Constant
-1.74 0.16
N 6088. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 79%. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6246
-2 Log Likelihood with model 5436.
Table A.36: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Frequent Voters MD
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts ***0.065 0.031 1.06
Voter History *0.824 0.037 2.27
Age *0.003 0.002 1
Democratic *-0.8 0.146 0.44
Republican *-0.81 0.188 0.44
Constant **-0.57 0.207
N-7229. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 84%.
. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level.
***Significant to the .05 level Beginning Log Likelihood 6388. -2 Log Likelihood with model 5722.
Table A.37: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Infrequent Voters MD
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts *0.102 0.03 1.1
Voter History *0.487 0.06 1.62
Age *0.015 0.002 1.01
Democratic **-0.227 0.075 0.79
Republican -0.27 0.157 0.75
Constant *-1.64 0.121
N=5927. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 63%. . *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the .01 level.
Beginning Log Likelihood 7894. -2 Log Likelihood with model 7680.
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Table A.38: Causes of Voter Turnout
Frequent Voters PA
by Age, Voter History, Part>, and Contacts:
N=8340. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 860/0.
‘Significant to the .001 level.
“Significant to the 01 level
Significant to the .05 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 6664. -2 Log Likelihood with model 6078.
Table A.39: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter
Infrequent Voters PA
History, Party, and Contacts:
Variable
Total Contacts
Voter History
Age
Democratic
Republican
Constant
Coefficient
*0.074
*0.245
*0.007
*0.271
-0.03
-0.721
SE
0.021
0.05
0.001
0.08
0.08
N-5940. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 56%. *Significant to the .001 level.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 8105.
Exp (B)
1.07
1.27
0.96
1.31
Beginning Log Likelihood 8218.
Table A.40: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts-
Frequent Voters CA
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts **0.036
0.05 1 03Voter History *0.935 0.012 2 54Age *0.01 0.002 1 01Democratic 0.154 0.109 1 16
Republican *0.389 0.116 1 47
Constant *-1.7 0.194
N-7985. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 89%. *Significant to the .001 level. **Significant to the 01 level
Beginning Log Likelihood 5482. -2 Log Likelihood with model 4901.
Table A.41: Causes of Voter Turnout by Age, Voter History, Party, and Contacts:
Infrequent Voters CA
Variable Coefficient SE Exp (B)
Total Contacts *0.197 0.008 1.21
Voter History *0.41 0.057 1.5
Age 0.002 0.002 1
Democratic *-0.24 0.07 0.78
Republican *0.39 0.07 1.47
Constant *-1.34 0.09
N-6014. Percentage of Cases Correctly Predicted - 66%.
. *Significant to the .001 level. Beginning Log Likelihood 8330.
-2 Log Likelihood with model 7556.
216
APPENDIX F
DISTRICT MAPS AND REGISTRATION FIGURES
The district is within Hamilton County
Ohio and contains the towns listed
below. Cincinnati has 47% of the voters
OH CONGRESS (U) = 01
COUNTY / CITY TOTAL REP DEM IND
VOTERS VOTERS VOTERS VOTERS
31 02 CHEVIOT CITY 5968 1328 758 3882
31 03 CINCINNATI CIT 173715 19949 36448 117318
31 04 DEER PARK CITY 19 1 3 15
31 05 FOREST PARK Cl 13568 1658 2676 9234
31 11 MT. HEALTHY Cl 4694 887 758 3049
31 12 NORTH COLLEGE 6452 1328 1065 4059
31 15 ST. BERNARD Cl 3426 611 490 2325
31 17 SILVERTON CITY 3787 458 1029 2300
31 23 COLERAIN TOWNS 30198 7344 3765 19089
31 24 COLUMBIA TOWNS 1446 299 288 859
31 26 DELHI TOWNSHIP 20169 6447 2640 11082
31 27 ELMWOOD TOWNSH 1741 214 160 1367
31 29 GLENDALE TOWNS 747 174 172 401
31 30 GOLF MANOR TOW 2385 248 630 1507
31 31 GREENHILLS TOW 2994 904 352 1738
31 32 GREEN TOWNSHIP 39104 14066 4110 20928
31 34 LOCKLAND TOWNS 3145 372 534 2239
31 36 MIAMI TOWNSHIP 3817 808 408 2601
31 37 MIAMI HEIGHTS 4624 1670 397 2557
31 39 SPRINGFIELD TO 22816 5907 3647 13262
31 44 WOODLAWN TOWNS 2203 162 645 1396
31 45 LINCOLN HEIGHT 2567 24 817 1726
31 HAMILTON 349585* 64859* 61792* 222934*
Report Total 349585 64859 61792 222934
Figure 1 Ohio Congressional District 01 : 1994
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COUNTY
02 ANNE ARUNDEL
05 CALVERT
09 CHARLES
17 PRINCE GEORGE'S
19 ST. MARY'S
Report Total
TOTAL REP
VOTERS VOTERS
48639 20559
36971 15330
56001 22735
164771 40884
37939 13848
344321 113356
DEM IND
VOTERS VOTERS
20904 7176
16884 4757
26366 6900
98435 25452
19517 4574
182106 48859
Figure 2. Maryland Congressional District 05: 1994
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COUNTY
10 BUTLER
20 CRAWFORD
25 ERIE
43 MERCER
Report Total
TOTAL REP
VOTERS VOTERS
57127 26988
33165 18088
164024 64401
68239 28165
322555 137642
DEM IND
VOTERS VOTERS
25355 4784
13045 2032
87668 11955
34395 5679
160463 24450
Figures. Pennsylvania Congressional District 21: 1996
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COUNTY
08 DEL NORTE
12 HUMBOLDT
17 LAKE
23 MENDOCINO
2 8 NAPA
48 SOLANO
49 SONOMA
Report Total
TOTAL
VOTERS
12784
78126
29654
46229
63198
68541
31795
330327
REP
VOTERS
4760
24191
10240
13432
22694
22485
11039
108841
DEM
VOTERS
5391
35791
14502
22770
30185
33329
15505
157473
IND
VOTERS
2633
18144
4912
10027
10319
12727
5251
64013
Figure 4. California Congressional District 0 1 : 1 996
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